Humanitext Reader

Seneca the Younger · Moral Letters to Lucilius §89.1-89.8

The Division of Philosophy and the Nature of Wisdom

Passage 156 of 254 · Latin

Summary

In response to Lucilius' request, Seneca proposes a systematic division of philosophy and begins by discussing the definitions and inseparable relationship of wisdom and philosophy.

§89.1Rem utilem desideras et ad sapientiam properanti necessariam, dividi philosophiam et ingens corpus eius in membra disponi.
You desire a useful thing, and one necessary for someone hastening toward wisdom: that philosophy be divided, and its immense body be arranged into limbs.
Facilius enim per partes in cognitionem totius adducimur.
For we are more easily led through parts into the knowledge of the whole.
Utinam quidem quemadmodum universa mundi facies in conspectum venit, ita philosophia tota nobis posset occurrere, simillimum mundo spectaculum.
Would indeed that, just as the entire face of the world comes into view, so the whole of philosophy could present itself to us, a spectacle most similar to the world.
Profecto enim omnes mortales in admirationem sui raperet relictis iis, quae nunc magna magnorum ignorantia credimus.
For indeed, it would carry away all mortals into admiration of itself, leaving behind those things which we now believe to be great through a great ignorance of great things.
Sed quia contingere hoc non potest, est sic nobis aspicienda, quemadmodum mundi secreta cernuntur.
But because this cannot happen, it must be viewed by us in the same way as the secrets of the world are discerned.
§89.2Sapientis quidem animus totam molem eius amplectitur nec minus illam velociter obit quam caelum acies nostra; nobis autem, quibus perrumpenda caligo est et quorum visus in proximo deficit, singula quaeque ostendi facilius possunt universi nondum capacibus.
The mind of the wise man indeed embraces its whole mass, and traverses it no less quickly than our sight traverses the sky; but to us, for whom the darkness must be broken through and whose vision fails in what is closest, individual things can be more easily shown, since we are not yet capable of the whole.
Faciam ergo quod exigis, et philosophiam in partes, non in frusta, dividam.
I will therefore do what you demand, and I will divide philosophy into parts, not into fragments.
Dividi enim illam, non concidi, utile est.
For it is useful for it to be divided, not cut to pieces.
Nam conprehendere quemadmodum maxima ita minima difficile est.
For it is difficult to comprehend the smallest things just as it is the greatest.
§89.3Discribitur in tribus populus, in centurias exercitus.
A people is distributed into tribes, an army into centuries.
Quicquid in maius crevit, facilius agnoscitur, si discessit in partes, quas, ut dixi, innumerabiles esse et parvulas non oportet.
Whatever has grown larger is more easily recognized if it has departed into parts, which, as I said, ought not to be innumerable and tiny.
Idem enim vitii habet nimia quod nulla divisio; simile confuso est, quidquid usque in pulverem sectum est.
For too much division has the same fault as none; whatever is cut down even to dust is similar to a confused thing.
§89.4Primum itaque, si videtur tibi, dicam, inter sapientiam et philosophiam quid intersit.
Therefore, first, if it seems good to you, I will say what is the difference between wisdom and philosophy.
Sapientia perfectum bonum est mentis humanae.
Wisdom is the perfect good of the human mind.
Philosophia sapientiae amor est et adfectatio.
Philosophy is the love and pursuit of wisdom.
Haec eo tendit, quo illa pervenit.
The latter tends toward where the former has arrived.
Philosophia unde dicta sit, apparet.
It is apparent whence philosophy is named.
Ipso enim nomine fatetur quid amet.
For by its very name it confesses what it loves.
§89.5Sapientiam quidam ita finierunt, ut dicerent divinorum et humanorum scientiam.
Some have defined wisdom in such a way as to say it is the knowledge of things divine and human.
Quidam ita: sapientia est nosse divina et humana et horum causas.
Others in this way: wisdom is to know things divine and human and the causes of these.
Supervacua mihi haec videtur adiectio, quia causae divinorum humanorumque pars divinorum sunt.
This addition seems superfluous to me, because the causes of divine and human things are part of divine things.
Philosophiam quoque fuerunt qui aliter atque aliter finirent.
There were also those who defined philosophy in one way or another.
Alii studium illam virtutis esse dixerunt, alii studium corrigendae mentis, a quibusdam dicta est adpetitio rectae rationis.
Some said it is the study of virtue, others the study of correcting the mind, and by some it was called the pursuit of right reason.
§89.6Illud quasi constitit, aliquid inter philosophiam et sapientiam interesse.
This has been established as it were, that some difference exists between philosophy and wisdom.
Neque enim fieri potest ut idem sit quod adfectatur et quod adfectat.
For it cannot happen that what is pursued and what pursues are the same.
Quomodo multum inter avaritiam et pecuniam interest, cum illa cupiat, haec concupiscatur, sic inter philosophiam et sapientiam.
Just as there is a great difference between avarice and money, since the former desires and the latter is desired, so it is between philosophy and wisdom.
Haec enim illius effectus ac praemium est; illa venit, ad hanc venitur.
For the latter is the effect and reward of the former; the former goes, to the latter it is gone.
Sapientia est, quam Graeci σοφίαν vocant.
Wisdom is what the Greeks call sophia.
§89.7Hoc verbo Romani quoque utebantur, sicut philosophia nunc quoque utuntur.
The Romans also used this word, just as they now also use philosophia.
Quod et togatae tibi antiquae probabunt et inscriptus Dossenni monumento titulus: " Hospes resiste et sophian Dossenni lege. "
This both the ancient plays in Roman dress will prove to you, and the title inscribed on the monument of Dossennus: "Stranger, stop and read the sophia of Dossennus.
§89.8Quidam ex nostris, quamvis philosophia studium virtutis esset et haec peteretur, illa peteret, tamen non putaverunt illas distrahi posse.
"Certain of our own school, although philosophy was the study of virtue, and the latter was sought, and the former sought it, nevertheless did not think they could be separated.
Nam nec philosophia sine virtute est nec sine philosophia virtus.
For neither is philosophy without virtue, nor virtue without philosophy.
Philosophia studium virtutis est, sed per ipsam virtutem; nec virtus autem esse sine studio sui potest nec virtutis studium sine ipsa.
Philosophy is the study of virtue, but through virtue itself; moreover, virtue cannot exist without the study of itself, nor the study of virtue without virtue itself.
Non enim quemadmodum in iis, qui aliquid ex distanti loco ferire conantur, alibi est qui petit, alibi quod petitur.
For it is not as in those who try to strike something from a distant place, where the one who aims is in one place, and what is aimed at is in another.
Nec quemadmodum itinera quae ad urbes perducunt, sic viae ad virtutem sunt extra ipsam; ad virtutem venitur per ipsam; cohaerent inter se philosophia virtusque.
Nor are the ways to virtue outside virtue itself, in the way that roads which lead to cities are; one comes to virtue through virtue itself; philosophy and virtue cohere with each other.

Notes

  1. §89.1dividi philosophiam et ingens corpus eius in membra disponi — This accusative and infinitive clause functions as an appositive to the preceding nominal phrase `Rem utilem... necessariam` in the accusative case, explaining what the 'useful and necessary thing' is.
  2. §89.1relictis iis, quae nunc magna magnorum ignorantia credimus — `relictis iis` is an ablative absolute. In the relative clause, `magna` is a predicative accusative with `credimus` ('which we believe to be great'), and `magnorum` is a genitive plural neuter depending on `ignorantia` as an objective genitive ('ignorance of great things'). The phrase means 'leaving behind those things which, through our great ignorance of great things, we now believe to be great.'
  3. §89.6Haec enim illius effectus ac praemium est; illa venit, ad hanc venitur. — The demonstrative pronouns `haec` (the closer/latter) and `illa` (the further/former) refer respectively to 'wisdom' (mentioned more recently) and 'philosophy' (mentioned earlier). Therefore, `haec` represents wisdom, and `illius` / `illa` represents philosophy.
  4. §89.8et haec peteretur, illa peteret — Here `haec` (the latter, 'virtue') is the subject of the passive `peteretur`, while `illa` (the former, 'philosophy') is the subject of the active `peteret`. It contrasts philosophy as the seeking subject with virtue as the object sought.

Cite this passage

Seneca the Younger, Moral Letters to Lucilius §89.1-89.8. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:89.1-89.8

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