[PAULUS libro tertio decimo ad edictum. ] §4.8.32.prNon distinguemus in compromissis, minor an maior sit poena quam res de qua agitur.
[PAULUS in his thirteenth book on the Edict.] We shall make no distinction in arbitration agreements as to whether the penalty is less or greater than the value of the matter in dispute.
§4.8.32.1Non cogetur arbiter sententiam dicere, si poena commissa sit.
An arbitrator will not be compelled to render a decision if the penalty has already been incurred.
§4.8.32.2Si mulier alieno nomine compromittat, non erit pecunia compromissa propter intercessionem.
If a woman enters into an arbitration agreement on behalf of another, the money agreed upon will not be due, because of the prohibition against intercession.
§4.8.32.3Summa rei est, ut praetor se non interponat, siue initio nullum sit compromissum: siue sit, sed pendeat an ex eo poena exigi potest: sine postea deficiat poena compromisso soluto die morte acceptilatione iudicio pacto.
The sum of the matter is that the praetor will not intervene, whether there was no arbitration agreement from the beginning, or there was one but it remains pending whether the penalty can be exacted from it, or afterwards the penalty fails because the arbitration agreement is extinguished by the expiration of the day, by death, by release, by judgment, or by agreement.
§4.8.32.4Sacerdotio obueniente uidebimus an cogatur arbiter sententiam dicere: id enim non tantum honori personarum, sed et maiestati dei indulgetur, cuius sacris uacare sacerdotes oportet.
If a priesthood should fall to an arbitrator, we shall see whether he is compelled to render a decision; for this indulgence is granted not only out of respect for the persons, but also for the majesty of God, whose sacred rites the priests must attend to.
ceterum si postea suscepit, iste quoque omnimodo sententiam ferre debet.
However, if he accepted the office of arbitrator after obtaining the priesthood, he too must by all means render a decision.
§4.8.32.5Item non est cogendus, si de negotio transactum est, uel homo mortuus est de quo erat compromissum: nisi si posteriore casu aliquid litigantium intersit.
Likewise, he is not to be compelled if a compromise has been reached concerning the business, or if the slave concerning whom the arbitration was made has died; unless, in the latter case, the litigants have some interest in the matter.
§4.8.32.6Iulianus indistincte scribit: si per errorem de famoso delicto ad arbitrum itum est, uel de ea re, de qua publicum iudicium sit constitutum, ueluti de adulteriis sicariis et similibus, uetare debet praetor sententiam dicere nec dare dictae exsecutionem.
Julian writes without distinction: if by error resort was had to an arbitrator concerning an infamous delict, or concerning a matter for which a public trial has been established, such as adultery, assassination, and the like, the praetor ought to forbid the rendering of a decision and must not grant execution of a decision that has been rendered.
§4.8.32.7De liberali causa compromisso facto recte non compelletur arbiter sententiam dicere, quia fauor libertatis est, ut maiores iudices habere debeat.
When an arbitration agreement is made concerning a status of freedom, the arbitrator is rightly not compelled to render a decision, because there is a favor shown to freedom, which requires that it should have superior judges.
eadem dicenda sunt, siue de ingenuitate siue de libertinitate quaestio sit et si ex fideicommissi causa libertas deberi dicatur.
The same must be said whether the question is about free birth or about freed status, and also if freedom is said to be due under a fideicommissum.
idem dicendum est in populari actione.
The same must be said in a popular action.
§4.8.32.8Si seruus compromiserit, non cogendum dicere sententiam arbitrum, nec si dixerit, poenae exsecutionem dandam de peculio putat Octauenus.
If a slave enters into an arbitration agreement, the arbitrator is not to be compelled to render a decision; and even if he does, Octavenus thinks that execution of the penalty should not be granted against the peculium.
sed an, si liber cum eo compromiserit, exsecutio aduersus liberum detur, uideamus: sed magis est, ut non detur.
But let us see whether, if a free person enters into an arbitration agreement with him, execution should be granted against the free person; it is more correct, however, that it should not be granted.
§4.8.32.9Item si quis Romae compromiserit, mox Romam in legationem uenerit: non est cogendus arbiter sententiam dicere, non magis quam cogeretur, si litem ante contestatus esset, nunc eam exercere: nec interest, tunc quoque in legatione fuerit an non.
Likewise, if anyone entered into an arbitration agreement at Rome, and shortly afterward came to Rome on an embassy, the arbitrator is not to be compelled to render a decision, any more than he would be compelled to proceed with a lawsuit if he had joined issue before, but now had to carry it on; and it makes no difference whether he was also on an embassy at that time or not.
sed si nunc in legatione compromittat, puto cogendum arbitrum sententiam dicere, quia et si iudicium sponte accepisset, cogeretur peragere.
But if he enters into an arbitration agreement now while on an embassy, I think the arbitrator must be compelled to render a decision, because even if he had voluntarily accepted a trial, he would be compelled to complete it.
sunt tamen qui de isto non recte dubitant: qui utique nullo modo dubitabunt, si de ea re in legatione compromisit, quam in legatione contraxit: quia et iudicium eo nomine accipere cogeretur.
There are, however, some who doubt this, and not rightly; who, at any rate, will have no doubt if he entered into an arbitration agreement while on an embassy concerning a matter which he contracted while on an embassy, because he would also be compelled to accept a trial on that account.
illud in prima specie potest dispici, an, si ante compromisit legatus, cogendus sit arbiter sententiam dicere, si ipse legatus postulet: quod prima ratione poterit uideri iniquum, ut in ipsius potestate sit.
In the first class of cases, it may be examined whether, if the envoy had entered into the arbitration agreement beforehand, the arbitrator should be compelled to render a decision if the envoy himself demands it. This might at first sight seem unfair, as being in his own power.
sed hoc tale erit, quale si actionem uelit dictare, quod facere ei licet.
But this is just as if he wished to bring an action, which he is permitted to do.
sed compromissum istud comparabimus ordinariae actioni, ut non alias audiatur desiderans ut arbiter sententiam dicat, quam si se defendat.
Yet we shall compare this arbitration agreement to an ordinary action, so that he who desires the arbitrator to render a decision shall not be heard otherwise than if he defends himself.
§4.8.32.10Si is faciat controuersiam hereditatis, qui cum defuncto compromiserat, futurum est praeiudicium hereditati, si arbiter sententiam dicat: ergo interea inhibendus est arbiter.
If one who had entered into an arbitration agreement with the deceased raises a dispute concerning the inheritance, a decision by the arbitrator would create a prejudice to the inheritance; therefore, in the meantime, the arbitrator must be restrained.