§92.1Puto, inter me teque conveniet externa corpori adquiri, corpus in honorem animi coli, in animo esse partes ministras, per quas movemur alimurque, propter ipsum principale nobis datas.
I think there will be agreement between me and you that external things are acquired for the body, the body is cultivated in honor of the soul, and in the soul there are ministering parts, through which we are moved and nourished, given to us on account of the ruling part itself.
In hoc principali est aliquid inrationale, est et rationale.
In this ruling part, there is something irrational, and there is also the rational.
Illud huic servit, hoc unum est, quod alio non refertur, sed omnia ad se refert.
The former serves the latter; the latter is the one thing which is not referred to anything else, but refers all things to itself.
Nam illa quoque divina ratio omnibus praeposita est, ipsa sub nullo est; et haec autem nostra eadem est, quia ex illa est.
For that divine reason too has been set over all things, and is itself under nothing; and this of ours is the same, because it is from that.
§92.2Si de hoc inter nos convenit, sequitur ut de illo quoque conveniat, in hoc uno positam esse beatam vitam, ut in nobis ratio perfecta sit.
If there is agreement between us on this point, it follows that there is agreement on that point too: that the happy life is placed in this one thing, that perfect reason be in us.
Haec enim sola non submittit animum, stat contra fortunam; in quolibet rerum habitu securos servat.
For this alone does not submit the mind, it stands against fortune, and keeps us secure in any condition of things.
Id autem unum bonum est, quod numquam defringitur.
And that is the unique good which is never broken.
Is est, inquam, beatus quem nulla res minorem facit; tenet summa, et ne ulli quidem nisi sibi innixus.
He is happy, I say, whom nothing makes lesser; he holds the highest, leaning upon no one but himself.
Nam qui aliquo auxilio sustinetur, potest cadere.
For he who is sustained by some help can fall.
Si aliter est, incipient multum in nobis valere non nostra.
If it is otherwise, things not our own will begin to have great power in us.
Quis autem vult constare fortunam aut quis se prudens ob aliena miratur?
But who wants fortune to be constant, or what wise man admires himself because of alien things?
§92.3Quid est beata vita? Securitas et perpetua tranquillitas.
What is a happy life? Security and perpetual tranquility.
Hanc dabit animi magnitudo, dabit constantia bene iudicati tenax.
This will be given by greatness of mind, and by constancy tenacious of what has been well judged.
Ad haec quomodo pervenitur? Si veritas tota perspecta est;
How is this arrived at?
si servatus est in rebus agendis ordo, modus, decor, innoxia voluntas ac benigna, intenta rationi nec umquam ab illa recedens, amabilis simul mirabilisque.
If the whole truth has been thoroughly seen; if in actions order, measure, propriety, and a harmless and benign will are preserved, intent upon reason and never departing from it, at once lovable and admirable.
Denique ut breviter tibi formulam scribam, talis animus esse sapientis viri debet, qualis deum deceat.
Finally, to write a brief formula for you, such ought to be the mind of the wise man, as would befit a god.
§92.4Quid potest desiderare is, cui omnia honesta contingunt? Nam si possunt aliquid non honesta conferre ad optimum statum, in his erit beata vita, sine quibus honesta.
What can he desire, to whom all honorable things happen? For if non-honorable things can contribute anything to the best state, the happy life will consist in those things without which the honorable exists.
Et quid turpius stultiusve quam bonum rationalis animi ex inrationalibus nectere?
And what is more shameful or foolish than to knit the good of the rational mind from irrational things?
§92.5Quidam tamen augeri summum bonum iudicant, quia parum plenum sit fortuitis repugnantibus.
Yet some judge that the supreme good can be increased, because it is insufficiently full when fortuitous things are opposing.
Antipater quoque inter magnos sectae huius auctores aliquid se tribuere dicit externis, sed exiguum admodum.
Antipater also, among the great founders of this sect, says that he attributes something to external things, but very little indeed.
Vides autem quale sit die non esse contentum, nisi aliquis igniculus adluxerit.
But you see what kind of thing it is not to be content with the day unless some tiny fire shines.
Quod potest in hac claritate solis habere scintilla momentum?
What weight can a spark have in this brightness of the sun?
§92.6Si non es sola honestate contentus, necesse est aut quietem adici velis, quam ἀοχλησίαν vocant Graeci, aut voluptatem.
If you are not content with honor alone, it is necessary that you wish either peace to be added, which the Greeks call aochlesia, or pleasure.
Horum alterum utcumque recipi potest.
The former of these can somehow be admitted.
Vacat enim animus molestia liber ad inspectum universi, nihilque illum avocat a contemplatione naturae.
For the mind is free, liberated from trouble, for the inspection of the universe, and nothing calls it away from the contemplation of nature.
Alterum illud, voluptas, bonum pecoris est.
That other one, pleasure, is the good of cattle.
Adicimus rationali inrationale, honesto inhonestum.
We add the irrational to the rational, the dishonorable to the honorable.
Ad hanc vitam facit titillatio corporis; quid ergo dubitaris dicere bene esse homini, si palato bene est?
To this life, the tickling of the body contributes; why then do you hesitate to say that it is well with a man, if it is well with his palate?
§92.7Et hunc tu, non dico inter viros numeras, sed inter homines, cuius summum bonum saporibus et coloribus sonisque constat? Excedat ex hoc animalium numero pulcherrimo ac dis secundo: mutis adgregetur animal pabulo laetum.
And do you count this man, I do not say among men, but among human beings, whose supreme good consists of tastes, colors, and sounds? Let him depart from this most beautiful class of animals, second only to the gods; let him be grouped with the mute beasts, an animal happy with its fodder.
§92.8Inrationalis pars animi duas habet partes, alteram animosam, ambitiosam, inpotentem, positam in adfectionibus, alteram humilem, languidam, voluptatibus deditam;
The irrational part of the soul has two parts: one spirited, ambitious, uncontrolled, placed in passions; the other humble, languid, devoted to pleasures.
illam effrenatam, meliorem tamen, certe fortiorem ac digniorem viro reliquerunt, hanc necessariam beatae vitae putaverunt, enervem et abiectam.
They left aside the former, which is unbridled, yet better, certainly stronger and more worthy of a man, and they thought this latter part, enervated and abject, necessary for the happy life.
§92.9Huic rationem servire iusserunt et fecerunt animalis generosissimi summum bonum demissum et ignobile, praeterea mixtum portentosumque et ex diversis ac male congruentibus membris.
They ordered reason to serve this, and made the supreme good of the most noble animal low and ignoble, and furthermore mixed and monstrous, composed of diverse and poorly matching limbs.
Nam ut ait Vergilius noster in Scylla
"
Prima hominis facies et pulchro pectore virgo
Pube tenus, postrema inmani corpore pistrix
Delphinum caudas utero commissa luporum. "
Huic tamen Scyllae fera animalia adiuncta sunt, horrenda, velocia; at isti sapientiam ex quibus conposuere portentis!
For as our Vergil says of Scylla: "First the face of a human, and a maiden with a beautiful breast down to the womb, last a sea-monster of monstrous body, having dolphin tails joined to a belly of wolves." Yet to this Scylla wild animals were joined, horrific and swift; but from what monsters have those men composed wisdom!