§124.1"
Possum multa tibi veterum praecepta referre,
Ni refugis tenuisque piget cognoscere curas.
"I can relate to you many precepts of the ancients, unless you shrink back and it displeases you to learn minor cares.
"
Non refugis autem nec ulla te subtilitas abigit.
"But you do not shrink back, nor does any subtlety drive you away.
Non est elegantiae tuae tam magna sectari secure.
It is not of your refinement to pursue such great matters carelessly.
Illud probo, quod omnia ad aliquem profectum redigis et tunc tantum offenderis, ubi summa subtilitate nihil agitur.
I approve of this, that you reduce all things to some progress, and are offended only when nothing is accomplished by the greatest subtlety.
Quod ne nunc quidem fieri laborabo.
I shall strive that this does not happen even now.
Quaeritur, utrum sensu conprendatur an intellectu bonum? Huic adiunctum est in mutis animalibus et infantibus non esse.
The question is raised, whether the good is comprehended by sense or by intellect? Connected to this is that it does not exist in mute animals and infants.
§124.2Quicumque voluptatem in summo ponunt, sensibile iudicant bonum, nos contra intellegibile, qui illud animo damus.
Whoever place pleasure at the highest judge the good to be sensible, but we, on the contrary, judge it to be intelligible, who assign it to the mind.
Si de bono sensus iudicarent, nullam voluptatem reiceremus, nulla enim non invitat, nulla non delectat; et e contrario nullum dolorem volentes subiremus, nullus enim non offendit sensum.
If the senses judged concerning the good, we would reject no pleasure, for there is none that does not attract, none that does not delight; and on the contrary, we would undergo no pain willingly, for there is none that does not offend the sense.
§124.3Praeterea non essent digni reprehensione, quibus nimium voluptas placet quibusque summus est doloris timor.
Furthermore, those whom pleasure pleases too much and for whom the fear of pain is greatest would not be worthy of blame.
Atqui inprobamus gulae ac libidini addictos et contemnimus illos, qui nihil viriliter ausuri sunt doloris metu.
And yet we disapprove of those addicted to gluttony and lust, and we despise those who, through fear of pain, will dare nothing manly.
Quid autem peccant, si sensibus, id est iudicibus boni ac mali, parent? His enim tradidistis adpetitionis et fugae arbitrium.
But what sin do they commit, if they obey the senses, that is, the judges of good and evil? For to these you have handed over the decision of desire and avoidance.
§124.4Sed videlicet ratio isti rei praeposita est; illa quemadmodum de beata vita, quemadmodum de virtute, de honesto, sic et de bono maloque constituit.
But obviously reason has been placed over this matter; just as it decides concerning the happy life, concerning virtue, and concerning the honorable, so also it decides concerning the good and the evil.
Nam apud istos vilissimae parti datur de meliore sententia, ut de bono pronuntiet sensus, obtunsa res et hebes et in homine quam in aliis animalibus tardior.
For among those people, the decision concerning the better part is given to the cheapest part, so that the sense pronounces on the good—a dull and blunt thing, and slower in man than in other animals.
§124.5Quid si quis vellet non oculis, sed tactu minuta discernere? Subtilior ad hoc acies nulla quam oculorum et intentior daret bonum malumque dinoscere.
What if someone wished to discern minute things not with the eyes, but by touch? No sight is subtler or more intent than that of the eyes for this purpose, which would grant the power to discern good and evil.
Vides in quanta ignorantia veritatis versetur et quam humi sublimia ac divina proiecerit, apud quem de summo, bono malo, iudicat tactus, "Quemadmodum," inquit, "omnis scientia atque ars aliquid debet habere manifestum sensuque conprehensum, ex quo oriatur et crescat, sic beata vita fundamentum et initium a manifestis ducit et eo, quod sub sensum cadat. §124.6Nempe vos a manifestis beatam vitam initium sui capere dicitis.
You see in how great an ignorance of the truth he is involved, and how on the ground he has cast down lofty and divine things, with whom touch judges concerning the highest, concerning the good and the evil. "Just as," he says, "every science and art must have something manifest and comprehended by sense, from which it may arise and grow, so the happy life derives its foundation and beginning from manifest things and from that which falls under the sense.
" §124.7Dicimus beata esse, quae secundum naturam sint.
Surely you too say that the happy life takes its beginning from manifest things." We say that those things are happy which are according to nature.
Quid autem secundum naturam sit, palam et protinus apparet, sicut quid sit integrum.
But what is according to nature is clear and immediately apparent, just as what is sound.
Quod secundum naturam est, quod contigit protinus nato, non dico bonum, sed initium boni.
What is according to nature, which falls to one immediately born, I do not call a good, but the beginning of a good.
Tu summum bonum, voluptatem, infantiae donas, ut inde incipiat nascens, quo consummatus homo pervenit.
You bestow the supreme good, pleasure, upon infancy, so that the newborn begins from that place where the perfected man arrives.
§124.8Cacumen radicis loco ponis.
You put the treetop in place of the root.
Si quis diceret illum in materno utero latentem, sexus quoque incerti, tenerum et inperfectum et informem iam in aliquo bono esse, aperte videretur errare.
If anyone should say that he who is latent in the maternal womb, of uncertain sex also, tender and imperfect and unformed, is already in some good, he would openly seem to err.
Atqui quantulum interest inter cum, qui cum maxime vitam accipit, et illum, qui maternorum viscerum latens onus est? Uterque, quantum ad intellectum boni ac mali, aeque maturus est, et non magis infans adhuc boni capax est quam arbor aut mutum aliquod animal.
And yet how little difference is there between him who is just now receiving life, and him who is a latent burden of the maternal womb? Both, as far as the understanding of good and evil is concerned, are equally immature, and an infant is no more capable of the good as yet than a tree or some mute animal.
Quare autem bonum in arbore animalique muto non est? Quia nec ratio.
But why is there no good in a tree and a mute animal?
Ob hoc in infante quoque non est, nam et huic deest;
Because there is no reason.
tunc ad bonum perveniet, cum ad rationem perveneris Est aliquod inrationale animal, est aliquod nondum rationale, est rationale sed inperfectum; in nullo horum bonum, ratio illud secum adfert.
For this reason, it is not in an infant either, for he also lacks it; he will arrive at the good only when he has arrived at reason. There is some irrational animal, there is some not yet rational, there is rational but imperfect; in none of these is the good, reason brings it with itself.