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Justinian I · The Digest of Justinian §49.8.1.pr-49.8.1.4

Calculation Errors, Invalid Judgments, and Need for Appeal

Passage 8511 of 9271 · Latin

Summary

Macer discusses the effects of a declaration on the existence of a prior judgment, the correction of mathematical errors, the distinction between judgments denying the law and those erring in fact, the invalidity of judgments based on defective peremptory edicts, and the optional nature of appeals in mutual claims.

[MACER libro secundo de appellationibus. ] §49.8.1.prIllud meminerimus: si quaeratur, iudicatum sit nec ne, et huius quaestionis iudex non esse iudicatum pronuntiauerit: licet fuerit iudicatum, rescinditur, si prouocatum non fuerit.
[MACER, On Appeals, Book II] Let us remember this: if it is questioned whether judgment has been passed or not, and the judge of this question pronounces that judgment was not passed: although judgment had been passed, it is rescinded, if no appeal is made.
§49.8.1.1Item si calculi error in sententia esse dicatur, appellare necesse non est: ueluti si iudex ita pronuntiauerit: 'Cum constet Titium Seio ex illa specie quinquaginta, item ex illa specie uiginti quinque debere, idcirco Lucium Titium Seio centum condemno': nam quoniam error computationis est, nec appellare necesse est et citra prouocationem corrigitur.
Likewise, if an error of calculation is said to be in the sentence, it is not necessary to appeal: for example, if the judge has pronounced as follows: "Since it is clear that Titius owes Seius fifty from that category, and likewise twenty-five from that category, therefore I condemn Lucius Titius to pay Seius one hundred": for since it is an error of computation, it is not necessary to appeal and it is corrected without an appeal.
sed et si huius quaestionis iudex sententiam centum confirmauerit, si quidem ideo, quod quinquaginta et uiginti quinque fieri centum putauerit, adhuc idem error computationis est nec appellare necesse est: si uero ideo, quoniam et alias species uiginti quinque fuisse dixerit, appellationi locus est.
But even if the judge of this question has confirmed the sentence of one hundred, if indeed for the reason that he thought fifty and twenty-five make one hundred, it is still the same error of computation and it is not necessary to appeal; but if indeed for the reason that he said there were also other categories amounting to twenty-five, there is room for an appeal.
§49.8.1.2Item cum contra sacras constitutiones iudicatur, appellationis necessitas remittitur.
Likewise, when judgment is given against the imperial constitutions, the necessity of appealing is remitted.
contra constitutiones autem iudicatur, cum de iure constitutionis, non de iure litigatoris pronuntiatur.
But judgment is given against the constitutions when a pronouncement is made concerning the law of the constitution, not concerning the right of the litigant.
nam si iudex uolenti se ex cura muneris uel tutelae beneficio liberorum uel aetatis aut priuilegii excusare, dixerit neque filios neque aetatem aut ullum priuilegium ad muneris uel tutelae excusationem prodesse, de iure constituto pronuntiasse intellegitur: quod si de iure suo probantem admiserit, sed idcirco contra eum sententiam dixerit, quod negauerit eum de aetate sua aut de numero liberorum probasse, de iure litigatoris pronuntiasse intellegitur: quo casu appellatio necessaria est.
For if a judge, to someone wishing to excuse himself from the duty of an office or guardianship by the benefit of children or age or privilege, says that neither children nor age nor any privilege is of avail for excuse from an office or guardianship, he is understood to have pronounced on the established law; but if he has admitted him when proving his right, but has given sentence against him for the reason that he denied that he had proved his age or the number of his children, he is understood to have pronounced on the right of the litigant, in which case an appeal is necessary.
§49.8.1.3Item cum ex edicto peremptorio, quod neque propositum est neque in notitiam peruenit absentis, condemnatio fit, nullius momenti esse sententiam constitutiones demonstrant.
Likewise, when a condemnation is made on a peremptory edict which has neither been posted up nor come to the knowledge of the absent person, the constitutions show that the sentence is of no force.
§49.8.1.4Si apud eundem iudicem inuicem petamus, si et mea et tua petitio sine usuris fuit et iudex me priorem tibi condemnauit, quo magis tu prior me condemnatum habeas: non est mihi necesse pro hac causa appellare, quando secundum sacras constitutiones iudicatum a me petere non possis, priusquam de mea quoque petitione iudicetur.
If we sue each other before the same judge, and if both my claim and yours were without interest, and the judge condemned me to you first, so that you might the more hold me condemned first: it is not necessary for me to appeal for this reason, since according to the imperial constitutions you cannot demand what has been judged from me before judgment is also given concerning my claim.
sed magis est, ut appellatio interponatur.
But it is better that an appeal be interposed.

Notes

  1. §49.8.1.prlicet fuerit iudicatum, rescinditur, si prouocatum non fuerit — This indicates that if no appeal has been made (`si prouocatum non fuerit`) against the declaration that no judgment had been passed, the original judgment is rescinded (`rescinditur`), even if it had actually been passed (`licet fuerit iudicatum`). It explains the procedural effect whereby a failure to appeal allows the new declaration of 'no judgment' to stand as final, thereby extinguishing the prior judgment.
  2. §49.8.1.1sed et si huius quaestionis iudex... — The `huius quaestionis iudex` (the judge of this question) refers to a subsequent judge evaluating the existence of a calculation error (`calculi error`). The text establishes a legal boundary: if the judge's confirmation of the 'one hundred' sentence is based on a pure arithmetical mistake (believing 50+25 equals 100), it is still considered a clerical error and no appeal is required; however, if it is based on a new finding of fact (that there were other categories amounting to 25), it constitutes a substantive decision on fact, making an appeal necessary.
  3. §49.8.1.2contra constitutiones autem iudicatur, cum de iure constitutionis, non de iure litigatoris pronuntiatur — This passage defines the distinction between a judgment directly violating the imperial constitutions (which is void ab initio, thus `remittitur` of the necessity of appeal) and an erroneous but valid judgment that requires an appeal. When a judge denies or misapplies the law itself, it is a pronouncement `de iure constitutionis` and is void; whereas, if the judge accepts the law but errs in verifying factual prerequisites (such as the litigant's age or number of children), it is a pronouncement `de iure litigatoris`, which remains valid unless challenged by a necessary appeal.
  4. §49.8.1.4quo magis tu prior me condemnatum habeas — A clause of purpose introduced by the conjunction `quo` (commonly used with comparatives like `magis`), governing the subjunctive present `habeas` with the perfect participle `condemnatum`. It translates to 'so that you might the more hold me condemned first,' indicating the judge's design in rendering the prior sentence.
  5. §49.8.1.4sed magis est, ut appellatio interponatur — The impersonal phrase `magis est` (it is better, more advisable) followed by an `ut` clause. It indicates a pragmatic counsel by Macer: although from a strict legal standpoint an appeal is not strictly necessary (as the opponent cannot yet execute), it is practically safer and more advisable to interpose an appeal to avoid any potential disputes.

Cite this passage

Justinian I, The Digest of Justinian §49.8.1.pr-49.8.1.4. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:latinLit:phi2806.phi002.humanitext-lat1:49.8.1.pr-49.8.1.4

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