§5.8.1pars altera probationum, quae est tota in arte constatque rebus ad faciendam fidem appositis, plerumque aut omnino negligitur aut levissime attingitur ab iis, qui argumenta velut horrida et confragosa vitantes amoenioribus locis desident, neque aliter quam ii, qui traduntur a poetis gustu cuiusdam apud Lotophagos graminis et Sirenum cantu deleniti voluptatem saluti praetulisse, dum laudis falsam imaginem persequuntur, ipsa, propter quam dicitur, victoria cedunt.
The other part of proofs, which is entirely based on art and consists of things adapted to create belief, is for the most part either completely neglected or touched upon very lightly by those who, avoiding arguments as if they were rugged and harsh, sit down in more pleasant commonplaces; and not otherwise than those who are related by the poets to have preferred pleasure to safety, charmed by the taste of a certain herb among the Lotophagi and the song of the Sirens, they, while pursuing a false image of praise, yield the victory itself, for the sake of which the speech is made.
§5.8.2atqui cetera, quae continuo magis orationis tractu decurrunt, in auxilium atque ornamentum argumentorum comparantur, nervisque illis, quibus causa continetur, adiiciunt inducti super corporis speciem: ut, si forte quid factum ira vel metu vel cupiditate dicatur, latius, quae cuiusque adfectus natura sit, prosequamur.
And yet the other things, which run in a more continuous course of speech, are provided for the assistance and ornament of arguments, and they add to those nerves, by which the cause is sustained, the appearance of a body drawn over them; so that, if by chance anything is said to have been done through anger, fear, or desire, we may pursue more widely what the nature of each affection is.
iisdem laudamus, incusamus, augemus, minuimus, describimus, deterremus, querimur, consolamur, hortamur.
By these same things we praise, accuse, amplify, diminish, describe, deter, complain, console, and exhort.
§5.8.3sed horum esse opera in rebus aut certis aut de quibus tanquam certis loquimur potest.
But the operation of these can be in things either certain or of which we speak as if they were certain.
nec abnuerim esse aliquid in delectatione, multum vero in commovendis adfectibus; sed haec ipsa plus valent, cum se didicisse iudex putat, quod consequi nisi argumentatione aliaque omni fide rerum non possumus.
Nor would I deny that there is something in pleasing, and indeed much in moving the affections; but these very things have more power when the judge thinks he has learned the truth, which we cannot achieve except by argumentation and all other proof of facts.
§5.8.4quorum priusquam partiamur species, indicandum est esse quaedam in omni probationum genere communia.
Before we divide their classes, it must be pointed out that there are certain things common to every kind of proofs.
nam neque ulla quaestio est, quae non sit aut in re aut in persona; neque esse argumentorum loci possunt nisi in iis, quae rebus aut personis accidunt, §5.8.5eaque aut per se inspici solent aut ad aliud referri; nec ulla confirmation nisi aut ex consequentibus aut ex repugnantibus, et haec necesse est aut ex praeterito tempore aut ex coniuncto aut ex insequenti petere; nec ulla res probari nisi ex alia potest, eaque sit oportet aut maior aut par aut minor.
For there is no question which is not either in a thing or in a person; nor can there be places of arguments except in those things which happen to things or persons, and these are accustomed either to be inspected by themselves or to be referred to something else; nor is there any confirmation except either from consequents or from incompatibles, and it is necessary to seek these either from past time, or from connected time, or from subsequent time; nor can any thing be proved except from another, and that must be either greater, or equal, or less.
§5.8.6argumenta vero reperiuntur aut in quaestionibus, quae etiam separatae a complexu rerum personarumque spectari per se possint, aut in ipsa causa, cum invenitur aliquid in ea non ex communi ratione ductum, sed eius iudicii, de quo cognoscitur, proprium.
But arguments are found either in general questions, which even separated from the connection of things and persons can be viewed by themselves, or in the cause itself, when something is found in it not derived from common reasoning, but peculiar to that trial which is being investigated.
probationum praeterea omnium aliae sunt necessariae, aliae credibiles, aliae non repugnantes.
Furthermore, of all proofs, some are necessary, others credible, others not incompatible.
§5.8.7et adhuc omnium probationum quadruplex ratio est, ut vel quia est aliquid, aliud non sit; ut dies est, nox non est; vel quia est aliquid, et aliud sit: sol est supra terram, dies est; vel quia aliquid non est, aliud sit: nox non est, dies est; vel quia aliquid non est, nec aliud sit: non est rationalis, nec homo est.
And still, the logical relation of all proofs is fourfold: either because one thing is, another is not (as, it is day, it is not night); or because one thing is, another also is (the sun is above the earth, it is day); or because one thing is not, another is (it is not night, it is day); or because one thing is not, another also is not (he is not rational, he is not a man).
his in universum praedictis partes subiiciam.
Having premised these things in general, I will subjoin the divisions.