§89.9Philosophiae tres partes esse dixerunt et maximi et plurimi auctores: moralem, naturalem, rationalem.
The greatest and most numerous authors have said that there are three parts of philosophy: moral, natural, and rational.
Prima conponit animum.
The first composes the mind.
Secunda rerum naturam scrutatur.
The second investigates the nature of things.
Tertia proprietates verborum exigit et structuram et argumentationes, ne pro vero falsa subrepant.
The third demands the proper meanings of words, structure, and argumentations, lest false things creep in under the guise of truth.
Ceterum inventi sunt et qui in pauciora philosophiam et qui in plura diducerent.
Furthermore, there have been found both those who divide philosophy into fewer parts and those who divide it into more.
§89.10Quidam ex Peripateticis quartam partem adiecerunt civilem, quia propriam quandam exercitationem desideret et circa aliam materiam occupata sit.
Certain of the Peripatetics added a fourth part, the civil, because it requires a certain proper practice and is occupied with another subject matter.
Quidam adfecerunt his partem, quam οἰκονομικὴν vocant, administrandae familiaris rei scientiam.
Some added to these the part which they call economic, the knowledge of managing domestic affairs.
Quidam et de generibus vitae locum separaverunt.
Some also separated a topic concerning the kinds of life.
Nihil autem horum non in illa parte morali reperietur.
However, none of these will fail to be found in that moral part.
§89.11Epicurei duas partes philosophiae putaverunt esse, naturalem atque moralem; rationalem removerunt.
The Epicureans thought there were two parts of philosophy, natural and moral; they removed the rational.
Deinde cum ipsis rebus cogerentur ambigua secernere, falsa sub specie veri latentia coarguere, ipsi quoque locum, quem de iudicio et regula appellant, alio nomine rationalem induxerunt, sed eum accessionem esse naturalis partis existimant.
Then, when they were forced by the very facts to distinguish ambiguities and to expose falsehoods lurking under the appearance of truth, they themselves also introduced, under another name, the rational part, which they call the topic concerning judgment and rule, but they consider it to be an addition to the natural part.
§89.12Cyrenaici naturalia cum rationalibus sustulerunt et contenti fuerunt monilibus, sed hi quoque quae removent, aliter inducunt.
The Cyrenaics abolished natural and rational philosophy and were content with moral philosophy alone, but they too introduce in another way what they remove.
In quinque enim partes moralia dividunt, ut una sit de fugiendis et petendis, altera de adfectibus, tertia de actionibus, quarta de causis, quinta de argumentis.
For they divide moral philosophy into five parts, so that one is on what is to be avoided and sought, another on affections, a third on actions, a fourth on causes, and a fifth on arguments.
Causae rerum ex naturali parte sunt, argumenta ex rationali.
The causes of things belong to the natural part, and the arguments to the rational.
Ariston Chius non tantum supervacuas esse dixit naturalem et rationalem, sed etiam contrarias.
Ariston of Chios said that the natural and rational are not only superfluous, but even contrary.
§89.13Moralem quoque, quam solam reliquerat, circumcidit; nam eum locum, qui monitiones continet, sustulit et paedagogi esse dixit, non philosophi, tamquam quidquam aliud sit sapiens quam humani generis paedagogus.
He also cut down the moral part, which alone he had left; for he removed that topic which contains admonitions and said it belonged to the pedagogue, not to the philosopher, as if the wise man were anything other than the pedagogue of the human race.
§89.14Ergo cum tripertita sit philosophia, moralem eius partem primum incipiamus disponere.
Therefore, since philosophy is tripartite, let us first begin to arrange its moral part.
Quam in tria rursus dividi placuit, ut prima esset inspectio suum cuique distribuens et aestimans quanto quidque dignum sit, maxime utilis.
This it has pleased to divide again into three, so that the first should be the evaluation which distributes to each his own and estimates how much each thing is worth, which is extremely useful.
Quid enim est tam necessarium quam pretia rebus inponere? Secunda de impetu, de actionibus tertia.
For what is so necessary as to assign prices to things? The second is on impulse, and the third on actions.
Primum enim est, ut quanti quidque sit iudices, secundum, ut impetum ad illa capias ordinatum temperatumque, tertium, ut inter impetum tuum actionemque conveniat, ut in omnibus istis tibi ipse consentias.
For the first is that you judge how much each thing is worth, the second that you take an ordered and tempered impulse toward those things, and the third that there be agreement between your impulse and action, so that in all these you may be in harmony with yourself.
§89.15Quicquid ex tribus defuit, turbat et cetera.
Whichever of the three is lacking, it disturbs the others as well.
Quid enim prodest inter se aestimati habere omnia, si sis in impetu nimius? Quid prodest impetus repressisse et habere cupiditates in tua potestate, si in ipsa rerum actione tempora ignores nec scias quando quidque et ubi et quemadmodum agi debeat? Aliud est enim dignitates et pretia rerum nosse, aliud articulos, aliud impetus refrenare et ad agenda ire, non ruere.
For what does it profit to have estimated all things among themselves, if you are excessive in your impulse? What does it profit to have repressed impulses and to have desires under your control, if in the very action of things you are ignorant of the proper times, and do not know when each thing, and where, and how, it ought to be done? For it is one thing to know the worth and prices of things, another to know the critical moments, and another to restrain impulses and go, not rush, to things to be done.
Tunc ergo vita concors sibi est, ubi actio non destituit impetum, impetus ex dignitate rei cuiusque concipitur proinde remissus vel acrior, prout illa digna est peti.
Therefore, then life is in harmony with itself, when action does not abandon impulse, and impulse is conceived from the worth of each thing, accordingly moderate or more eager, just as that thing is worthy of being sought.
§89.16Naturalis pars philosophiae in duo scinditur: corporalia et incorporalia. Utraque dividuntur in suos, ut ita dicam, gradus.
The natural part of philosophy is split into two: corporals and incorporals. Both are divided into their own, so to speak, steps.
Corporum locus in hos primum, in ea quae faciunt et quae ex his gignuntur; gignuntur autem elementa.
The topic of bodies is first divided into these: into those things which act and those which are produced from them; and those produced are the elements.
Ipse de elementis locus, ut quidam putant, simplex est, ut quidam, in materiam et causam omnia moventem et elementa dividitur.
The topic concerning the elements itself is either simple, as some think, or, as others think, is divided into matter, the cause that moves all things, and the elements.