§113.1Desideras tibi scribi a me, quid sentiam de hac quaestione iactata apud nostros: an iustitia, fortitudo, prudentia ceteraeque virtutes animalia sint.
You desire me to write to you what I think about this question bandied about among our school: whether justice, courage, prudence, and the other virtues are animals.
Hac subtilitate effecimus, Lucili carissime, ut exercere ingenium inter inrita videremur et disputationibus nihil profuturis otium ferere.
By this subtlety, my dearest Lucilius, we have brought it about that we seem to exercise our intellect among trivialities and to spend our leisure on discussions that will be of no benefit.
Faciam quod desideras, et quid nostris videatur, exponam.
I will do what you desire, and I will set forth what seems right to our school.
Sed me in alia esse sententia profiteor: puto quaedam esse, quae deceant phaecasiatum palliatumque.
But I confess that I am of another opinion: I think there are certain things that befit one who wears the white shoe and the Greek cloak.
Quae sint ergo quae antiquos moverint, vel quae sint quae antiqui moverint, dicam, §113.2Animum constat animal esse, cum ipse efficiat, ut simus animalia, cum ab illo animalia nomen hoc traxerint.
Therefore, I will tell what those things are which moved the ancients, or what those things are which the ancients moved, It is agreed that the mind is an animal, since it itself brings it about that we are animals, since animals have derived this name from it.
virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens; ergo animal est.
But virtue is nothing other than the mind disposed in a certain way; therefore, it is an animal.
Deinde virtus agit aliquid; agi autem nihil sine impetu potest.
Next, virtue does something; but nothing can be done without impulse.
Si impetum habet, qui nulli est nisi animali, animal est.
If it has impulse, which belongs to nothing except an animal, it is an animal.
"Si animal est," inquit, "virtus, habet ipsa virtutem. " §113.3Quidni habeat se ipsam? Quo modo sapiens omnia per virtutem gerit, sic virtus per se.
"If virtue is an animal," he says, "it itself has virtue." Why should it not have itself? Just as the wise man does all things through virtue, so virtue does so through itself.
"Ergo," inquit, "et omnes artes animalia sunt et omnia, quae cogitamus quaeque mente conplectimur.
"Therefore," he says, "all arts too are animals, and all things that we think and embrace with our mind.
Sequitur, ut multa millia animalium habitent in his angustiis pectoris, et singuli multa simus animalia aut multa habeamus animalia. "
Quaeris, quid adversus istud respondeatur? Unaquaeque ex istis res animal erit; multa animalia non erunt.
It follows that many thousands of animals dwell in these narrow limits of our breast, and we as individuals are many animals or have many animals." You ask what should be answered against this? Each single one of those things will be an animal; they will not be many animals.
Quare? Dicam, si mihi accommodaveris subtilitatem et intentionem tuam.
Why? I will tell you, if you lend me your subtlety and attention.
§113.4Singula animalia singulas habere debent substantias; ista omnia unum animum habent; itaque singula esse possunt, multa esse non possunt.
Single animals ought to have single substances; all those things have one mind; therefore they can be single, but they cannot be many.
Ego et animal sum et homo, non tamen duos esse nos dices.
I am both an animal and a man, yet you will not say that we are two.
Quare? Quia separati debent esse.
Why? Because they ought to be separated.
Ita dico: alter ab altero debet esse diductus, ut duo sint.
I mean this: one must be separated from the other so that they may be two.
Quicquid in uno multiplex est, sub unam naturam cadit; itaque unum est.
Whatever is manifold in one falls under one nature; therefore it is one.
§113.5Et animus meus animal est et ego animal sum, duo tamen non sumus.
Both my mind is an animal and I am an animal, yet we are not two.
Quare? Quia animus mei pars est.
Why? Because the mind is a part of me.
tunc aliquid per se numerabitur, cum per se stabit.
Something will be counted by itself then when it stands by itself.
Ubi vero alterius membrum erit, non poterit videri aliud.
But where it is a member of another, it cannot be seen as another.
Quare? Dicam: quia quod aliud est, suum oportet esse et proprium et totum et intra se absolutum.
Why? I will tell you: because that which is another must be its own, proper, whole, and complete within itself.
§113.6Ego in alia esse me sententia professus sum.
I have professed that I am of another opinion.
Non enim tantum virtutes animalia erunt, si hoc recipitur, sed opposita quoque illis vitia et adfectus, tamquam ira, timor, luctus, suspicio.
For if this is accepted, not only will virtues be animals, but also the vices opposed to them and the passions, such as anger, fear, grief, and suspicion.
Ultra res ista procedet; omnes sententiae, omnes cogitationes animalia erunt.
This matter will go further; all opinions, all thoughts will be animals.
Quod nullo modo recipiendum est.
This must in no way be accepted.
Non enim quicquid ab homine fit, homo est.
For not whatever is done by man is a man.
§113.7"Iustitia quid est? "inquit.
"What is justice?" he says.
Animus quodammodo se habens.
The mind disposed in a certain way.
"Itaque si animus animal est, et iustitia. "Minime.
"Therefore, if the mind is an animal, justice is too." By no means.
Haec enim habitus animi est et quaedam vis; idem animus in varias figuras convertitur et non totiens animal aliud est, quotiens aliud facit.
For this is a disposition of the mind and a certain power; the same mind is transformed into various figures, and it is not a different animal as many times as it does a different thing.
Nec illud, quod fit ab animo, animal est.
Nor is that which is done by the mind an animal.
§113.8Si iustitia animal est, si fortitudo, si ceterae virtutes, utrum desinunt esse animalia, subinde autem rursus incipiunt, an semper sunt?
Desinere virtutes non possunt.
If justice is an animal, if courage, if the other virtues, do they cease to be animals and then immediately begin again, or are they always so? Virtues cannot cease to be.
Ergo multa animalia, immo innumerabilia, in hoc animo versantur.
Therefore, many animals, indeed innumerable ones, dwell in this mind.
§113.9"Non sunt," inquit, "multa, quia ex uno religata sunt et partes unius ac membra sunt. "Talem ergo faciem animi nobis proponimus, qualis est hydrae multa habentis capita, quorum unumquodque per se pugnat, per se nocet.
"They are not many," he says, "because they are bound together from one thing and are parts and members of one." Therefore we picture to ourselves such a form of the mind as is that of the hydra having many heads, each of which fights by itself, harms by itself.
Atqui nullum ex illis capitibus animal est, sed animalis caput, ceterum ipsa unum animal est.
And yet none of those heads is an animal, but the head of an animal, while the thing itself is one animal.
Nemo in Chimaera leonem animal esse dixit aut draconem; hae partes erant eius; partes autem non sunt animalia.
No one said that the lion in the Chimaera was an animal, or the dragon; these were parts of it; but parts are not animals.
Quid est, quo colligas iustitiam animal esse?" §113.10Agit," inquit, "aliquid et prodest.
What is there by which you gather that justice is an animal?" "It acts," he says, "and is of benefit.
Quod autem agit et prodest, impetum habet; quod autem impetum habet, animal est. "verum est, si suum impetum habet; suum autem non habet, sed animi.
Moreover, that which acts and is of benefit has an impulse; and that which has an impulse is an animal." This is true, if it has its own impulse; but it does not have its own, but that of the mind.