§102.1Quomodo molestus est iucundum somnium videnti qui excitat, aufert enim voluptatem, etiam si falsam, effectum tamen verae habentem; sic epistula tua mihi fecit iniuriam.
Just as he who wakes someone seeing a pleasant dream is annoying, for he takes away a pleasure, even if false, yet having the effect of a true one; so your letter did me an injustice.
Revocavit enim me cogitationi aptae traditum et iturum, si licuisset, ulterius.
For it called me back, who had been delivered to fitting thought and would have gone, if it had been permitted, further.
§102.2Iuvabat de aeternitate animarum quaerere, immo mehercules credere.
It was pleasing to inquire into the eternity of souls, indeed by Hercules to believe in it.
Praebebam enim me facilem opinionibus magnorum virorum rem gratissimam promittentium magis quam probantium.
For I was offering myself as easy to the opinions of great men, who promise a most welcome thing rather than prove it.
Dabam me spei tantae.
I was giving myself to so great a hope.
Iam eram fastidio mihi, iam reliquias aetatis infractae contemnebam in immensum illud tempus et in possessionem omnis aevi transiturus; cum subito experrectus sum epistula tua accepta et tam bellum somnium perdidi.
Already I was a source of disgust to myself, already I was despising the remnants of my broken age, being about to pass into that immense time and into the possession of all age; when suddenly I was awakened by the receipt of your letter, and lost so beautiful a dream.
Quod repetam, si te dimisero, et redimam.
Which I shall seek again, if I dismiss you, and redeem.
§102.3Negat me epistula prima totam quaestionem explicuisse, in qua probare conabar id quod nostris placet, claritatem, quae post mortem contingit, bonum esse.
Your first letter denies that I have explained the whole question, in which I was trying to prove that which pleases our school, that renown, which happens after death, is a good.
Id enim me non solvisse, quod opponitur nobis: "Nullum," inquiunt, "bonum ex distantibus.
For it says that I have not solved that which is opposed to us: 'No good,' they say, 'consists of distant things.
Hoc autem ex distantibus constat. " §102.4Quod interrogas, mi Lucili, eiusdem quaestionis est loci alterius, et ideo non hoc tantum, sed alia quoque eodem pertinentia distuleram.
But this consists of distant things.' What you ask, my Lucilius, belongs to another part of the same question, and therefore I had postponed not only this, but also other things pertaining to the same.
Quaedam enim, ut scis, moralibus rationalia inmixta sunt.
For some logical things, as you know, are mixed with moral ones.
Itaque illam partem rectam et ad mores pertinentem tractavi: numquid stultum sit ac supervacuum ultra extremum diem curas, transmittere, an cadant bona nostra nobiscum nihilque sit eius, qui nullus est, an ex eo, quod, cum erit, sensuri non sumus, antequam sit, aliquis fructus percipi aut peti possit.
Therefore, I treated that direct part pertaining to morals: whether it is foolish and superfluous to send cares beyond our last day, or whether our goods fall with us and there is nothing of him who is no more, or whether from that which we are not going to feel when it exists, some fruit can be perceived or sought before it exists.
§102.5Haec omnia mores spectant; itaque suo loco posita sunt.
All these things look to morals; therefore they were placed in their proper place.
At quae a dialecticis contra hanc opinionem dicuntur, segreganda fuerunt et ideo seposita sunt.
But those things which are said by dialecticians against this opinion had to be separated, and therefore were set aside.
Nunc, quia omnia exigis, omnia quae dicunt persequar, deinde singulis occurram.
Now, because you demand all, I shall pursue all that they say, and then meet individual points.
§102.6Nisi aliquid praedixero, intellegi non poterunt quae refellentur.
Unless I say something beforehand, those things which will be refuted will not be able to be understood.
Quid est, quod praedicere velim? Quaedam continua corpora esse, ut hominem;
What is it that I wish to say beforehand?
quaedam esse composita, ut navem, domum, omnia denique, quorum diversae partes iunctura in unum coactae sunt; quaedam ex distantibus, quorum adhuc membra separata sunt, tamquam exercitus, populus, senatus.
That some bodies are continuous, like a human being; some are composite, like a ship, a house, and finally all things whose diverse parts have been forced into one by a joint; some are from distant parts, whose members are still separate, like an army, a people, a senate.
Illi enim, per quos ista corpora efficiuntur, iure aut officio cohaerent, natura diducti et singuli sunt.
For those through whom these bodies are made hold together by law or duty, but are separated by nature and are individuals.
Quid est, quod etiamnunc praedicere velim?
What is it that even now I wish to say beforehand?
§102.7Nullum bonum putamus esse, quod ex distantibus constat.
We think that no good consists of distant things.
Uno enim spiritu unum bonum contineri ac regi debet, unum esse unius boni principale.
For one good must be contained and ruled by one spirit, and there must be one ruling principle of one good.
Hoc si quando desideraveris, per se probatur; interim ponendum fuit, quia in nos nostra tela mittuntur.
If you ever desire this, it is proved by itself; meanwhile, it had to be laid down as a premise, because our own weapons are being turned against us.
§102.8"Dicitis," inquit, "nullum bonum ex distantibus esse? Claritas autem ista bonorum virorum secunda opinio est.
'Do you say,' he says, 'that no good is from distant things? But that renown of yours is the favorable opinion of good men.
Nam quomodo fama non est unius sermo nec infamia unius mala existimatio, sic nec claritas uni bono placuisse.
For just as fame is not the talk of one person, nor is infamy the bad opinion of one, so neither is renown having pleased one good man.
Consentire in hoc plures insignes et spectabiles viri debent, ut claritas sit.
More distinguished and respectable men must agree on this, so that there may be renown.
Haec autem ex iudiciis plurium efficitur, id est distantium; ergo non est bonum. §102.9Claritas," inquit, "laus est a bonis bono reddita; laus oratio, vox est aliquid significans; vox est autem, licet virorum sit bonorum, non bonum.
But this is produced from the judgments of many, that is, of distant persons; therefore it is not a good.' 'Renown,' he says, 'is praise rendered by good men to a good man; praise is speech, a voice signifying something; but a voice, even though it may be of good men, is not a good.
Nec enim quicquid vir bonus facit, bonum est.
For not whatever a good man does is a good.
Nam et plaudit et sibilat, sed nec plausum quisquam nec sibilum, licet omnia eius admiretur et laudet, bonum dicit, non magis quam sternumentum aut tussim.
For he both applauds and hisses, but no one calls either applause or a hiss a good, even though he admires and praises all his actions, no more than a sneeze or a cough.
Ergo claritas bonum non est. §102.10Ad summam dicite nobis, utrum laudantis an laudati bonum sit: si laudati bonum esse dicitis, tam ridiculam rem facitis, quam si adfirmetis meum esse, quod alius bene valeat.
Therefore renown is not a good.' 'In short, tell us whether it is the good of the praiser or of the praised: if you say it is the good of the praised, you do a thing as ridiculous as if you should assert that it is mine that another is in good health.
Sed laudare dignos honesta actio est; ita laudantis bonum est, cuius actio est, non nostrum, qui laudamur.
But to praise those who are worthy is an honorable action; thus it is the good of the praiser, whose action it is, not ours, who are praised.
Atqui hoc quaerebatur. " §102.11Respondebo nunc singulis cursim.
And yet, this was what was being sought.' I shall now answer individual points briefly.
Primum, an sit aliquod ex distantibus bonum, etiamnunc quaeritur et pars utraque sententias habet.
First, whether there is any good from distant things is still being questioned, and each side has its opinions.
Deinde claritas desiderat multa suffragia? Potest et unius boni viri iudicio esse contenta; unus nos bonus bonos iudicat.
Next, does renown require many votes? It can be content even with the judgment of one good man; one good man judges us to be good.