§7.1.1sit igitur, ut supra significavi, divisio rerum plurium ex singulas, partitio singularum ex partes discretio, ordo recta quaedam collocatio prioribus sequentia adnectens, dispositio utilis rerum ac partium ex locos distributio.
Let therefore, as I indicated above, division (divisio) be the separation of multiple things into individual ones, partition (partitio) the dividing of individual things into parts, order (ordo) a correct arrangement connecting subsequent things to prior ones, and arrangement (dispositio) the useful distribution of things and parts into their places.
§7.1.2sed meminerimus ipsam dispositionem plerumque utilitate mutari nec eandem semper primam quaestionem ex utraque parte tractandam.
But let us remember that arrangement itself is for the most part changed by utility, and that the same question is not always to be treated first by both sides.
cuius rei, ut cetera exempla praeteream, Demosthenes quoque atque Aeschines possunt esse documento ex iudicio Ctesiphontis diversum secuti ordinem, cum accusator a iure, quo videbatur potentior, coeperit, patronus omnia paene ante ius posuerit, quibus iudicem quaestioni legum praepararet.
Of this matter, to pass over other examples, Demosthenes and Aeschines also can be a proof, having followed a different order in the trial of Ctesiphon, since the accuser began with the law, in which he seemed to be stronger, while the advocate placed almost everything before the law, by which he might prepare the judge for the question of the laws.
§7.1.3aliud enim alii docere prius expedit, alioqui semper petitoris arbitrio diceretur;
For it is expedient for one to teach one thing first, and for another to teach another; otherwise, the speech would always be made at the discretion of the plaintiff.
denique ex accusatione mutua, cum se uterque defendat, priusquam adversarium arguat, omnium rerum necesse est ordinem esse diversum.
Finally, in a mutual accusation, when each defends himself before he accuses his adversary, it is necessary that the order of all things be different.
igitur, quid ipse sim secutus, quod partim praeceptis partim usurpatum ratione cognoveram, promam nec unquam dissimulavi.
Therefore, I will bring forward what I myself have followed, which I had learned partly from precepts, partly as practiced by reason; nor have I ever concealed it.
§7.1.4erat mihi curae ex controversiis forensibus nosse omnia, quae ex causa versarentur.
In forensic controversies, it was my care to know everything that was involved in the cause.
nam ex schola certa sunt et pauca et ante declamationem exponuntur, quae themata Graeci vocant, Cicero proposita.
For in the school, the facts are certain and few, and are set forth before the declamation, which the Greeks call 'themes', and Cicero 'propositions'.
cum haec ex conspectu quodammodo collocaveram, non minus pro adversa parte quam pro mea cogitabam.
When I had in a way placed these before my eyes, I thought no less for the opposing side than for my own.
§7.1.5et primum (quod non difficile dictu est sed tamen ante omnia intuendum) constituebam, quid utraque pars vellet efficere, tum per quid, hoc modo.
And first (which is not difficult to say, but yet to be looked into before all things), I established what each party wished to effect, and then by what means, in this manner.
cogitabam, quid primum petitor diceret. id aut confessum erat aut controversum.
I considered what the plaintiff would say first; that was either admitted or disputed.
§7.1.6si confessum, non poterat ibi esse quaestio.
If admitted, there could be no question there.
transibam ergo ad responsum partis alterius, idem intuebar; nonnunquam etiam quod inde obtinebatur confessum erat.
I passed, therefore, to the reply of the other party, and looked at the same; sometimes even what was obtained from there was admitted.
ubi primum coeperat non convenire, quaestio oriebatur.
As soon as they began to disagree, the question arose.
id tale est: occidisti hominem; Occidi.
It is of this kind: 'You killed a man'; 'I killed him'.
§7.1.7convenit; transeo.
It is agreed; I pass on.
rationem reddere debet reus, quare occiderit.
The accused must give a reason why he killed him.
adulterum, inquit, cum adultera occidere licet. legem esse certum est.
'It is lawful,' he says, 'to kill an adulterer with an adulteress.' That there is such a law is certain.
tertium iam aliquid videndum est, ex quo pugna consistat.
Now we must look for a third point, from which the dispute may arise.
non fuerunt adulteri; Fuerunt: quaestio; de facto ambigitur, coniectura est.
'They were not adulterers'; 'They were': here is the question; there is doubt about the fact, it is conjecture.
§7.1.8interim et hoc tertium confessum est adulteros fuisse sed tibi, inquit accusator, illos non licuit occidere; exul enim eras, aut ignominiosus. de iure quaeritur.
Sometimes even this third point is admitted, that they were adulterers, but the accuser says, 'It was not lawful for you to kill them, for you were an exile, or infamous.' Here the question is about the law.
at si protinus dicenti occidisti respondeatur non occidi, statim pugna est.
But if to the one who says, 'You killed,' it is immediately answered, 'I did not kill,' there is at once a dispute.
si explorandum est, ubi controversia incipiat, et considerari debet, quid primam quaestionem faciat.
We must explore where the controversy begins, and consider what makes the first question.
Intentio simplex, occidit Saturninum Rabirius;
A simple proposition: 'Rabirius killed Saturninus'.
§7.1.9coniuncta, lege de sicariis commisit L. Varenus.
A conjunct proposition: 'L.
nam C. Varenum occidendum et Cn.
Varenus committed an offense against the law concerning assassins; for he took care that C.
Varenum vulnerandum et Salarium item occidendum curavit.
Varenus should be killed, Cn.
Nam sic diuersae propositiones erunt; quod idem de petitionibus dictum sit.
Varenus wounded, and Salarius likewise killed.' For thus there will be different propositions; let the same be said concerning claims.
verum ex coniuncta propositione plures esse quaestiones ac status possunt, si aliud negat reus, aliud defendit, aliud a iure actionis excludit.
But from a conjunct proposition there can be several questions and statuses, if the accused denies one thing, defends another, and excludes another from the right of action.
in quo genere agenti est dispiciendum, quid quoque loco diluat.
In which kind of case, the pleader must discern what to refute in each place.
§7.1.10quod pertinet ad actorem, non plane dissentio a Celso, qui sine dubio Ciceronem secutus instat tamen huic parti vehementius, ut putet primo firmum aliquid esse ponendum, summo firmissimum, imbecilliora medio, quia et initio movendus sit iudex et summo impellendus.
As far as pertains to the accuser, I do not entirely disagree with Celsus, who, undoubtedly following Cicero, yet insists on this part more vehemently, so as to think that something strong should be placed first, the strongest at the end, and the weaker in the middle, because the judge must be moved at the beginning and impelled at the end.
§7.1.11at pro reo plerumque gravissimum quidque primum movendum est, ne illud spectans iudex reliquorum defensioni sit aversior.
But for the defendant, for the most part, the gravest accusation must be shaken first, lest the judge, looking at that, should be more averse to the defense of the rest.
interim tamen et hoc mutabitur, si leviora illa palam falsa erunt, gravissimi defensio difficilior, ut detracta prius accusatoribus fide aggrediamur ultimum, iam iudicibus omnia vana esse credentibus.
Sometimes, however, even this will be changed, if those lighter charges are patently false and the defense of the gravest is more difficult, so that, the credibility having been first withdrawn from the accusers, we may attack the last point when the judges already believe everything to be groundless.
opus erit tamen praefatione, qua et ratio reddatur dilati criminis et promittatur defensio, ne id quod non statim diluemus timere videamur.
Yet there will be need of a preface, by which both a reason is given for delaying the charge and a defense is promised, lest we should seem to fear that which we do not immediately refute.