§7.1.12anteactae vitae crimina plerumque prima purganda sunt, ut id, de quo laturus est sententiam iudex, audire propitius incipiat.
The accusations of past life must for the most part be cleared first, so that the judge may begin to hear with favor that matter about which he is to pass sentence.
sed hoc quoque pro Vareno Cicero ex ultimum distulit, non quid frequentissime sed quid tum expediret intuitus.
But Cicero, in his defense of Varenus, postponed even this to the very end, looking not to what was most frequently done, but to what was expedient at that time.
§7.1.13cum simplex intentio erit, videndum est, unum aliquid respondeamus an plura.
When the accusation is simple, we must see whether we should answer one thing or several.
si unum, ex re quaestionem instituamus an ex scripto; si ex re, negandum sit quod obiicitur an tuendum; si ex scripto, ex qua specie iuris pugna sit, et ex ea, de verbis an de voluntate quaeratur.
If one, whether we should establish the question from the fact or from the written text; if from the fact, whether what is charged should be denied or defended; if from the written text, from what species of law the dispute arises, and within that, whether the question is about the words or about the intention.
§7.1.14id ita consequemur, si intuiti fuerimus, quae sit lex quae litem faciat, hoc est, qua iudicium sit constitutum.
This we shall attain if we look to what law it is that makes the lawsuit, that is, by which the trial is established.
nam quaedam ex scholasticis ponuntur ad coniungendam modo actae rei seriem, ut puta: expositum qui agnouerit, solutis alimentis recipiat. minus dicto audientem filium liceat abdicare. qui expositum recepit, imperat ei nuptias locupletis propinquae; ille deducere vult filiam pauperis educatoris. §7.1.15lex de expositis ad adfectum pertinet; iudicium pendet ex lege abdicationis.
For some things are set down in school themes merely to connect the sequence of the action, as for example: "Let him who recognizes an exposed child take him back after paying for his nourishment." "Let it be lawful to disinherit a son who is not obedient to his father's word." "He who took back the exposed child commands him to marry a rich female relative; the son wishes to marry the daughter of his poor foster-father." The law concerning exposed children pertains to emotion; the trial depends on the law of disinheritance.
nec tamen semper ex una lege quaestio est, ut ex antinomia.
Yet the question does not always arise from a single law, as in the case of conflicting laws.
his spectatis apparebit circa quod pugna sit.
When these have been observed, it will appear around what the dispute lies.
§7.1.16coniuncta defensio est, qualis pro Rabirio: si occidisset, recte fecisset; sed non occidit. ubi vero multa contra unam propositionem dicimus, cogitandum est primum quidquid dici potest, tum ex his quo quidque loco dici expediat aestimandum.
A conjunct defense is such as that for Rabirius: "If he had killed him, he would have done rightly; but he did not kill him." But when we speak many things against a single proposition, we must first think of whatever can be said, and then we must estimate from these in which place it is expedient for each to be said.
in quo non idem sentio, quod de propositionibus paulo ante, quodque de argumentis probationum loco concessi, posse aliquando nos incipere a firmioribus.
On this point, I do not hold the same opinion as I did a little before regarding propositions, and as I conceded regarding the arguments in the place of proofs, that we can sometimes begin with the stronger ones.
§7.1.17nam vis quaestionum semper crescere debet et ad potentissima ab infirmissimis pervenire, sive sunt eiusdem generis sive diversi.
For the force of the questions ought always to grow and to arrive at the most powerful from the weakest, whether they are of the same kind or of different kinds.
§7.1.18iuris autem quaestiones solent esse nonnunquam ex alis atque allis conflictionibus, facti semper idem spectant; ex utroque genere similis ordo est.
But questions of law are sometimes accustomed to arise from various and different conflicts, whereas those of fact always look to the same point; from both classes the order is similar.
sed prius de dissimilibus, ex quibus infirmissimum quidque primum tractari oportet, ideo quod quasdam quaestiones exsecuti donate solemus et concedere; neque enim transire ad alias possumus nisi omissis prioribus.
But first of dissimilar ones, among which the weakest must be treated first, for the reason that after pursuing certain questions we are accustomed to give them up and concede them; nor can we pass on to others unless the prior ones are abandoned.
quod ipsum ita fieri oportet, §7.1.19non ut damnasse eas videamur, sed omisisse, quia possimus etiam sine eis vincere.
And this very thing ought to be done in such a way, not so that we seem to have condemned them, but to have omitted them because we are able to win even without them.
procurator alicuius pecuniam petit ex fenore hereditario: potest incidere quaestio, an huic esse procuratori liceat.
Suppose someone's agent demands money from inherited interest: the question can arise, whether it is lawful for this man to be the agent.
§7.1.20finge nos, postquam tractavimus eam, remittere vel etiam convinci: quaeretur, an ei, cuius nomine litigatur, procuratorem habendi sit ius.
Imagine that, after we have discussed it, we withdraw it or are even defeated on it: it will be asked whether he in whose name the lawsuit is conducted has the right to have an agent.
discedamus hinc quoque: recipit materia quaestionem, an ille, cuius nomine agitur, heres sit feneratoris an ex asse heres.
Let us depart from this point as well: the case admits the question, whether he in whose name the action is brought is the heir of the money-lender, or the sole heir.
haec quoque concessa sint: §7.1.21quaeretur an debeatur.
Let these things also be granted: it will be asked whether the money is owed.
contra nemo tam demens fuerit, ut cum id quod firmissimum duxerit se habere protulerit, remittat illud et ad leviora transcendat.
On the other hand, no one would be so foolish as to withdraw what he considered the strongest point he possessed after bringing it forward, and pass to lighter ones.
huic ex schola simile est: non abdicabis adoptatum; ut hunc quoque, non virum. fortem; ut et fortem, non qui cuicunque voluntati tuae non paruerit; ut ex alia omnia subiectus sit, non propter optionem; ut propter optionem, non propter talem optionem. Haec iuris quaestionum differentia est.
Similar to this from the school is: "You shall not disinherit an adopted son"; and even if you can disinherit him, "not a brave man"; and even if a brave man, "not one who has not disobeyed your every wish"; and even if he has been submissive in all other things, "not on account of his option"; and even if on account of his option, "not on account of such an option." This is the difference of questions of law.
§7.1.22in factis autem ad idem tendentia sunt plura, ex quibus aliqua citra summam quaestionem remitti solent; ut si is, cum quo furti agitur, dicat: proba te habuisse, proba perdidisse, proba furto perdidisse, proba mea fraude. priora enim remitti possunt, ultimum non potest.
But in matters of fact, there are several things tending to the same end, of which some are accustomed to be dismissed without reaching the ultimate question; as if he against whom an action for theft is brought should say: "Prove that you possessed it, prove that you lost it, prove that you lost it by theft, prove that you lost it by my fraud." For the former points can be dismissed, but the last cannot.