[IDEM libro nono decimo quaestionum. ] §36.1.54.prSi res aliena Titio legata fuerit isque domino rei herede instituto petierit, ut hereditatem Maeuio restituat, Maeuius legatum inutiliter petet: non enim poterit consequi, quod ad institutum, id est rei dominum peruenire non poterat.
[THE SAME, Questions, Book 19] If a thing belonging to another has been legacyed to Titius, and he has requested the designated heir, who is the owner of the thing, to restore the inheritance to Maevius, Maevius will claim the legacy uselessly; for he cannot obtain what could not come to the designated heir, that is, the owner of the thing.
§36.1.54.1Seruus ab altero ex heredibus libertatem, ab altero fideicommissum hereditatis accepit.
A slave received freedom from one of the heirs, and a trust of the inheritance from the other.
si neuter adire uelit, nullae praetoris partes erunt, quia neque propter solam libertatem compellitur adire neque is, a quo libertas data non est, propter eum, quinondum liber est, ut adeat, compellitur: et senatus consulto locus est, cum ab omnibus directa, uel fideicommissa libertas ab eo datur a quo hereditas quoque relinquitur.
If neither of them wishes to enter upon the inheritance, there will be no part for the praetor to play, because an heir is not compelled to enter upon the inheritance solely for the sake of freedom, nor is the one by whom freedom was not given compelled to enter for the sake of him who is not yet free. And there is room for the senatusconsultum when direct freedom is given by all, or when trusted freedom is given by him by whom the inheritance is also left.
sed si forte is, a quo libertas data est, portionem suam repudiauit uel condicione exclusus est, cum portio eius ad alterum peruenerit, defendi poterit adire cogendum: quid enim interest, quo iure debitor libertatis et hereditatis idem esse coeperit?
But if, by chance, the one by whom freedom was given has rejected his share or has been excluded by a condition, when his share has come to the other, it can be maintained that the latter ought to be compelled to enter; for what difference does it make by what right the debtor of freedom and of the inheritance has begun to be the same person?