[CELSUS libro nono decimo digestorum. ] §33.10.7.prLabeo ait originem fuisse supellectilis, quod olim his, qui in legationem proficiscerentur, locari solerent, quae sub pellibus usui forent.
[CELSUS in his nineteenth book of the Digests.] Labeo says that the origin of household goods was that formerly there used to be leased to those who went on an embassy those things which would be of use under skins.
§33.10.7.1Tubero hoc modo demonstrare supellectilem temptat: instrumentum quoddam patris familiae rerum ad cottidianum usum paratarum, quod in aliam speciem non caderet, ut uerbi gratia penum argentum uestem ornamenta instrumenta agri aut domus.
Tubero attempts to define household goods in this manner: a certain equipment of the father of a family, consisting of things prepared for daily use, which does not fall into any other category, such as, for example, provisions, silver, clothing, ornaments, or the equipment of a farm or a house.
nec mirum est moribus ciuitatis et usu rerum appellationem eius mutatam esse: nam fictili aut lignea aut uitrea aut aerea denique supellectili utebantur, nunc ex ebore atque testudine et argento, iam ex auro etiam atque gemmis supellectili utuntur.
And it is not surprising that, by the customs of the state and the usage of things, its designation has been changed; for they used to use household goods of clay, wood, glass, or finally bronze, whereas now they use household goods made of ivory, tortoise-shell, and silver, and now even of gold and gems.
quare speciem potius rerum, quam materiam intueri oportet, suppellectilis potius an argenti, an uestis sint.
Therefore, one ought to look at the character of the things rather than their material, to determine whether they belong to household goods, or silver, or clothing.
§33.10.7.2Seruius fatetur sententiam eius qui legauerit aspici oportere, in quam rationem ea solitus sit referre: uerum si ea, de quibus non ambigeretur, quin in alieno genere essent, ut puta escarium argentum aut paenulas et togas, supellectili quis adscribere solitus sit, non idcirco existimari oportere supellectili legata ea quoque contineri: non enim ex opinionibus singulorum, sed ex communi usu nomina exaudiri debere.
Servius admits that the intention of the testator ought to be regarded, to see in what account he was accustomed to refer those things; but if anyone was accustomed to class under household goods those things about which there could be no doubt that they belonged to another category, such as, for example, table silver or cloaks and togas, it ought not on that account to be considered that when household goods are bequeathed, these things also are included; for names ought to be understood not from the opinions of individuals, but from common usage.
id Tubero parum sibi liquere ait: nam quorsum nomina, inquit, nisi ut demonstrarent uoluntatem dicentis? equidem non arbitror quemquam dicere, quod non sentiret, ut maxime nomine usus sit, quo id appellari solet: nam uocis ministerio utimur: ceterum nemo existimandus est dixisse, quod non mente agitauerit.
Tubero says that this is not very clear to him; 'for to what purpose are names,' he says, 'except to show the intention of the speaker?
sed etsi magnopere me Tuberonis et ratio et auctoritas mouet, non tamen a Seruio dissentio non uideri quemquam dixisse, cuius non suo nomine usus sit.
Indeed, I do not think that anyone says what he does not mean, even if he has especially used the name by which it is accustomed to be called; for we employ the service of the voice, but no one is to be thought to have said what he has not revolved in his mind.' But although both the reasoning and the authority of Tubero move me greatly, yet I do not disagree with Servius that no one is deemed to have expressed that of which he did not use its proper name.
nam etsi prior atque potentior est quam uox mens dicentis, tamen nemo sine uoce dixisse existimatur: nisi forte et eos, qui loqui non possunt, conato ipso et sono quodam καὶ τῇ ἀνάρθρω φωνῇ dicere existimamus.
For although the mind of the speaker is prior and more powerful than the voice, yet no one is deemed to have spoken without a voice; unless perhaps we think that those also who cannot speak do speak by their very effort and by a certain sound and inarticulate voice.