§124.9Quid ergo inter ista, quae rettuli, distat? In eo, quod inrationale est, numquam erit bonum.
What then is the difference between those things which I have related? In that which is irrational, there will never be a good.
In eo, quod nondum rationale est, tunc esse bonum non potest.
In that which is not yet rational, a good cannot exist at that time.
Esse in eo, quod rationale est sed inperfectum, iam potest bonum, sed non est.
In that which is rational but imperfect, a good can already exist, but it is not yet there.
§124.10Ita dico, Lucili: bonum non in quolibet corpore, non in qualibet aetate invenitur et tantum abest ab infantia, quantum a primo ultimum, quantum ab initio perfectum.
I say this, Lucilius: the good is not found in just any body, nor in just any age, and it is as far removed from infancy as the last is from the first, as the perfected is from the beginning.
Ergo nec in tenero, modo coalescente corpusculo est.
Therefore, it is not in a tender, just now forming body either.
Quidni non sit? Non magis quam in semine.
Why indeed should it not be absent? No more than in a seed.
§124.11Hoc si dicas, aliquod arboris ac sati bonum novimus; hoc non est in prima fronde, quae emissa eum maxime solum rumpit.
If you say this: we know some good of a tree and of a planted thing; this is not in the first leaf, which, having been sent forth, just now breaks the soil.
Est aliquod bonum tritici; hoc nondum est in herba lactente nec cum folliculo se exerit spica mollis, sed cum frumentum aestas et debita maturitas coxit.
There is some good of wheat; this is not yet in the milky blade, nor when the soft ear of corn thrusts itself out from the husk, but when summer and due maturity have cooked the grain.
Quemadmodum omnis natura bonum suum nisi consummata non profert, ita hominis bonum non est in homine, nisi cum illi ratio perfecta est.
Just as every nature does not bring forth its own good unless perfected, so the good of man is not in man, except when reason is perfected in him.
§124.12Quod autem hoc bonum? Dicam: liber animus, erectus, alia subiciens sibi, se nulli.
What moreover is this good? I will tell you: a free mind, upright, subjecting other things to itself, itself to none.
Hoc bonum adeo non recipit infantia, ut pueritia non speret, adulescentia inprobe speret; bene agitur cum senectute, si ad illud longo studio intentoque pervenit.
Infancy is so far from receiving this good that childhood does not hope for it, and youth hopes for it improperly; it goes well with old age if it arrives at it by long and intent study.
Si hoc est bonum, et intellegibile est.
If this is the good, it is also intelligible.
§124.13"Dixisti," inquit, "aliquod bonum esse arboris, aliquod herbae; potest ergo aliquod esse et infantis. "Verum bonum nec in arboribus nec in mutis animalibus; hoc, quod in illis bonum est, precario bonum dicitur.
'You said,' he says, 'that there is some good of a tree, some of a herb; therefore there can be some of an infant also.' But true good is neither in trees nor in mute animals; this which is called good in them is so called only precariously.
"Quod est? "inquis.
'What is it?' you ask.
Hoc, quod secundum cuiusque naturam est.
This: that which is according to the nature of each.
Bonum quidem cadere in mutum animal nullo modo potest; felicioris meliorisque naturae est.
Indeed, the good can in no way apply to a mute animal; it belongs to a happier and better nature.
Nisi ubi rationi locus est, bonum non est.
Unless there is room for reason, there is no good.
§124.14Quattuor hae naturae sunt, arboris, animalis, hominis, dei; haec duo, quae rationalia, sunt, eandem naturam habent, illo diversa sunt, quod alterum inmortale, alterum mortale est.
These four natures there are: of tree, of animal, of man, of god; these two which are rational have the same nature, but they are different in this, that the one is immortal, the other mortal.
Ex his ergo unius bonum natura perficit, dei scilicet, alterius cura, hominis.
Therefore, of these, nature perfects the good of the one—namely, of god—and care perfects the good of the other—of man.
Cetera tantum in sua natura perfecta sunt, non vere perfecta, a quibus abest ratio.
The others are only perfected in their own nature, not truly perfected, from which reason is absent.
Hoc enim demum perfectum est, quod secundum universam naturam perfectum, universa autem natura rationalis est.
For that indeed is perfected which is perfected according to the universal nature, and the universal nature is rational.
Cetera possunt in suo genere esse perfecta.
The others can be perfected in their own kind.
§124.15In quo non potest beata vita esse, nec id potest, quo beata vita efficitur, beata autem vita bonis efficitur.
In that in which a happy life cannot exist, neither can that exist by which a happy life is effected; moreover, a happy life is effected by goods.
In muto animali non est beata vita nec id, quo beata vita efficitur, in muto animali bonum non est.
In a mute animal there is no happy life, nor that by which a happy life is effected; therefore in a mute animal, there is no good.
§124.16Mutum animal sensu conprendit praesentia.
A mute animal comprehends present things by sense.
Praeteritorum reminiscitur, cum id incidit, quo sensus admoneretur; tamquam equus reminiscitur viae, cum ad initium eius admotus est.
It remembers past things only when that occurs by which the sense is stimulated; just as a horse remembers a road when he has been brought to the beginning of it.
In stabulo quidem nulla illi viae est quamvis saepe calcatae memoria.
Indeed, in the stable, he has no memory of the road, however often trodden.
Tertium vero tempus, id est futurum, ad muta non pertinet.
But the third time, that is, the future, does not pertain to mute animals.