[ULPIANUS libro quinquagensimo quarto ad edictum. ] §40.12.7.prLiberis etiam hominibus, maxime si maiores uiginti annis uenum se dari passi sunt uel in seruitutem qua ratione deduci, nihil obest, quo minus possint in libertatem proclamare, nisi forte se uenum dari passi sunt, ut participauerint pretium.
[ULPIAN on the Edict, book 54.] Even for free persons, especially if they, being over twenty years of age, allowed themselves to be sold or to be reduced into slavery by any means, nothing prevents them from being able to proclaim their freedom, unless by chance they allowed themselves to be sold in order to share the price.
§40.12.7.1Si quis minor uiginti annis ad partiendum pretium uenum se dari passus est, nihil ei hoc post uiginti annos nocebit.
If anyone under twenty years of age has allowed himself to be sold in order to share the price, this will not harm him at all after twenty years.
sed si ante quidem se uenum dedit, post uicensimum autem annum pretium partitus est, poterit ei libertas dene gari.
But if he indeed allowed himself to be sold before, but shared the price after his twentieth year, freedom can be denied to him.
§40.12.7.2Si quis sciens liberum emerit, non denegatur uendito in libertatem proclamatio aduersus eum qui eum comparauit, cuiusque sit aetatis qui emptus est, idcirco quia non est uenia dignus qui emit, etiamsi scientem prudentemque se liberum emerit.
If anyone has knowingly purchased a free person, the proclamation of freedom against the one who acquired him is not denied to the person sold, of whatever age the one purchased may be, for the reason that the purchaser is not worthy of pardon, even if he purchased him knowing that the person knew and was aware of being free.
sed enim si postea alius eum emerit ab hoc, qui sciuit, ignorans, deneganda est ei libertas.
But if afterwards another person, being ignorant, purchased him from this one who knew, freedom must be denied to him.
§40.12.7.3Si duo simul emerint partes, alter sciens, alter ignorans, uidendum erit, numquid is qui scit non debeat nocere ignoranti: quod quidem magis est.
If two persons have simultaneously purchased shares, one knowing and the other being ignorant, it must be considered whether the one who knows ought not to prejudice the one who is ignorant; which indeed is rather the case.
sed enim illa erit quaestio, partem solam habebit is qui ignorauit an totum? et quid dicemus de alia parte? an ad eum qui scit pertineat? sed ille indignus est quid habere, quia sciens emerit.
But then this question will arise: will the one who was ignorant have only his share or the whole? And what shall we say about the other share? Does it belong to the one who knew? But he is unworthy to have anything, because he purchased knowingly.
rursum qui ignorauit, non potest maiorem partem dominii habere quam emit: euenit igitur, ut ei prosit qui eum comparauit sciens, quod alius ignorauit.
On the other hand, the one who was ignorant cannot have a greater share of ownership than he purchased; it happens, therefore, that the fact that the other was ignorant benefits the one who purchased knowingly.
§40.12.7.4Sunt et aliae causae, ex quibus in libertatem proclamatio denegatur, ueluti si quis ex eo testamento liber esse dicatur, quod testamentum aperiri praetor uetat, quia testator a familia necatus esse dicatur: cum enim in eo sit iste, ut supplicio forte sit adficiendus, non debet liberale iudicium ei concedi.
There are also other causes for which the proclamation of freedom is denied, as for instance if anyone is said to be free under a will which the praetor forbids to be opened because the testator is said to have been killed by his household; for since he may perhaps be in such a position as to be subjected to capital punishment, a trial concerning freedom ought not to be granted to him.
sed et si data fuerit, quia dubitatur, utrum nocens sit an innocens, differtur liberale iudicium, donec constet de morte eius, qui necatus est: apparebit enim, utrum supplicio adficiendus sit an non.
But even if it has been granted, because it is doubted whether he is guilty or innocent, the trial concerning freedom is postponed until the death of the one who was killed is established; for it will then appear whether he is to be subjected to punishment or not.
§40.12.7.5Si quis ex seruitute in libertatem proclamat, petitoris partes sustinet: si uero ex libertate in seruitutem petatur, is partes actoris sustinet qui seruum suum dicit.
If anyone proclaims his freedom from slavery, he sustains the role of the plaintiff; but if he is claimed into slavery from freedom, the one who says he is his slave sustains the role of the plaintiff.
igitur cum de hoc incertum est, ut possit iudicium ordinem accipere, hoc ante apud eum, qui de libertate cogniturus est, uisceptatur, utrum ex libertate in seruitutem aut contra agatur.
Therefore, when this is uncertain, so that the trial may receive its order, this is first preliminarily investigated before the one who is to cognize concerning freedom, whether the action is brought from freedom into slavery or the reverse.
et si forte apparuerit cum, qui de libertate sua litigat, in libertate sine dolo malo fuisse, is qui se dominum dicit actoris partes sustinebit et necesse habebit seruum suum probare: quod si pronuntiatum fuerit eo tempore, quo lis praeparabatur, in libertate eum non fuisse aut dolo malo fuisse, ipse qui de sua libertate litigat debet se liberum probare.
And if by chance it appears that the one who is litigating concerning his freedom was in freedom without bad faith, the one who says he is the master will sustain the role of the plaintiff and will be obliged to prove him to be his slave; but if it is pronounced at that time when the litigation was being prepared that he was not in freedom or was so with bad faith, the one who litigates concerning his own freedom must himself prove that he is free.