§92.10Prima ars hominis est ipsa virtus; huic committitur inutilis caro et fluida, receptandis tantum cibis habilis, ut ait Posidonius.
The first art of man is virtue itself; to this is committed the useless and fluid flesh, fit only for receiving food, as Posidonius says.
Virtus illa divina in lubricum desinit et superioribus eius partibus venerandis atque caelestibus animal iners ac marcidum adtexitur.
That divine virtue ends in a slippery place, and to its reverend and celestial upper parts an inactive and lifeless animal is attached.
Illa utcumque altera quies nihil quidem ipsa praestabat animo, sed inpedimenta removebat; voluptas ultro dissolvit et omne robur emollit.
That other quiet, in any case, did not itself perform anything for the soul, but it removed hindrances; pleasure, on the other hand, voluntarily dissolves it and softens all its strength.
Quae invenietur tam discors inter se iunctura corporum? Fortissimae rei inertissima adstruitur, severissimae parum seria, sanctissimae intemperans usque ad incesta.
What so discordant joining of bodies will be found? To the strongest thing the most inactive is added, to the most severe the least serious, to the most holy the intemperate even to the point of unchastity.
"Quid ergo?" inquit,"si virtutem nihil inpeditura sit bona valitudo et quies et dolorum vacatio, non petes illas?" §92.11Quidni petam? Non quia bona sunt, sed quia secundum naturam sunt, et quia bono a me iudicio sumentur.
"What then?" he says, "if good health and quiet and the absence of pain are not going to hinder virtue, will you not seek them?" Why should I not seek them? Not because they are goods, but because they are according to nature, and because they will be taken by me with a good judgment.
Quid erit tunc in illis bonum? Hoc unum, bene eligi.
What then will be the good in them? This one thing, to be well chosen.
Nam cum vestem qualem decet, sumo, cum ambulo ut oportet, cum ceno quemadmodum debeo, non cena aut ambulatio aut vestis bona sunt, sed meum in iis propositum servantis in quaque re rationi convenientem modum.
For when I assume a garment as is proper, when I walk as is fitting, when I dine as I ought, it is not the dinner or the walking or the garment that are good, but my purpose in them, which preserves in each thing a limit suitable to reason.
§92.12Etiamnunc adiciam: mundae vestis electio adpetenda est homini.
Still I will add: the choice of a clean garment is to be sought by man.
Natura enim homo mundum et elegans animal est.
For by nature man is a clean and elegant animal.
Itaque non est bonum per se munda vestis, sed mundae vestis electio, quia non in re bonum est, sed in electione quali. Actiones nostrae honestae sunt, non ipsa quae aguntur.
Therefore, a clean garment is not a good in itself, but the choice of a clean garment is, because the good is not in the thing, but in what kind of choice it is. Our actions are honorable, not the things themselves which are done.
§92.13Quod de veste dixi, idem me dicere de corpore existima.
What I have said of the garment, assume that I say the same of the body.
Nam hoc quoque natura ut quandam vestem animo circumdedit; velamentum eius est.
For nature has surrounded the soul with this too as a kind of garment; it is its covering.
Quis autem umquam vestimenta aestimavit arcula? Nec bonum nec malum vagina gladium facit.
But who has ever valued clothes by the chest? Neither a good nor a bad scabbard makes a sword.
Ergo de corpore quoque idem tibi respondeo: sumpturum quidem me, si detur electio, et sanitatem et vires, bonum autem futurum iudicium de illis meum, non ipsa.
Therefore, concerning the body also, I answer you the same: that I will indeed take, if choice is given, both health and strength, but the good will be my judgment concerning them, not the things themselves.
§92.14"Est quidem," inquit, "sapiens beatus; summum tamen illud bonum non consequitur, nisi illi et naturalia instrumenta respondeant.
"Indeed," he says, "the wise man is happy; yet he does not attain that supreme good unless natural instruments also respond to him.
Ita miser quidem esse, qui virtutem habet, non potest, beatissimus autem non est, qui naturalibus bonis destituitur ut valitudine, ut membrorum integritate. " §92.15Quod incredibilius videtur, id concedis, aliquem in maximis et continuis doloribus non esse miserum, esse etiam beatum; quod levius est, negas, beatissimum esse.
Thus, he who has virtue cannot indeed be miserable, but he is not the happiest who is destitute of natural goods like health and soundness of limbs." That which seems more incredible, you concede: that someone in the greatest and continuous pains is not miserable, and is even happy; but that which is lighter, you deny: that he is the happiest.
Atqui si potest virtus efficere, ne miser aliquis sit, facilius efficiet, ut beatissimus sit.
And yet, if virtue can bring it about that someone is not miserable, it will more easily bring it about that he is the happiest.
Minus enim intervalli a beato ad beatissimum restat quam a misero ad beatum.
For there remains less interval from the happy to the happiest than from the miserable to the happy.
An quae res tantum valet, ut ereptum calamitatibus inter beatos locet, non potest adicere quod superest, ut beatissimum faciat? In summo deficit clivo?
Or can that thing which is so powerful that it places one snatched from calamities among the happy, not add what is left so as to make him the happiest? Does it fail at the top of the hill?
§92.16Commoda sunt in vita et incommoda, utraque extra nos.
There are advantages in life and disadvantages, both outside of us.
Si non est miser vir bonus, quamvis omnibus prematur incommodis, quomodo non est beatissimus, si aliquibus commodis deficitur? Nam quemadmodum incommodorum onere usque ad miserum non deprimitur, sic commodorum inopia non deducitur a beatissimo, sed tam sine commodis beatissimus est, quam non est sub incommodis miser; aut potest illi eripi bonum suum, si potest minui.
If a good man is not miserable, although pressed by all disadvantages, how is he not the happiest, if he is lacking some advantages? For just as he is not depressed by the weight of disadvantages to the point of being miserable, so he is not drawn down from being the happiest by the lack of advantages, but he is just as happiest without advantages as he is not miserable under disadvantages; otherwise, his own good can be snatched from him, if it can be diminished.
§92.17Paulo ante dicebam igniculum nihil conferre lumini solis.
A little while ago I was saying that a tiny fire contributes nothing to the light of the sun.
Claritate enim eius quicquid sine illo luceret absconditur.
For by its brightness whatever would shine without it is hidden.
"Sed quaedam," inquit, "soli quoque opstant. "At sol integer est etiam inter opposita, et quamvis aliquid interiacet, quod nos prohibeat eius aspectu, in opere est, cursu suo fertur.
"But some things," he says, "oppose even the sun." But the sun is complete even among opposing things, and although something lies between that prevents us from its sight, it is at work, carried on its course.
Quotiens inter nubila eluxit, non est sereno minor, ne tardior quidem, quoniam multum interest, utrum aliquid obstet tantum, an inpediat.
Whenever it has shone out from among the clouds, it is not less than in clear weather, nor indeed slower, since there is a great difference between whether something merely stands in the way, or hinders.
§92.18Eodem modo virtuti opposita nihil detrahunt; non est minor, sed minus fulget.
In the same way, things opposing virtue detract nothing; it is not lesser, but it shines less.
Nobis forsitan non aeque apparet ac nitet, sibi eadem est et more solis obscuri in occulto vim suam exercet.
To us, perhaps, it does not appear and shine equally, but it is the same to itself, and in the manner of a clouded sun, it exercises its power in secret.
Hoc itaque adversus virtutem possunt calamitates et damna et iniuriae, quod adversus solem potest nebula.
This, therefore, is what calamities and losses and injuries can do against virtue, which a cloud can do against the sun.