§102.12"Quid ergo? "inquit, "et fama erit unius hominis existimatio et infamia unius malignus sermo? Gloriam quoque," inquit, "latius fusam intellego, consensum enim multorum exigit. "Diversa horum condicio est et illius.
"What then?" he says, "will fame also be the opinion of one man, and infamy the malicious speech of one? I understand glory also," he says, "as more widely spread, for it requires the consensus of many." The condition of these is different from that of the other.
Quare? Quia, si de me bene vir bonus sentit, eodem loco sum, quo si omnes boni idem sentirent; omnes enim, si me cognoverint, idem sentient.
Why? Because, if a good man thinks well of me, I am in the same position as if all good men thought the same; for all, if they get to know me, will think the same.
Par illis idemque iudicium est, aeque vero inficiscitur.
Their judgment is equal and the same, and is equally imbued with truth.
Dissidere non possunt; ita pro eo est, ac si omnes idem sentiant, quia aliud sentire non possunt.
They cannot disagree; thus it is the same as if all think the same, because they cannot think otherwise.
" §102.13Ad gloriam aut famam non est satis unius opinio. "Illic idem potest una sententia, quod omnium, quia omnium, si perrogetur, una erit;
"For glory or fame, the opinion of one is not enough." In the former case, a single opinion has the same power as that of all, because the opinion of all, if they are asked one by one, will be one; in the latter case, there are diverse judgments of unlike people.
hic diversa dissimilium iudicia sunt. Difficiles adfectus, dubia omnia invenies, levia, suspecta.
You will find troublesome passions, all things doubtful, light, and suspected.
Putas tu posse unam omnium esse sententiam? Non est unius una sententia.
Do you think that there can be one opinion of all? Even of a single person, there is not one opinion.
Illi placet verum, veritatis una vis, una facies est; apud hos falsa sunt, quibus adsentiuntur.
To the former (the good man), truth is pleasing, and the power of truth is one, its face is one; among the latter, there are false things to which they assent.
Numquam autem falsis constantia est: variantur et dissident. "
But there is never constancy in false things: they vary and disagree.
§102.14Sed laus," inquit, "nihil aliud quam vox est, vox autem bonum non est. "Cum dicunt claritatem esse laudem bonorum a bonis redditam, non ad vocem referunt, sed ad sententiam.
"But praise," he says, "is nothing other than a voice, and a voice is not a good." When they say that renown is praise rendered by good men to good men, they refer it not to the voice, but to the opinion.
Licet enim vir bonus taceat, sed aliquem iudicet dignum laude esse, laudatus est.
For although a good man may keep silent, if he judges someone to be worthy of praise, that person has been praised.
§102.15Praeterea aliud est laus, aliud laudatio, haec et vocem exigit.
Furthermore, praise (laus) is one thing, eulogy (laudatio) another; the latter requires a voice as well.
Itaque nemo dicit laudem funebrem, sed laudationem, cuius officium oratione constat.
Therefore, no one says a "funeral praise," but a "funeral eulogy," the function of which consists of a speech.
Cum dicimus aliquem laude dignum, non verba illi benigna hominum, sed iudicia promittimus.
When we say someone is worthy of praise, we are not promising him the kind words of men, but their judgments.
Ergo laus etiam taciti est bene sentientis ac bonum virum apud se laudantis.
Therefore, praise belongs even to one who is silent but thinks well and praises a good man within himself.
§102.16Deinde, ut dixi, ad animum refertur laus, non ad verba, quae conceptam laudem egerunt et in notitiam plurium emittunt.
Next, as I said, praise is referred to the mind, not to words, which bring out the conceived praise and send it forth into the knowledge of many.
Laudat qui laudandum esse iudicat.
He praises who judges that someone ought to be praised.
Cum tragicus ille apud nos ait magnificum esse "laudari a laudato viro," laude digno ait.
When that tragic poet among us says that it is magnificent "to be praised by a praised man," he means by one worthy of praise.
Et cum aeque antiquus poeta ait "laus alit artis," non laudationem dicit, quae corrumpit artes.
And when an equally ancient poet says "praise nourishes the arts," he does not mean a eulogy, which corrupts the arts.
Nihil enim aeque et eloquentiam et omne aliud studium auribus deditum vitiavit quam popularis adsensio.
For nothing has so corrupted both eloquence and every other study directed to the ears as popular assent.
§102.17Fama vocem utique desiderat, claritas potest etiam citra vocem contingere contenta iudicio.
Fame certainly requires a voice, but renown can happen even without a voice, being content with judgment.
Plena est non tantum inter tacentis, sed etiam inter reclamantis.
It is full not only among those who are silent, but also among those who object.
Quid intersit inter claritatem et gloriam dicam: gloria multorum iudiciis constat, claritas bonorum, "Cuius," inquit, "bonum est claritas, id est laus bono a bonis reddita?
I shall say what is the difference between renown and glory: glory consists of the judgments of many, renown of the good. "Whose good," he says, "is renown, that is, praise rendered to a good man by good men?
§102.18Utrum laudati an laudantis? "Utriusque, Meum, qui laudor;
Is it of the praised or of the praiser?" Of both.
quia natura me amantem omnium genuit, et bene fecisse gaudeo, et gratos me invenisse virtutum interpretes laetor; hoc plurium bonum est, quod grati sunt, sed et meum.
It is mine, who am praised; because nature generated me as a lover of all, and I rejoice to have done well, and I am glad to have found grateful interpreters of my virtues; this is the good of the many, in that they are grateful, but it is also mine.
Ita enim animo conpositus sum, ut aliorum bonum meum iudicem, utique eorum, quibus ipse sum boni causa.
For I am so disposed in mind that I judge the good of others to be my own, especially of those to whom I myself am the cause of good.
§102.19Est istud laudantium bonum, virtute enim geritur; omnis autem virtutis actio bonum est.
That is the good of the praisers, for it is done with virtue; and every action of virtue is a good.
Hoc contingere illis non potuisset, nisi ego talis essem.
This could not have happened to them unless I had been such a person.
Itaque utriusque bonum est merito laudari, tam mehercules quam bene iudicasse iudicantis bonum est et eius, secundum quem iudicatum est.
Therefore it is the good of both to be deservedly praised, just as, by Hercules, to have judged well is the good of the judge and of him in whose favor the judgment was made.
Numquid dubitas, quin iustitia et habentis bonum sit et autem sit eius, cui debitum solvit? Merentem laudare iustitia est; ergo utriusque bonum est.
Do you doubt that justice is the good both of the possessor and of him to whom the debt is paid? To praise one who deserves it is justice; therefore it is the good of both.
§102.20Cavillatoribus istis abunde responderimus.
We have answered those cavillers abundantly.
Sed non debet hoc nobis esse propositum arguta disserere et philosophiam in has angustias ex sua maiestate detrahere;
But this ought not to be our purpose, to dispute subtle things and drag philosophy down from its majesty into these narrow straits; how much better is it to go by an open and straight path than to set up turnings for oneself, which you must retrace with great trouble?
quanto satius est ire aperta via et recta quam sibi ipsum flexus disponere, quos cum magna molestia debeas relegere? Neque enim quicquam aliud istae disputationes sunt quam inter se perite captantium lusus.
For those disputations are nothing other than a game of people skillfully trying to catch one another.