§94.36Nemo," inquit," praeceptis curat insaniam; ergo ne malitiam quidem.
'No one,' he says, 'cures madness with precepts; therefore, not wickedness either.' It is different.
"Dissimile est. Nam si insaniam sustuleris, sanitas redit, at si falsas opiniones exclusimus, non statim sequitur dispectus rerum agendarum.
For if you remove madness, health returns, but if we have shut out false opinions, the discernment of things to be done does not immediately follow.
Ut sequatur, tamen admonitio conroborabit rectam de bonis malisque sententiam.
Even if it should follow, nevertheless admonition will strengthen the correct opinion about goods and evils.
Illud quoque falsum est, nihil apud insanos proficere praecepta.
That is also false, that precepts benefit nothing among the mad.
Nam quemadmodum sola non prosunt, sic curationem adiuvant.
For just as they do not benefit alone, so they assist the cure.
Et denuntiatio et castigatio insanos coercuit.
Both warning and chastisement have restrained the mad.
De illis nunc insanis loquor, quibus mens mota est, non erepta.
I am speaking now of those madmen whose mind is disturbed, not snatched away.
§94.37"Leges," inquit, "ut faciamus, quod oportet, non efficiunt, et quid aliud sunt quam minis mixta praecepta? "Primum omnium ob hoc illae non persuadent, quia minantur, at haec non cogunt, sed exorant.
'Laws,' he says, 'do not bring it about that we do what we ought, and what else are they than precepts mixed with threats?' First of all, they do not persuade for this reason, because they threaten, but the latter do not compel, but win over.
Deinde leges a scelere deterrent, praecepta in officium adhortantur.
Next, laws deter from crime, precepts exhort to duty.
His adice quod leges quoque proficiunt ad bonos mores, utique si non tantum imperant, sed docent.
To these add that laws also benefit good morals, especially if they do not only command, but teach.
§94.38In hac re dissentio a Posidonio, qui "inprobo," inquit, "quod Platonis legibus adiecta principia sunt.
In this matter I dissent from Posidonius, who says, 'I disapprove that principles (prefaces) have been added to Plato's laws.
Legem enim brevem esse oportet, quo facilius ab imperitis teneatur.
For a law ought to be short, so that it may be more easily grasped by the unlearned.
Velut emissa divinitus vox sit; iubeat, non disputet.
Let it be like a voice sent from heaven; let it command, not dispute.
Nihil videtur mihi frigidius, nihil ineptius quam lex cum prologo.
Nothing seems to me colder, nothing more inept than a law with a prologue.
Mone, dic, quid me velis fecisse; non disco, sed pareo. "Proficiunt vero; itaque malis moribus uti videbis civitates usas malis legibus.
Warn, say what you wish me to have done; I do not learn, but obey.' Yet they do benefit; and so you will see that states which have used bad laws have used bad morals.
"At non apud omnis proficiunt. " §94.39Ne philosophia quidem; nec ideo inutilis et formandis animis inefficax est.
'But they do not benefit among all.' Not even philosophy does; yet it is not therefore useless and ineffective in forming minds.
Quid autem? Philosophia non vitae lex est? Sed putemus non proficere leges; non ideo sequitur, ut ne monitiones quidem proficiant.
What then? Is not philosophy the law of life? But let us suppose that laws do not benefit; it does not therefore follow that not even admonitions benefit.
Aut sic et consolationes nega proficere dissuasionesque et adhortationes et obiurgationes et laudationes.
Or else, deny that consolations also benefit, and dissuasions, and exhortations, and rebukes, and praises.
Omnia ista monitionum genera sunt.
All those are kinds of admonitions.
Per ista ad perfectum animi statum pervenitur.
Through those, one arrives at the perfect state of the mind.
§94.40Nulla res magis animis honesta induit dubiosque et in pravum inclinabiles revocat ad rectum quam bonorum virorum conversatio.
No thing clothes minds with honorable things and recalls those who are doubtful and inclinable to evil to the right path more than the conversation of good men.
Paulatim enim descendit in pectora, et vim praeceptorum obtinet frequenter aspici, frequenter audiri.
For it gradually descends into the breast, and to be frequently seen, to be frequently heard, obtains the force of precepts.
Occursus mehercules ipse sapientium iuvat, et est aliquid, quod ex magno, viro vel tacente proficias.
By Hercules, the very meeting with wise men helps, and there is something that you may benefit from a great man even when he is silent.
§94.41Nec tibi facile dixerim quemadmodum prosit, sicut illud intellego profuisse.
Nor could I easily tell you how it benefits, just as I understand that that other thing benefited.
"Minuta quaedam," ut ait Phaedon, "animalia cum mordent non sentiuntur; adeo tenuis illis et fallens in periculum vis est.
'Certain minute,' as Phaedo says, 'animals when they bite are not felt; so thin and deceptive into danger is their power.
Tumor indicat morsum et in ipso tumore nullum vulnus apparet.
A swelling indicates the bite, and in the swelling itself no wound appears.
Idem tibi in conversatione virorum sapientium eveniet: non deprehendes, quemadmodum aut quando tibi prosit, profuisse deprendes. " §94.42Quorsus, inquis, hoc pertinet? Aeque praecepta bona, si saepe tecum sint, profutura quam bona exempla.
The same will happen to you in the conversation of wise men: you will not perceive how or when it benefits you, but you will perceive that it has benefited.' 'Whither,' you say, 'does this point?' Just as good precepts, if they are often with you, will benefit as much as good examples.
Pythagoras ait alium animum fieri intrantibus templum deorumque simulacra ex vicino cernentibus et alicuius oraculi opperientibus vocem.
Pythagoras says that a different mind is made in those entering a temple and beholding the statues of the gods from nearby and waiting for the voice of some oracle.
§94.43Quis autem negabit feriri quibusdam praeceptis, efficaciter etiam inperitissimos? Velut his brevissimis vocibus, sed multum habentibus ponderis:
"
Nil nimis. Avarus animus nullo satiatur lucro. Ab alio exspectes, alteri quod feceris. "
Haec cum ictu quodam audimus, nec ulli Meet dubitare aut interrogare "quare?"; adeo etiam sine ratione ipsa veritas ducit.
But who will deny that some are struck by certain precepts, effectively even the most unlearned? As by these shortest words, yet having much weight: 'Nothing in excess.' 'A greedy mind is satisfied by no gain.' 'Expect from another what you have done to the other.' We hear these with a certain shock, nor is it permitted to anyone to doubt or ask 'why?'; so much does truth itself lead even without a reason.
§94.44Si reverentia frenat animos ac vitia compescit, cur non et admonitio idem possit? Si inponit pudorem castigatio, cur admonitio non faciat, etiam si nudis praeceptis utitur? Illa vero efficacior est et altius penetrat, quae adiuvat ratione quod praecipit, quae adicit, quare quidque faciendum sit et quis facientem oboedientemque praeceptis fructus exspectet.
If reverence curbs minds and restrains vices, why should not admonition also be able to do the same? If chastisement imposes shame, why should admonition not do so, even if it uses bare precepts? But that indeed is more effective and penetrates deeper, which assists with reason what it prescribes, which adds why each thing is to be done and what fruit awaits the one who does it and obeys the precepts.
Si imperio proficitur, et admonitione; atqui proficitur imperio; ergo et admonitione.
If it is benefited by command, also by admonition; but it is benefited by command; therefore also by admonition.
§94.45In duas partes virtus dividitur, in contemplationem veri et actionem.
Virtue is divided into two parts, into the contemplation of truth and action.
Contemplationem institutio tradit, actionem admonitio.
Instruction delivers contemplation, admonition action.
Virtutem et exercet et ostendit recta actio.
Right action both exercises and shows virtue.
Acturo autem si prodest qui suadet, et qui monet proderit.
But if he who persuades benefits the one about to act, he who admonishes will also benefit.
Ergo si recta actio virtuti necessaria est, rectas autem actiones admonitio demonstrat, et admonitio necessaria est.
Therefore, if right action is necessary for virtue, and admonition points out right actions, admonition also is necessary.