§6.1.1peroratio sequebatur, quam cumulum quidam, conclusionem alii vocant.
The peroration followed, which some call the finishing touch (cumulum) and others the conclusion.
eius duplex ratio est posita aut ira rebus aut ira adfectibus.
Its method is twofold, placed either in facts or in feelings.
rerum repetitio et congregatio, quae Graece dicitur ἀνακεφαλαίωσις a quibusdam Latinorum enumeratio, et memoriam iudicis reficit et totam simul causam ponit ante oculos et, etiamsi per singula minus moverat, turba valet.
The repetition and collection of facts, which is called ἀνακεφαλαίωσις in Greek and enumeration (enumeratio) by some Latin writers, both refreshes the memory of the judge and places the whole cause before his eyes at once; and even if it had less power in individual points, it is effective by its collective weight.
§6.1.2in hac, quae repetemus, quam brevissime dicenda sunt et, quod Graeco verbo patet, decurrendum per capita.
In this, what we repeat must be said as briefly as possible and, as is clear from the Greek word, we must run through the main heads.
nam, si morabimur, non iam enumeratio sed quasi altera fiet oratio.
For if we linger, it will no longer be an enumeration but, as it were, a second speech.
quae autem enumeranda videntur, cum pondere aliquo dicenda sunt et aptis excitanda sententiis et figuris utique varianda; alioqui nihil est odiosius recta illa repetitione velut memoriae iudicum diffidentis.
Those things, however, which seem to require enumeration, must be said with some weight, heightened by suitable maxims, and varied by all means with figures; otherwise, nothing is more tedious than that straightforward repetition, as if distrusting the memory of the judges.
§6.1.3sunt autem innumerabiles species, optimeque ira Verrem Cicero: si pater ipse iudicaret, quid diceret, cum haec probarentur? et deinde subiecit enumerationem; aut cum idem ira eundem per invocationem deorum spoliata a praetore templa dinumerat.
The varieties, moreover, are countless, and Cicero does this most excellently in his speech against Verres: "If his father himself were judging, what would he say when these things were proved?" and then he added an enumeration; or when the same Cicero, in his speech against the same Verres, enumerates the temples plundered by the praetor through an invocation of the gods.
licet et dubitare, num quid nos fugerit, et quid responsurus sit adversarius his et his, aut quam spem accusator habeat omnibus ita defensis.
It is also permissible to pretend to doubt whether anything has escaped us, or what the adversary is going to answer to this or that, or what hope the accuser can have when everything has been thus defended.
§6.1.4illa vero iucundissima, si contingat aliquod ex adversario ducere argumentum, ut si dicas: reliquit hanc partem causae, aut inuidia premere maluit, aut ad preces confugit merito, cum sciret haec et haec. §6.1.5sed non sunt singulae species persequendae, ne sola videantur, quae forte nunc dixero, cum occasiones et ex causis et ex dictis adversariorum et ex quibusdam fortuitis quoque oriantur.
It is indeed most pleasing if it happens that you can draw some argument from the adversary, as if you should say: "He left this part of the cause," or "He preferred to press with envy," or "He rightly fled to prayers, since he knew this and that." But we must not follow up every single variety, lest those only which I happen to mention now should seem to exist, since opportunities arise both from the causes themselves, from the sayings of the adversaries, and also from certain fortuitous circumstances.
nec referenda modo nostra, sed postulandum etiam ab adversariis, ut ad quaedam respondeant.
Nor must we only bring forward our own points, but we must also demand of our adversaries that they answer to certain things.
§6.1.6id autem, si et actioni supererit locus et ea proposuerimus, quae refelli non possint.
This, however, is only if there is still room left for speaking, and if we have proposed things that cannot be refuted.
nam provocare quae inde sint fortia, non arguentis est, §6.1.7sed monentis.
For to provoke what is strong on the other side is not the part of one who is proving, but of one who is giving a warning.
id unum epilogi genus visum est plerisque Atticorum et philosophis fere omnibus, qui de arte oratoria scriptum aliquid reliquerunt.
This single kind of epilogue seemed sufficient to most of the Attic orators and to almost all the philosophers who have left any writings on the art of oratory.
id sensisse Atticos credo, quia Athenis adfectus movere etiam per praeconem prohibebatur orator.
I believe that the Attic writers felt this because at Athens an orator was forbidden to move the feelings even through a herald.
philosophos minus miror, apud quos vitii loco est adfici; nec bono moris videntur, sic a vero iudicem averti, nec convenire bono viro vitiis uti.
I wonder less at the philosophers, among whom to be affected is regarded as a vice; nor does it seem consistent with good morals that a judge should be thus turned away from the truth, nor does it become a good man to employ vices.
necessarios tamen adfectus fatebuntur, si aliter obtineri vera et iusta et ira commune profutura non possint.
Yet they will confess that feelings are necessary, if truth, justice, and the common good cannot otherwise be secured.
§6.1.8ceterum illud constitit inter omnes, etiam ira aliis partibus actionis, si multiplex causa sit et pluribus argumentis defensa, utiliter ἀνακεφαλαίωσιν fieri solere, sicut nemo dubitaverit multas esse causas, ira quibus nullo loco sit necessaria, si breves et simplices fuerint.
For the rest, it has been agreed among all that, even in other parts of the speech, if the cause is complex and defended by many arguments, a summary (ἀνακεφαλαίωσις) is usefully made; just as no one would doubt that there are many causes in which it is in no place necessary, if they are short and simple.
haec pars perorationis accusatori patronoque ex aequo communis est.
This part of the peroration is equally common to both the accuser and the advocate.
adfectibus quoque iisdem fere utuntur,
They also use almost the same feelings, but the former uses some and the latter uses others more frequently and with greater force.
§6.1.9sed aliis hic, aliis ille saepius ac magis, nam huic concitare iudices, illi flectere convenit.
For it is fitting for the former to excite the judges, and for the latter to soften them.
verum et accusator habet interim lacrimas ex miseratione eius rei quam ulciscitur; et reus de indignitate calumniae aut conspirationis vehementius interim queritur.
Yet even the accuser sometimes has tears from pity for the thing which he is avenging, and the accused sometimes complains more vehemently of the unworthiness of the calumny or conspiracy.
dividere igitur haec officia commodissimum, quae plerumque sunt, ut dixi, ira prooemio similia, sed hic liberiora plenioraque.
Therefore, it is most convenient to divide these duties, which are for the most part, as I have said, similar to those in the introduction, but here they are more free and full.
§6.1.10inclinatio enim iudicum ad nos petitur initio parcius, cum admitti satis est et oratio tota superest; ira epilogo vero est, qualem animum iudex ira consilium ferat, et iam nihil amplius dicturi sumus nec restat quo reservemus.
For the inclination of the judges towards us is sought more sparingly at the beginning, when it is enough to be admitted and the whole speech remains; but in the epilogue, it depends on what kind of mind the judge carries to the council, and we are now going to say nothing further, nor does any place remain to reserve anything.
§6.1.11est igitur utrisque commune, conciliare sibi, avertere ab adversario iudicem, concitare adfectus et componere.
It is therefore common to both to conciliate the judge to themselves, to turn him away from the adversary, to excite feelings and to compose them.
et brevissimum quidem hoc praeceptum dari utrique parti potest, ut totas causae suae vires orator ponat ante oculos; et cum viderit, quid invidiosum, favorabile, invisum, miserabile aut sit ira rebus aut videri possit, ea dicat, quibus, si iudex esset, ipse maxime moveretur.
And indeed, this very brief precept can be given to both sides: that the orator should place the whole strength of his cause before his eyes; and when he has seen what is invidious, favorable, hateful, or miserable either in the facts or what can appear so, he should say those things by which, if he were the judge, he himself would be most strongly moved.
sed certius est ire per singula.
But it is more certain to go through individual points.