§117.1Multum mihi negotii concinnabis et, dum nescis, in magnam me litem ac molestiam inpinges, qui mihi tales quaestiunculas ponis, in quibus ego nec dissentire a nostris salva gratia nec consentire salva conscientia possum.
You will cook up a lot of trouble for me and, without knowing it, you will drive me into a great dispute and annoyance, you who pose such petty questions to me, in which I can neither dissent from our school without losing favor, nor agree with them without losing my conscience.
Quaeris, an verum sit, quod Stoicis placet, sapientiam bonum esse, sapere bonum non esse.
You ask whether it is true, as the Stoics hold, that wisdom is a good, but to be wise is not a good.
Primum exponam, quid Stoicis videatur; deinde tunc dicere sententiam audebo.
First I shall explain what the Stoics think; then, only then, shall I dare to state my opinion.
§117.2Placet nostris, quod bonum est, corpus esse, quia quod bonum est, facit: quidquid facit, corpus est.
It is agreed among our school that what is good is a body, because what is good acts; whatever acts is a body.
Quod bonum est, prodest.
What is good is beneficial.
Faciat autem aliquid oportet, ut prosit; si facit, corpus est.
But it must do something in order to be beneficial; if it does, it is a body.
Sapientiam bonum esse dicunt; sequitur, ut necesse sit illam corporalem quoque dicere.
They say that wisdom is a good; it follows that it is necessary to say that it is also corporeal.
§117.3At sapere non putant eiusdem condicionis esse.
But they do not think that to be wise is of the same condition.
Incorporale est et accidens alteri, id est sapientiae; itaque nec facit quidquam nec prodest.
It is incorporeal and an accident to another, that is, to wisdom; and therefore it neither does anything nor is beneficial.
' "Quid ergo? "inquit, "non dicimus, bonum est sapere? "Dicimus referentes ad id, ex quo pendet, id est ad ipsam sapientiam.
' "What then?"' someone says, ' "do we not say that to be wise is a good?"' We do say so, but by referring it to that on which it depends, that is, to wisdom itself.
§117.4Adversus hos quid ab aliis respondeatur, audi, antequam ego incipio secedere et in alia parte considere.
Hear what is answered by others against these men, before I begin to secede and take my seat on another side.
"Isto modo," inquiunt, "nec beate vivere bonum est.
"In that way," they say, "to live happily is not a good either.
velint nolint, respondendum est beatam vitam bonum esse, beate vivere bonum non esse. " §117.5Etiamnunc nostris illud quoque opponitur: "vultis sapere.
Whether they wish it or not, they must answer that a happy life is a good, but to live happily is not a good." Furthermore, this is also opposed to our school: "You wish to be wise.
Ergo expetenda res est sapere.
Therefore, to be wise is a thing to be desired.
Si expetenda res est, bona est. "Coguntur nostri verba torquere et unam syllabam expetendo interponere, quam sermo noster inseri non sinit.
If it is a thing to be desired, it is good." Our school is forced to twist words and insert a single syllable into 'expetendum', which our language does not allow to be inserted.
Ego illam, si pateris, adiungam.
I will add it, if you allow.
"Expetendum est," inquiunt, "quod bonum est: expetibile, quod nobis contingit, cum bonum consecuti sumus.
"What is to be desired (expetendum)," they say, "is what is good; what is desirable (expetibile) is what falls to our lot when we have attained the good.
Non petitur tamquam bonum, sed petito bono accedit. " §117.6Ego non idem sentio et nostros iudico in hoc descendere, quia iam primo vinculo tenentur et mutare illis formulam non licet.
It is not sought as a good, but it is added when the good is sought." I do not feel the same way, and I judge that our school descends to this because they are already bound by their first chain and are not allowed to change their formula.
Multum dare solemus praesumptioni omnium hominum, et apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri.
We are accustomed to give much weight to the presupposition of all men, and among us it is a proof of truth that something seems so to everyone.
Tamquam deos esse inter alia hoc colligimus, quod omnibus insita de dis opinio est nec ulla gens usquam est adeo extra leges moresque proiecta, ut non aliquos deos credat.
For instance, we infer that gods exist from this, among other things, that an opinion about the gods is engrained in everyone, nor is there any nation anywhere so cast out beyond laws and customs as not to believe in some gods.
Cum de animarum aeternitate disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet consensus hominum aut timentium inferos aut colentium.
When we discuss the immortality of souls, the consensus of men who either fear the underworld or worship it has no small weight with us.
Utor hac publica persuasione: neminem invenies, qui non putet et sapientiam bonum et sapere.
I make use of this public conviction: you will find no one who does not think both that wisdom is a good and that to be wise is too.
§117.7Non faciam, quod victi solent, ut provocem ad populum; nostris incipiamus armis confligere.
I shall not do what the defeated are accustomed to do, namely, appeal to the people; let us begin to fight with our own weapons.
Quod accidit alicui, utrum extra id, cui accidit, est an in eo, cui accidit? Si in eo est, cui accidit, tam corpus est quam illud, cui accidit.
Does that which happens to something exist outside that to which it happens, or inside that to which it happens? If it is in that to which it happens, it is as much a body as that to which it happens.
Nihil enim accidere sine tactu potest; quod tangit, corpus est.
For nothing can happen without contact; and what touches is a body.
Si extra est, posteaquam acciderat, recessit.
If it is outside, after it had happened, it withdrew.
Quod recessit, motum habet.
What has withdrawn has motion.
Quod motum habet, corpus est.
What has motion is a body.
Speras me dicturum non esse aliud cursum, aliud currere, nec aliud calorem, aliud calere, nec aliud lucem, aliud lucere; concedo ista alia esse, sed non sortis alterius.
You expect that I will say that running is not one thing and to run another, nor heat one thing and to be hot another, nor light one thing and to shine another; I grant that those things are different, but not of a different category.
§117.8Si valetudo indifferens est, et valere indifferens est; si forma indifferens est, et formonsum esse.
If health is an indifferent thing, to be healthy is also indifferent; if beauty is indifferent, to be beautiful is also indifferent.
Si iustitia bonum est, et iustum esse.
If justice is a good, to be just is also a good.
Si turpitudo malum est, et turpem esse malum est, tam mehercules quam, si lippitudo malum est, lippire quoque malum est.
If baseness is an evil, to be base is also an evil, just as, by Hercules, if blear-eyedness is an evil, to be blear-eyed is also an evil.
Hoc ut scias, neutrum esse sine altero potest.
That you may know this, neither can exist without the other.
Qui sapit, sapiens est; qui sapiens est, sapit.
He who is wise is a wise man; he who is a wise man is wise.
Adeo non potest dubitari, an quale illud sit, tale hoc sit, ut quibusdam utrumque unum videatur atque idem,
So little can it be doubted whether the latter is of the same nature as the former, that to some people both seem to be one and the same,