§87.26Quidam ex nostris adversus hoc sic respondent: "Putemus pecuniam bonum esse undecumque sumptam; non tamen ideo ex sacrilegio pecunia est, etiam si ex sacrilegio sumitur.
Some of our school reply to this as follows: "Let us suppose that money is a good, from whatever source it is taken; yet money is not therefore derived from temple-robbery, even if it is taken from temple-robbery.
Hoc sic intellege: in eadem urna et aurum est et vipera.
Understand this in this way: in the same urn there is both gold and a viper.
Si aurum ex urna sustuleris, quia illic et vipera est, non ideo, inquam, mihi urna aurum dat, quia viperam habet, sed aurum dat, cum et viperam habeat.
If you take the gold out of the urn because there is also a viper there, the urn, I say, does not therefore give me gold because it has a viper, but it gives gold although it also has a viper.
Eodem modo ex sacrilegio lucrum fit, non quia turpe et sceleratum est sacrilegium, sed quia et lucrum habet.
In the same way, profit is made from temple-robbery, not because temple-robbery is shameful and criminal, but because it also has profit.
Quemadmodum in illa urna vipera malum est, non aurum, quod cum vipera iacet, sic in sacrilegio malum est scelus, non lucrum. " §87.27A quibus dissentio: dissimillima enim utriusque rei condicio est.
Just as in that urn the viper is the evil, not the gold which lies with the viper, so in temple-robbery the crime is the evil, not the profit." With whom I disagree; for the condition of each case is entirely different.
Illic aurum possum sine vipera tollere, hic lucrum sine sacrilegio facere non possum.
In the former case, I can take the gold without the viper; in the latter, I cannot make profit without temple-robbery.
Lucrum istud non est adpositum sceleri, sed inmixtum.
That profit is not set alongside the crime, but mixed in with it.
§87.28"Quod dum consequi volumus, in multa mala incidimus, id bonum non est.
"That which, while we wish to attain it, we fall into many evils, is not a good.
Dum divitias autem consequi volumus, in multa mala incidimus; ergo divitiae bonum non sunt. ""Duas," inquit, "significationes habet propositio vestra, unam: dum divitias consequi volumus, in multa nos mala incidere.
But while we wish to attain riches, we fall into many evils; therefore, riches are not a good." "Your proposition," he says, "has two meanings: one, that while we wish to attain riches, we fall into many evils.
In multa autem mala incidimus et dum virtutem consequi volumus.
But we fall into many evils even while we wish to attain virtue.
Aliquis dum navigat studii causa, naufragium fecit, aliquis captus est.
Someone, while sailing for the sake of study, made shipwreck; someone was captured.
§87.29Altera significatio talis est: per quod in mala incidimus, bonum non est.
The other meaning is as follows: that through which we fall into evils is not a good.
Huic propositioni non erit consequens per divitias nos aut per voluptates in mala incidere; aut si per divitias in multa mala incidimus, non tantum bonum non sunt divitiae, sed malum sunt; vos autem illas dicitis tantum bonum non esse.
It will not follow from this proposition that we fall into evils through riches or through pleasures; or if we fall into many evils through riches, riches are not only not a good, but they are an evil; yet you say that they are only not a good.
Praeterea," inquit, "conceditis divitias habere aliquid usus.
Furthermore," he says, "you concede that riches have some use.
Inter commoda illas numeratis; atqui eadem ratione ne commodum quidem erunt.
You number them among advantages; and yet, by the same reasoning, they will not even be an advantage.
Per illas enim multa nobis incommoda eveniunt. " §87.30His quidam hoc respondent: "Erratis, qui incommoda divitiis inputatis.
For through them many disadvantages happen to us." To these some reply as follows: "You err who impute disadvantages to riches.
Illae neminem laedunt; aut sua nocet cuique stultitia aut aliena nequitia, sic quemadmodum gladius neminem occidit; occidentis telum est.
They harm no one; either his own folly or another's wickedness harms each person, just as a sword kills no one; it is the weapon of the one who kills.
Non ideo divitiae tibi nocent, si propter divitias tibi nocetur. " §87.31Posidonius, ut ego existimo, melius, qui ait divitias esse causam malorum, non quia ipsae faciunt aliquid, sed quia facturos inritant.
Riches do not therefore harm you, even if you are harmed because of riches." Posidonius, as I think, speaks better, who says that riches are the cause of evils, not because they themselves do anything, but because they provoke those who will do it.
Alia est enim causa e(iiciens, quae protinus necesse est noceat, alia praecedens.
For the efficient cause, which must immediately harm, is one thing, the preceding cause is another.
Hanc praecedentem causam divitiae habent; inflant animos, superbiam pariunt, invidiam contrahunt et usque eo mentem alienant, ut fama pecuniae nos etiam nocitura delectet.
Riches have this preceding cause; they puff up minds, produce pride, bring on envy, and alienate the mind to such an extent that the reputation of money delights us even though it is about to harm us.
§87.32Bona autem omnia carere culpa decet; pura sunt, non corrumpunt animos, non sollicitant.
But it is fitting for all goods to be free from blame; they are pure, they do not corrupt minds, they do not disturb them.
Extollunt quidem et dilatant, sed sine tumore.
They do indeed elevate and expand them, but without swelling.
Quae bona sunt fiduciam faciunt, divitiae audaciam.
Those which are goods produce confidence, riches produce audacity.
Quae bona sunt magnitudinem animi dant, divitiae insolentiam.
Those which are goods give greatness of mind, riches insolence.
Nihil autem alii est insolentia quam species magnitudinis falsa.
But insolence is nothing else than a false appearance of greatness.
§87.33"Isto modo," inquit, "etiam malum sunt divitia non tantum bonum non sunt. "Essent malum, ipsae nocerent, si, ut dixi, haberent efficientem causam; nunc praecedentem habent et quidem non inritantem tantum animos, sed adtrahentem.
"In that way," he says, "riches are also an evil, not only not a good." They would be an evil and would themselves harm, if, as I said, they had an efficient cause; now they have a preceding cause, and indeed one that not only provokes minds but attracts them.
Specie enim boni offundunt veri similem ac plerisque credibilem.
For they spread a plausible appearance of good, credible to most people.