[ULPIANUS libro quadragensimo nono ad Sabinum. ] §45.1.38.prStipulatio ista: 'habere licere spondes?' hoc continet, ut liceat habere, nec per quemquam omnino fieri, quo minus nobis habere liceat.
[ULPIANUS, in the forty-ninth book on Sabinus.] This stipulation: "Do you promise that I shall be allowed to have?" contains this: that it be allowed to have, and that absolutely nothing be done by anyone to prevent us from being allowed to have.
quae res facit, ut uideatur reus promisisse per omnes futurum, ut tibi habere liceat: uidetur igitur alienum factum promisisse, nemo autem alienum factum promittendo obligatur, et ita utimur.
This circumstance causes the promisor to appear to have promised that it will be secured through everyone that you be allowed to have. It seems, therefore, that he has promised the act of another; but no one is bound by promising the act of another, and this is the rule we apply.
sed se obligat, ne ipse faciat, quo minus habere liceat: obligatur etiam, ne heres suus faciat uel quis ceterorum successorum efficiat, ne habere liceat.
But he binds himself not to do anything himself to prevent being allowed to have; he is also bound that his heir will not do so, or that none of his other successors will bring it about that it is not allowed to have.
§45.1.38.1Sed si quis promittat per alium non fieri, praeter heredem suum dicendum est inutiliter eum promittere factum alienum.
But if anyone promises that nothing will be done by another, except his own heir, it must be said that he ineffectually promises the act of another.
§45.1.38.2At si quis uelit factum alienum promittere, poenam uel quanti ea res sit potest promittere.
But if anyone wishes to promise the act of another, he can promise a penalty or the value of the matter.
sed quatenus habere licere uidebitur? si nemo controuersiam faciat, hoc est neque ipse reus, neque heredes eius heredumue successores.
But to what extent will it be deemed "allowed to have"? If no one raises a dispute, that is, neither the promisor himself, nor his heirs, nor the successors of his heirs.
§45.1.38.3Si quis forte non de proprietate, sed de possessione nuda controuersiam fecerit uel de usu fructu uel de usu uel de quo alio iure eius, quod distractum est, palam est committi stipulationem: habere enim non licet ei, cui aliquid minuitur ex iure quod habuit.
If someone should happen to raise a dispute not about ownership, but about bare possession, or about a usufruct, or a use, or about any other right in the thing which has been sold, it is clear that the stipulation is triggered; for he is not allowed to have, from whose right which he had anything is diminished.
§45.1.38.4Quaesitum est, utrum propriam demum rem an et alienam promittere possit habere licere.
The question was raised whether one can promise that a person is allowed to have only one's own property, or also that of another.
et magis est, ut et aliena promitti possit: quae res ita effectum habebit, si propria esse promissoris coeperit.
And the better opinion is that even another's property can be promised; which matter will have effect in this way, if it begins to belong to the promisor.
quare si perseuerauerit aliena, dicendum erit stipulationem non committi, nisi poena adiecta sit, cum neque per eum neque per successorem eius quicquam factum sit.
Therefore, if it continues to belong to another, it must be said that the stipulation is not triggered, unless a penalty has been added, since nothing has been done either by him or by his successor.
§45.1.38.5Sicut autem ex parte rei successores eius cum ipso tenentur, ita etiam ex parte actoris committitur stipulatio ipsi stipulatori ceterisque, quicumque ei succedunt, scilicet si rem ipsi habere non licuerit.
Moreover, just as on the part of the promisor his successors are bound together with him, so also on the part of the plaintiff the stipulation is triggered for the stipulator himself and the others, whoever succeed him, that is to say, if he himself has not been allowed to have the thing.
ceterum si alii habere non licuit, certo certius est non committi stipulationem, et nihil intererit, utrum ita stipuler 'habere licere' an 'mihi habere licere'.
But if some other person has not been allowed to have it, it is more than certain that the stipulation is not triggered, and it will make no difference whether I stipulate "to be allowed to have" or "that I be allowed to have".
§45.1.38.6Hi, qui sunt in aliena potestate, his, in quorum sunt potestate, habere licere stipulari possunt ea ratione, qua cetera quoque his possunt stipulari.
Those who are under the power of another can stipulate "to be allowed to have" for those under whose power they are, for the same reason that they can also stipulate other things for them.
sed si seruus fuerit stipulatus sibi habere, quaesitum est, an recte stipulatus uideatur.
But if a slave has stipulated that he himself have, the question was raised whether he is deemed to have correctly stipulated.
et ait Iulianus libro quinquagensimo secundo digestorum, si seruus stipuletur sibi habere licere aut per se non fieri, quo minus habere stipulatori liceat, promittat: stipulatio, inquit, non committitur, quamuis auferri res ei et ipse auferre eandem possit: non enim factum, sed ius in hac stipulatione uertitur.
And Julian says in the fifty-second book of the Digests: if a slave stipulates that he be allowed to have, or promises that "nothing will be done by him to prevent the stipulator from being allowed to have," the stipulation, he says, is not triggered, although the thing can be taken from him and he himself can take it away; for not fact, but right is at issue in this stipulation.
cum uero stipulatur per promissorem non fieri, quo minus sibi ire agere liceat, non ius stipulationis, inquit, sed factum uersatur.
But when he stipulates that nothing will be done by the promisor to prevent him from walking or driving, he says, it is not the right of the stipulation but fact that is at issue.
sed uidetur mihi, licet iuris uerba contineat haec stipulatio 'habere licere', tamen sic esse accipiendam, ut in seruo et in filio familias uideatur actum esse de possessione retinenda aut non auferenda et uires habeat stipulatio.
But it seems to me that, although this stipulation "to be allowed to have" contains words of law, it should nevertheless be understood in such a way that, in the case of a slave and a son under power, it is deemed to have been agreed concerning the retention of possession or its not being taken away, and thus the stipulation has force.
§45.1.38.7Haec quoque stipulatio: 'possidere mihi licere spondes?' utilis est: quam stipulationem seruus an possit utiliter in suam personam concipere, uideamus.
This stipulation also: "Do you promise that I shall be allowed to possess?" is effective.
sed quamuis ciuili iure seruus non possideat, tamen ad possessionem naturalem hoc referendum est, et ideo dubitari non oportet, quin et seruus recte ita stipuletur.
Let us see whether a slave can effectively formulate this stipulation for his own person. But although by civil law a slave does not possess, this must nevertheless be referred to natural possession, and therefore there ought to be no doubt that a slave also correctly stipulates in this way.
§45.1.38.8Plane si 'tenere sibi licere' stipulatus sit seruus, utilem esse stipulationem conuenit: licet enim possidere ciuiliter non possint, tenere tamen eos nemo dubitat.
Clearly, if a slave has stipulated "to be allowed to hold for himself," it is agreed that the stipulation is effective; for although they cannot possess by civil law, no one doubts that they hold.