§87.34Habet virtus quoque praecedentem causan adducit invidiam, multis enim propter sapientiam multis propter iustitiam invidetur.
Virtue also has a preceding cause: it brings on envy, for many are envied on account of wisdom, and many on account of justice.
Sed nec ex se hanc causam habet nec veri similem.
But it does not have this cause from itself, nor as a plausible one.
Contra enim veri similior illa species hominum animis obicitur virtute, quae illos in amorem et admirationem vocet.
For, on the contrary, a more plausible appearance is presented to the minds of men by virtue, which calls them to love and admiration.
§87.35Posidonius sic interrogandum ait: "quae neque magnitudinem animo dant nec fiduciam nec securitatem, non sunt bona.
Posidonius says that we should question in this way: "Those things which give to the mind neither greatness nor confidence nor security are not goods.
Divitiae autem et bona valetudo et similia his nihil horum faciunt; ergo non sunt bona. "Hanc interrogationem magis etiam nunc hoc modo intendit: "quae neque magnitudinem animo dant nec fiduciam nec securitatem, contra autem insolentiam, tumorem, arrogantiam creant, mala sunt.
But riches and good health and similar things do none of these; therefore, they are not goods." He now makes this questioning even stronger in this way: "Those things which give to the mind neither greatness nor confidence nor security, but on the contrary create insolence, swelling, and arrogance, are evils.
A fortuitis autem in haec inpellimur ergo non sunt bona. "" §87.36Hac," inquit, "ratione ne commoda quidem ista erunt.
But by fortuitous things we are impelled toward these; therefore, they are not goods." "By this reasoning," he says, "even those advantages of yours will not be advantages." The condition of advantages is one thing, that of goods is another.
"Alia est commodorum condicio, alia bonorum; commodum est, quod plus usus habet quam molestiae.
An advantage is that which has more of use than of trouble.
Bonum sincerum esse debet et ab omni parte innoxium.
A good must be pure and harmless in every part.
Non est id bonum, quod plus prodest, sed quod tantum prodest.
That is not a good which benefits more, but which benefits only.
§87.37Praeterea commodum et ad animalia pertinet et ad inperfectos homines et ad stultos.
Furthermore, an advantage pertains to animals and to imperfect men and to fools.
Itaque potest ei esse incommodum mixtum, sed commodum dicitur a maiore sui parte aestimatum; bonum ad unum sapientem pertinet; inviolatum esse oportet.
Therefore, an advantage can have disadvantage mixed in, but it is called an advantage being estimated by its greater part; a good pertains only to the wise man; it must be inviolate.
§87.38Bonum animum habere; unus tibi nodus, sed Herculaneus restat: "ex malis bonum non fit.
Have a good mind; one knot remains for you, but it is a Herculean one: "A good does not come from evils.
Ex multis paupertatibus divitiae fiunt; ergo divitiae bonum non sunt. "Hanc interrogationem nostri non agnoscunt, Peripatetici et fingunt illam et solvunt.
Riches come from many poverty-stricken states; therefore, riches are not a good." Our school does not acknowledge this questioning, but the Peripatetics both invent and solve it.
Ait autem Posidonius hoc sophisma, per omnes dialecticorum scholas iactatum, sic ab Antipatro refelli: "paupertas non per possessionem dicitur, sed per detractionem vel, ut antiqui dixerunt, orbationem.
But Posidonius says that this sophism, tossed about through all the schools of dialecticians, is refuted by Antipater in this way: "Poverty is not spoken of in respect of possession, but in respect of subtraction, or, as the ancients said, deprivation.
§87.39Graeci κατὰ στέρησιν dicunt.
The Greeks call this 'kat' sterēsin'.
Non quod habeat dicit, sed quod non habeat.
It does not say what it has, but what it does not have.
Itaque ex multis inanibus nihil inpleri potest; divitias multae res faciunt, non multae inopiae.
Therefore, from many empty things nothing can be filled; many resources make riches, not many wants.
Aliter," inquit, "quam debes, paupertatem intellegis.
You understand poverty," he says, "otherwise than you ought.
Paupertas enim est non quae pauca possidet, sed quae multa non possidet; ita non ab eo dicitur, quod habet, sed ab eo, quod ei deest. " §87.40Facilius, quod volo, exprimerem, si Latinum verbum esset, quo ἀνυπαρξία, significatum Hanc paupertati Antipater adsignat;
For poverty is not that which possesses few things, but that which does not possess many things; so it is spoken of not from what it has, but from what it lacks." I could express what I want more easily if there were a Latin word by which 'anyparxia' is signified.
ego non video, quid aliud sit paupertas quam parvi possessio.
Antipater assigns this to poverty; I do not see what else poverty is than the possession of little.
De isto videbimus, si quando valde vacabit, quae sit divitiarum, quae paupertatis substantia; sed tunc quoque considerabimus, numquid satius sit paupertatem permulcere, divitiis demere supercilium quam litigare de verbis, quasi iam de rebus iudicatum sit.
We shall see about that, if ever we have plenty of leisure, what the substance of riches is, and what that of poverty is; but even then we shall consider whether it is not better to soothe poverty and take away arrogance from riches than to dispute about words, as if judgment had already been passed on things.
§87.41Putemus nos ad contionem vocatos; lex de abolendis divitiis fertur.
Let us suppose we are called to an assembly; a law is being proposed concerning the abolition of riches.
His interrogationibus suasuri aut dissuasuri sumus? His effecturi, ut populus Romanus paupertatem, fundamentum et causam imperii sui, requirat ac laudet, divitias autem suas timeat, ut cogitet has se apud victos repperisse, hinc ambitum et largitiones et tumultus in urbem sanctissimam et temperantissimam inrupisse, nimis luxuriose ostentari gentium spolia, quod unus populus eripuerit omnibus, facilius ab omnibus uni eripi posse? Hanc satius est suadere et expugnare adfectus, non circumscribere.
Are we going to advocate or oppose it with these questionings? Are we going to bring it about by these that the Roman people seek and praise poverty, the foundation and cause of their empire, but fear their riches, reflecting that they found these among the conquered, that from here electioneering, bribery, and tumults rushed into the most sacred and temperate city, that the spoils of nations are displayed too luxuriously, and that what one people snatched from all can more easily be snatched from one by all? It is better to persuade this and to conquer emotions, not to circumvent them.
Si possumus, fortius loquamur; si minus, apertius.
If we can, let us speak more strongly; if not, more clearly.
VALE.
FAREWELL.