§113.11Omne animal, donec moriatur, id est, quod coepit; homo, donec moriatur, homo est, equus equus, canis canis.
Every animal, until it dies, is what it began to be; a man, until he dies, is a man, a horse a horse, a dog a dog.
Transire in aliud non potest.
It cannot pass into something else.
Iustitia, id est animus quodammodo se habens, animal est.
Justice, that is, the mind disposed in a certain way, is an animal.
Credamus; deinde animal est fortitudo, id est animus quodammodo se habens.
Let us believe it; next, courage, that is, the mind disposed in a certain way, is an animal.
Quis animus? Ille, qui modo iustitia erat? Tenetur in priore animali, in aliud animal transire ei non licet; in eo illi, in quo primum esse coepit, perseverandum est.
Which mind? That which just now was justice? It is held in the former animal, and it is not permitted for it to pass into another animal; it must persevere in that in which it first began to be.
§113.12Praeterea unus animus duorum esse animalium non potest, multo minus plurium.
Moreover, one mind cannot belong to two animals, much less to more.
Si iustitia, fortitudo, temperantia ceteraeque virtutes animalia sunt, quo modo unum animum habebunt? Singulos habeant oportet, aut non sunt animalia.
If justice, courage, temperance, and the other virtues are animals, how will they have one mind? They ought to have individual minds, or they are not animals.
§113.13Non potest unum corpus plurium animalium esse.
One body cannot belong to several animals.
Hoc et ipsi fatentur.
This they themselves also admit.
Iustitiae quod est corpus? "Animus. "Quid? Fortitudinis quod est corpus? "Idem animus. "Atqui unum corpus esse duorum animalium non potest.
What is the body of justice? 'The mind.' What? What is the body of courage? 'The same mind.' And yet, one body cannot belong to two animals.
§113.14"Sed idem animus," inquit, "iustitiae habitum induit et fortitudinis et temperantiae. "Hoc fieri posset, si quo tempore iustitia esset, fortitudo non esset, quo tempore fortitudo esset, temperantia non esset; nunc vero omnes virtutes simul sunt.
'But the same mind,' he says, 'assumes the disposition of justice, of courage, and of temperance.' This could happen if, at the time when justice existed, courage did not exist, and at the time when courage existed, temperance did not exist; but in fact, all virtues exist together.
Ita quomodo singulae erunt animalia, cum unus animus sit, qui plus quam unum animal non potest facere?
Thus, how will they be individual animals, when there is only one mind, which cannot make more than one animal?
§113.15Denique nullum animal pars est alterius animalis.
Finally, no animal is a part of another animal.
Iustitia autem pars est animi; non est ergo animal, videor mihi in re confessa perdere operam; magis enim indignandum de isto quam disputandum est.
But justice is a part of the mind; therefore it is not an animal. I seem to myself to be wasting my effort on an admitted matter; for one ought to be indignant about this rather than argue about it.
Nullum animal alteri par est.
No animal is equal to another.
Circumspice omnium corpora: nulli non et color proprius est et figura sua et magnitudo.
Look around at the bodies of all: there is none that does not have both its own color, its own shape, and its own magnitude.
§113.16Inter cetera, propter quae mirabile divini artificis ingenium est, hoc quoque existimo, et quod in tanta copia rerum numquam in idem incidit; etiam quae similia videntur, cum contuleris, diversa sunt.
Among other things on account of which the intellect of the divine craftsman is wonderful, I think this is also one: that in such an abundance of things he never stumbled upon the same; even things which seem similar, when you compare them, are different.
Tot fecit genera foliorum: nullum non sua proprietate signatum.
He made so many kinds of leaves: none is not marked with its own characteristic.
Tot animalia: nullius magnitudo cum altero convenit, utique aliquid interest.
So many animals: the magnitude of none agrees with another, at any rate there is some difference.
Exegit a se, ut quae alia erant, et dissimilia essent et inparia; virtutes omnes, ut dicitis, pares sunt.
He demanded of himself that those things which were different should also be dissimilar and unequal; but all virtues, as you say, are equal.
Ergo non sunt animalia.
Therefore they are not animals.
§113.17Nullum non animal per se agit.
There is no animal that does not act of itself.
virtus autem per se nihil agit, sed cum homine.
But virtue does nothing of itself, but only with man.
Omnia animalia aut rationalia sunt, ut homines, ut di, aut inrationalia, ut ferae, ut pecora.
All animals are either rational, as men and gods, or irrational, as wild beasts and cattle.
virtutes utique rationales sunt; atqui nec homines sunt nec di; ergo non sunt animalia.
Virtues are indeed rational; and yet they are neither men nor gods; therefore they are not animals.
§113.18Omne rationale animal nihil agit, nisi primum specie alicuius rei inritatum est, deinde impetum cepit, deinde adsensio confirmavit hunc impetum.
Every rational animal does nothing unless it has first been stimulated by the appearance of some thing, then has conceived an impulse, and then assent has confirmed this impulse.
Quid sit adsensio, dicam.
I will tell you what assent is.
Oportet me ambulare: tunc demum ambulo, cum hoc mihi dixi et adprobavi hanc opinionem meam.
'I ought to walk': then at last I walk, when I have said this to myself and approved this opinion of mine.
Oportet me sedere: tunc demum sedeo.
'I ought to sit': then at last I sit.
Haec adsensio in virtute non est.
This assent is not in virtue.
§113.19Puta enim prudentiam esse; quomodo adsentietur "oportet me ambulare"? Hoc natura non recipit.
For suppose that prudence exists; how will it assent to 'I ought to walk'? This nature does not admit.
Prudentia enim ei, cuius est, prospicit, non sibi.
For prudence provides for him to whom it belongs, not for itself.
Nam nec ambulare potest nec sedere.
For it can neither walk nor sit.
Ergo adsensionem non habet, rationale animal non est.
Therefore, it does not have assent, and is not a rational animal.
virtus si animal est, rationale est.
If virtue is an animal, it is rational.
§113.20Rationale autem non est; ergo nec animal.
But it is not rational; therefore it is not an animal either.
Si virtus animal est, virtus autem bonum, non est omne bonum animal? Est.
If virtue is an animal, and virtue is a good, is not every good an animal? It is.
Hoc nostri fatentur.
This our school admits.
Patrem servare bonum est, et sententiam prudenter in senatu dicere bonum est, et iuste decernere bonum est; ergo et patrem servare animal est et prudenter sententiam dicere animal est.
To save one's father is a good, and to express an opinion prudently in the senate is a good, and to judge justly is a good; therefore, both saving one's father is an animal and expressing an opinion prudently is an animal.
Eo usque res exegit, ut risum tenere non possis: prudenter tacere bonum est, frugaliter cenare bonum est; ita et tacere et cenare animal est.
The matter is pushed so far that you cannot hold your laughter: to be silent prudently is a good, to dine frugally is a good; thus both being silent and dining are animals.
§113.21Ego mehercules titillare non desinam et ludos mihi ex istis subtilibus ineptus facere.
I, by Hercules, will not cease to tickle them and to make sport for myself out of those subtle absurdities.
Iustitia et fortitudo, si animalia sunt, certe terrestria sunt.
Justice and courage, if they are animals, are certainly terrestrial.
Omne animal terrestre alget, esurit, sitit; ergo iustitia alget, fortitudo esurit, clementia sitit.
Every terrestrial animal gets cold, hungers, thirsts; therefore justice gets cold, courage hungers, and clemency thirsts.