§117.9Sed illud libenter quaesierim: cum omnia aut mala sint aut bona aut indifferentia, sapere in quo numero sit? Bonum negant esse, malum utique non est; sequitur ut medium sit.
But I should like to ask this: since all things are either evil or good or indifferent, in which class is to be wise? They deny that it is a good, and it is certainly not an evil; it follows that it is indifferent.
Id autem medium atque indifferens vocamus, quod tam malo contingere quam bono possit, tamquam pecunia, forma, nobilitas.
Now, we call that indifferent which can happen to a bad man as well as to a good man, like money, beauty, noble birth.
Hoc, ut sapiat, contingere nisi bono non potest; ergo indifferens non est.
But this, to be wise, cannot happen to anyone except a good man; therefore it is not indifferent.
Atqui ne malum quidem est, quod contingere malo non potest; ergo bonum est.
And yet it is not an evil either, which cannot happen to a bad man; therefore it is a good.
Quod nisi bonus non habet, bonum est. Sapere non nisi bonus habet; ergo bonum est. "
What nobody but a good man has is a good; only a good man has to be wise; therefore it is a good.
§117.10Accidens est," inquit, "sapientiae.
"It is an accident," someone says, "to wisdom." Therefore, this which you call to be wise, does it act upon wisdom or suffer from it?
"Hoc ergo, quod vocas sapere, utrum facit sapientiam an patitur? Utroque modo corpus est.
In either way, it is a body.
Nam et quod fit et quod facit, corpus est; si corpus est, bonum est.
For both that which is made and that which makes are a body; if it is a body, it is a good.
Unum enim illi deerat, quominus bonum esset, quod incorporale erat.
For only one thing was lacking to it to prevent it from being a good, namely, that it was incorporeal.
§117.11Peripateticis placet nihil interesse inter sapientiam et sapere, cu in utrolibet eorum et alterum sit.
It is agreed among the Peripatetics that there is no difference between wisdom and to be wise, since in either of them the other is also present.
Numquid enim quemquam existimas sapere nisi qui sapientiam habet? Numquid quemquam, qui sapit, non putas habere sapientiam?
For do you think anyone is wise except the one who has wisdom? Do you think anyone who is wise does not have wisdom?
§117.12Dialectici veteres ista distinguunt; ab illis divisio usque ad Stoicos venit.
The ancient dialecticians distinguish these; from them the division came down to the Stoics.
Qualis sit haec, dicam.
I shall tell you what kind of division this is.
Aliud est ager, aliud agrum habere, quidni? Cum habere agrum ad habentem, non ad agrum pertineat.
A field is one thing, to have a field is another, is it not? Since to have a field belongs to the owner, not to the field.
Sic aliud est sapientia, aliud sapere.
So wisdom is one thing, to be wise is another.
Puto concedes duo esse haec, id, quod habetur, et eum, qui habet; habetur sapientia, habet qui sapit.
I think you will grant that these two are different: that which is possessed, and the one who possesses; wisdom is possessed, the one who is wise possesses it.
Sapientia est mens perfecta vel ad summum optimumque perducta.
Wisdom is a mind perfected or brought to the highest and best condition.
Ars enim vitae est.
For it is the art of life.
Sapere quid est? Non possum dicere "mens perfecta," sed id quod contingit perfectam mentem habenti; ita alterum est mens bona, alterum quasi habere mentem bonam.
What is to be wise? I cannot say "a perfected mind," but that which happens to the one who has a perfected mind; thus, the one is a good mind, the other is, as it were, to have a good mind.
§117.13"Sunt," inquit, "naturae corporum, tamquam hic homo est, hic equus.
"There are," he says, "natures of bodies, like this man, this horse.
Has deinde sequuntur motus animorum enuntiativi corporum.
These are followed by the enunciative movements of minds concerning bodies.
Hi habent proprium quiddam et a corporibus seductum, tamquam video Catonem ambulantem. Hoc sensus ostendit, animus credidit.
These have something of their own and separated from bodies, like 'I see Cato walking.' Sense-perception showed this, the mind believed it.
Corpus est, quod video, cui et oculos intendi et animum.
What I see, to which I directed both my eyes and my mind, is a body.
Dico deinde: Cato ambulat. Non corpus," inquit, "est, quod nunc loquor, sed enuntiativum quiddam de corpore, quod alii effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii dictum.
Then I say: 'Cato walks.' What I now speak," he says, "is not a body, but an enunciative proposition about a body, which some call a statement (effatum), others a proposition (enuntiatum), others an utterance (dictum).
Sic cum dicimus sapientiam, corporale quiddam intellegimus; cum dicimus "sapit," de corpore loquimur.
Thus, when we say 'wisdom', we understand a corporeal thing; when we say 'he is wise', we speak about a body.
Plurimum autem interest, utrum illum dicas an de illo. "
But there is a very great difference whether you speak of him or about him." Let us assume for the present that these two are different,—for I do not yet declare my own opinion,—what prevents them from being indeed different, but nevertheless a good?
§117.14Putemus in praesentia ista duo esse,—nondum enim, quid mihi videatur, pronuntio,—quid prohibet, quominus aliud quidem sit, sed nihilominus bonum? Dicebam paulo ante aliud esse agrum, aliud habere agrum.
I said a little earlier that a field is one thing, to have a field is another.
Quidni? In alia enim natura est qui habet, in alia quod habetur.
Why not? For the possessor is of one nature, and the possessed is of another.
Illa terra est, hic homo est.
The former is land, the latter is a human being.
At in hoc, de quo agitur, eiusdem naturae sunt utraque, et qui habet sapientiam, et ipsa.
But in this matter under discussion, both are of the same nature, both the one who has wisdom and wisdom itself.
§117.15Praeterea illic aliud est, quod habetur, alius, qui habet; hic in eodem est et quod habetur et qui habet.
Furthermore, in that case, what is possessed is one thing, and the possessor is another; in this case, both what is possessed and the possessor are in the same subject.
Ager iure possidetur, sapientia natura.
A field is possessed by law, wisdom by nature.
Ille abalienari potest et alteri tradi, haec non discedit a domino.
The former can be alienated and transferred to another, the latter does not leave its master.
Non est itaque quod compares inter se dissimilia.
Therefore, there is no reason for you to compare unlike things.
Coeperam dicere posse ista duo esse et tamen utraque bona, tamquam sapientia et sapiens duo sunt et utrumque bonum esse concedis.
I had begun to say that these two can be different and yet both can be good, just as wisdom and a wise man are two things and you grant that both are a good.
Quomodo nihil obstat, quominus et sapientia bonum sit et habens sapientiam, sic nihil obstat, quominus et sapientia bonum sit et habere sapientiam, id est sapere.
Just as nothing prevents both wisdom and the one who has wisdom from being a good, so nothing prevents both wisdom and to have wisdom—that is, to be wise—from being a good.