[IDEM libro septuagensimo quarto ad edictum praetoris. ] §44.7.44.prObligationum fere quattuor causae sunt: aut enim dies in iis est aut condicio aut modus aut accessio.
[THE SAME, from his seventy-fourth book on the Edict of the Praetor.] There are generally four causes of obligations: for there is in them either a day, a condition, a manner, or an accession.
§44.7.44.1Circa diem duplex inspectio est: nam uel ex die incipit obligatio aut confertur in diem.
Concerning a day, there is a double consideration: for an obligation either begins from a certain day or is limited to a certain day.
ex die ueluti 'kalendis Martiis dare spondes'? cuius natura haec est, ut ante diem non exigatur.
"From a certain day" is, for example, "Do you promise to give on the Kalends of March?" The nature of this is that it cannot be demanded before that day.
ad diem autem 'usque ad kalendas dare spondes'? placet autem ad tempus obligationem constitui non posse non magis quam legatum: nam quod alicui deberi coepit, certis modis desinit deberi.
"To a certain day," however, is "Do you promise to give until the Kalends?" But it is accepted that an obligation cannot be established to a certain time, any more than a legacy can: for what has once begun to be owed to someone ceases to be owed only in certain ways.
plane post tempus stipulator uel pacti conuenti uel doli mali exceptione summoueri poterit.
Clearly, after the time has passed, the stipulator can be barred by the defense of an agreed pact or of fraud.
sic et in tradendo si quis dixerit se solum sine superficie tradere, nihil proficit, quo minus et superficies transeat, quae natura solo cohaeret.
So also in transferring property, if anyone says that he transfers the land alone without the surface, it is of no avail to prevent the surface also from passing, which by nature adheres to the soil.
§44.7.44.2Condicio uero efficax est, quae in constituenda obligatione inseritur, non quae post perfectam eam ponitur, ueluti 'centum dare spondes, nisi nauis ex Asia uenerit'? sed hoc casu existente condicione locus erit exceptioni pacti conuenti uel doli mali.
But an effective condition is one which is inserted in establishing the obligation, not one which is placed after it has been completed, such as "Do you promise to give a hundred, unless the ship comes from Asia?" But in this case, if the condition occurs, there will be room for the defense of an agreed pact or of fraud.
§44.7.44.3Modus obligationis est, cum stipulamur decem aut hominem: nam alterius solutio totam obligationem interemit nec alter peti potest, utique quamdiu utrumque est.
The mode of an obligation is when we stipulate for "ten or a slave"; for the payment of one extinguishes the whole obligation, and the other cannot be demanded, at least as long as both exist.
§44.7.44.4Accessio uero in obligatione aut personae aut rei fit.
But an accession in an obligation is made either to a person or to a thing.
personae, cum mihi aut Titio stipulor. rei, cum mihi decem aut Titio hominem stipulor: ubi quaeritur, an ipso iure fiat liberatio homine soluto Titio.
To a person, when I stipulate "to myself or to Titius." To a thing, when I stipulate "ten to myself or a slave to Titius"; where it is asked whether liberation occurs by operation of law upon the payment of the slave to Titius.
§44.7.44.5Si ita stipulatus sim: 'si fundum non dederis, centum dare spondes'? sola centum in stipulatione sunt, in exsolutione fundus.
If I have stipulated thus: "If you do not give the land, do you promise to give a hundred?" only the hundred is in the stipulation, while the land is in the discharge.
§44.7.44.6Sed si nauem fieri stipulatus sum et, si non feceris, centum, uidendum, utrum duae stipulationes sint, pura et condicionalis, et existens sequentis condicio non tollat priorem? an uero transferat in se et quasi nouatio prioris fiat? quod magis uerum est.
But if I have stipulated for a ship to be built, and "if you do not build it, a hundred," it must be seen whether there are two stipulations, one unconditional and one conditional, and the occurrence of the condition of the subsequent one does not destroy the former; or whether indeed it transfers the former into itself, and as it were, a novation of the former takes place. The latter is more true.