§94.27"Si dubia sunt," inquit, "quae praecipis, probationes adicere debebis; ergo illae, non praecepta proficient.
'If what you prescribe is doubtful,' he says, 'you will have to add proofs; therefore, those proofs, not the precepts, will be of benefit.' What of the fact that even without proofs, the very authority of the adviser is of benefit?
"Quid, quod etiam sine probationibus ipsa monentis auctoritas prodest? Sic quomodo iurisconsultorum valent responsa, etiam si ratio non redditur.
Just as the opinions of legal experts have weight, even if no reason is rendered.
Praeterea ipsa, quae praecipiuntur, per se multum habent ponderis, utique si aut carmini intexta sunt aut prosa oratione in sententiam coartata, sicut illa Catoniana: "emas non quod opus est, sed quod necesse est; quod non opus est, asse earum est," qualia sunt illa aut reddita oraculo aut similia: "tempori parce," "te nosce. "
Moreover, the very things that are prescribed have much weight in themselves, especially if they are either woven into a poem or compressed in prose into a short maxim like that saying of Cato: 'Buy not what you need, but what is essential; what you do not need is dear at a penny (asse),' or such as those rendered by the oracle or similar to them: 'Spare your time,' 'Know yourself.' Would you demand a reason when someone has said to you these verses?
§94.28Numquid rationem exiges, eum tibi aliquis hos dixerit versus?
"
Iniuriarum remedium est oblivio. Audentes fortuna iuvat, piger ipse sibi opstat. "
Advocatum ista non quaerunt; adfectus ipsos tangunt et natura vim suam exercente proficiunt.
'Oblivion is the remedy for injuries.' 'Fortune favors the brave, the lazy man stands in his own way.' Those sayings do not seek an advocate; they touch the feelings themselves and are of benefit as nature exerts her power.
§94.29Omnium honestarum rerum semina animi gerunt, quae admonitione excitantur, non aliter quam scintilla flatu levi adiuta ignem suum explicat.
The minds bear the seeds of all honorable things, which are stimulated by admonition, in no other way than a spark, assisted by a gentle breath, unfolds its fire.
Erigitur virtus, eum tacta est et inpulsa.
Virtue is aroused when it is touched and nudged.
Praeterea quaedam sunt quidem in animo, sed parum prompta, quae incipiunt in expedito esse, eum dicta sunt.
Moreover, some things are indeed in the mind, but not ready at hand, which begin to be in readiness when they have been spoken.
Quaedam diversis locis iacent sparsa, quae contrahere inexercitata mens non potest.
Some things lie scattered in different places, which an untrained mind cannot bring together.
Itaque in unum conferenda sunt et iungenda, ut plus valeant animumque magis adlevent.
Therefore, they must be gathered into one and joined, so that they may have more weight and lift the mind more.
§94.30Aut si praecepta nihil adiuvant, omnis institutio tollenda est, ipsa natura contenti esse debemus.
Or if precepts help nothing, all education must be abolished, and we ought to be content with nature itself.
Hoc qui dicunt, non vident alium esse ingenii mobilis et erecti, alium tardi et hebetis, utique alium alio ingeniosiorem.
Those who say this do not see that one mind is active and upright, another slow and dull, and certainly one is more talented than another.
Ingenii vis praeceptis alitur et crescit novasque persuasiones adicit innatis et depravata corrigit. "
The power of natural talent is nourished and grows by precepts, and adds new convictions to those inborn, and corrects depraved things.
§94.31Si quis," inquit, "non habet recta decreta, quid illum admonitiones iuvabunt vitiosis obligatum? "Hoc scilicet, ut illis liberetur; non enim extincta in illo indoles naturalis est, sed obscurata et oppressa.
'If anyone,' he says, 'does not have upright decrees, what will admonitions benefit him when he is bound to vices?' This, indeed, so that he may be freed from them; for the natural disposition in him is not extinct, but obscured and oppressed.
Sic quoque temptat resurgere et contra prava nititur, nancta vero praesidium et adiuta praeceptis evalescit, si tamen illam diutina pestis non infecit nec enecuit; hanc enim ne disciplina quidem philosophiae toto inpetu suo conisa restituet.
Even thus it attempts to rise again and struggles against depraved things, but having found protection and assisted by precepts, it gains strength, provided, however, that a long-standing plague has not infected and killed it; for this even the discipline of philosophy, striving with all its force, will not restore.
Quid enim interest inter decreta philosophiae et praecepta, nisi quod illa generalia praecepta sunt, haec specialia? Utraque res praecipit, sed altera in totum, particulatim altera.
For what difference is there between the decrees of philosophy and precepts, except that the former are general precepts, while the latter are specific? Both prescribe, but the one in general, the other in detail.
§94.32"Si quis," inquit, "recta habet et honesta decreta, hic ex supervacuo monetur. "Minime; nam hic quoque doctus quidem est facere quae debet, sed haec non satis perspicit.
'If anyone,' he says, 'has upright and honorable decrees, this person is admonished superfluously.' Not at all; for this person too is indeed taught to do what he ought, but does not see these things clearly enough.
Non enim tantum adfectibus inpedimur, quo minus probanda faciamus, sed inperitia inveniendi quid quaeque res exigat.
For we are hindered from doing what is to be approved not only by feelings, but by inexperience in finding what each situation demands.
Habemus interdum compositum animum, sed residem et inexercitatum ad inveniendam officiorum viam, quam admonitio demonstrat. "
We have at times a well-ordered mind, but inactive and untrained in finding the way of duties, which admonition points out.
§94.33Expelle," inquit, "falsas opiniones de bonis et malis, in locum autem earum veras repone, et nihil habebit admonitio, quod agat. "Ordinatur sine dubio ista ratione animus, sed non ista tantum.
'Expel,' he says, 'false opinions about goods and evils, and in their place put true ones, and admonition will have nothing to do.' The mind is without doubt ordered by that method, but not only by that.
Nam quamvis argumentis collectum sit, quae bona malaque sint, nihilominus habent praecepta partes suas.
For although it has been gathered by arguments what things are good and bad, nevertheless precepts have their part.
Et prudentia et iustitia officiis constat, officia praeceptis disponuntur.
Both prudence and justice consist of duties, and duties are arranged by precepts.
§94.34Praeterea ipsum de malis bonisque iudicium confirmatur officiorum exsecutione, ad quam praecepta perducunt.
Moreover, the very judgment about evils and goods is confirmed by the execution of duties, to which precepts lead.
Utraque enim inter se consentiunt; nec illa possunt praecedere, ut non haec sequantur.
For both agree with each other; nor can the former precede without the latter following.
Et haec ordinem sequuntur suum; unde apparet illa praecedere.
And the latter follow their own order; whence it appears that the former precede.
§94.35"Infinita," inquit, "praecepta sunt. "Falsum est.
'Precepts,' he says, 'are infinite.' This is false.
Nam de maximis ac necessariis rebus non sunt infinita.
For concerning the greatest and necessary things they are not infinite.
Tenues autem differentias habent, quas exigunt tempora, loca, personae, sed his quoque dantur praecepta generalia. "
They have indeed subtle differences, which times, places, and persons demand, but to these also general precepts are given.'