§5.7.27probos quosdam et verecundos non aspere incessere profuit; nam saepe, qui adversus insectantem pugnassent, modestia mitigantur.
It has been beneficial not to attack some honest and modest witnesses harshly; for often, those who would have fought against an assailant are softened by modesty.
omnis autem interrogatio aut in causa est aut extra causam.
But all interrogation is either in the cause or outside the cause.
in causa, sicut accusatori praecepimus, patronus quoque altius et unde nihil suspecti sit repetita percontatione, priora sequentibus applicando saepe eo perducit homines, ut invitis quod prosit extorqueat.
In the cause, as we prescribed to the accuser, the advocate also, by repeating the inquiry from a further point and from where nothing is suspected, connecting the former things with the latter, often leads men to the point where he extorts what is beneficial from them against their will.
§5.7.28eius rei sine dubio neque disciplina ulla in scholis neque exercitatio traditur, et naturali magis acumine aut usu contingit haec virtus.
Of this matter, without doubt, no instruction is delivered in the schools, nor any exercise, and this ability comes rather by natural acumen or experience.
si quod tamen exemplum ad imitationem demonstrandum sit, solum est, quod ex dialogis Socraticorum maximeque Platonis duci potest; in quibus adeo scitae sunt interrogationes, ut, cum plerisque bene respondeatur, res tamen ad id quod volunt efficere perveniat.
If, however, any example is to be shown for imitation, the only one is that which can be derived from the dialogues of the Socratics, and especially of Plato; in which the interrogations are so skillful that, although most of them are answered well, the matter nevertheless arrives at that which they wish to accomplish.
§5.7.29illud fortuna interim praestat, ut aliquid, quod inter se parum consentiat, a teste dicatur; interim, quod saepius evenit, ut testis testi diversa dicat.
Sometimes fortune provides this, that something which is little consistent with itself is said by a witness; sometimes, which happens more frequently, that one witness says different things from another witness.
acuta autem interrogatio ad hoc, quod casu fieri solet, §5.7.30etiam ratione perducet.
But a sharp interrogation will lead, by reasoning also, to that which is accustomed to happen by chance.
extra causam quoque multa, quae prosint, rogari solent, de vita testium aliorum, de sua quisque, si turpitudo, si humilitas, si amicitia accusatoris, si inimicitiae cum reo, in quibus aut dicant aliquid quod prosit, aut in mendacio vel cupiditate laedendi deprehendantur.
Outside the cause also, many things that may be beneficial are accustomed to be asked, concerning the life of other witnesses, or concerning his own life, if there is any disgrace, any lowliness of station, any friendship with the accuser, or any enmity with the defendant, in which they may either say something that is useful, or be caught in a lie or in their eagerness to harm.
sed in primis interrogatio cum debet esse circumspecta, §5.7.31quia multa contra patronos venuste testis saepe respondet, eique praecipue vulgo favetur; tum verbis quam maxime ex medio sumptis, ut qui rogatur (is autem est saepius imperitus) intelligat aut ne intelligere se neget, quod interrogantis non leve frigus est.
But above all, since interrogation ought to be circumspect, because a witness often answers wittily against the advocates, and he is especially favored by the crowd; and then, it must be conducted in words taken as much as possible from common speech, so that he who is asked (and he is more often unlearned) may understand, or may not deny that he understands, which is no small embarrassment for the questioner.
§5.7.32illae vero pessimae artes, testem subornatum in subsellia adversarii mittere, ut inde excitatus plus noceat vel dicendo contra reum cum quo sederit, vel, cum adiuvisse testimonio videbitur, faciendo ex industria multa immodeste atque intemperanter, per quae non a se tantum dictis detrahat fidem, sed ceteris quoque, qui profuerant, auferat auctoritatem; quorum mentionem habui, non ut fierent, sed ut vitarentur.
But those are the worst practices, to send a suborned witness onto the benches of the adversary, so that when called from there he may do more harm, either by speaking against the defendant with whom he had been sitting, or, when he seems to have assisted by his testimony, by intentionally doing many things shamelessly and immoderately, through which he may not only detract from the credibility of his own words, but also take away the authority from others who had been helpful; of which things I have made mention, not that they should be done, but that they should be avoided.
saepe inter se collidi solent inde testatio hinc testes; locus utrinque; haec enim se pars iureiurando, ilia consensa signantium tuetur.
Often a written testimony on one side and witnesses on the other are accustomed to clash with each other; there is a commonplace on both sides; for this party defends itself by oath, that one by the consensus of the signatories.
§5.7.33saepe inter testes et argumenta quaesitum est.
Often there is a question between witnesses and arguments.
inde scientiam in testibus et religionem, ingenia esse in argumentis dicitur; hinc testem gratia, metu, pecunia, ira, odio, amicitia, ambitu fieri; argumenta ex natura duci, in his iudicem sibi, in illis alii credere.
On the one side, it is said that there is knowledge and religious scruple in witnesses, and ingenuity in arguments; on the other, that a witness is made by favor, fear, money, anger, hatred, friendship, or bribery, while arguments are derived from nature, and in the latter the judge believes himself, in the former he believes another.
§5.7.34communia haec pluribus causis, multumque iactata sunt et semper tamen iactabuntur.
These things are common to many causes, and have been much debated and will always be debated.
aliquando utrinque sunt testes, et quaestio sequitur ex ipsis, utri meliores viri; ex causis, utri magis credibilia dixerint; ex litigatoribus, utri gratia magis valuerint.
Sometimes there are witnesses on both sides, and the question arises from the witnesses themselves, which of them are better men; from the causes, which of them have spoken more credible things; from the litigants, which of them have prevailed more in influence.
§5.7.35his adiicere si qui volet ea, quae divina testimonia vocant, ex responsis, oraculis, ominibus, duplicem sciat esse eorum tractatum; generalem alterum, in quo inter Stoicos et Epicuri sectam secutos pugna perpetua est, regaturne providentia mundus; specialem alterum circa partes divinationis, ut quaeque in quaestionem cadit.
If anyone wishes to add to these what they call divine testimonies, from replies, oracles, or omens, let him know that their treatment is twofold; one general, in which there is a perpetual battle between the Stoics and those who follow the sect of Epicurus, whether the world is ruled by providence; the other special, concerning the parts of divination, as each falls into question.
§5.7.36aliter enim oraculorum aliter haruspicum augurum, coniectorum, mathematicorum fides confirmari aut refelli potest, cum sit rerum ipsarum ratio diversa.
For the credibility of oracles is established or refuted in one way, and that of haruspices, augurs, dream-interpreters, and astrologers in another, since the nature of the things themselves is different.
circa eiusmodi quoque instrumenta firmanda vel destruenda multum habet operis oratio, si quae sint voces per vinum, somnum, dementiam emissae, vel excepta parvulorum indicia, quos pars altera nihil fingere, altera nihil iudicare dictura est.
Around confirming or destroying such instruments also, speech has much work, if there are any words uttered through wine, sleep, or madness, or the evidence obtained from young children, whom one party will say feign nothing, and the other will say judge nothing.
nec tantum praestari hoc genus potenter, §5.7.37sed etiam, ubi non est, desiderari solet: pecuniam dedisti;
And not only is this kind of proof powerfully provided, but also, where it is not, it is accustomed to be demanded: "You gave money; who counted it?
quis numeravit? ubi? unde? venenum arguis;
Where? From where?" "You charge poisoning; where did I buy it?
ubi emi? a quo? quanti? per quem dedi? quo conscio? quae fere omnia pro Cluentio Cicero in crimine veneficii excutit.
From whom? For how much? Through whom did I give it? Who was conscious of it?" Almost all of which Cicero shakes out in the poisoning charge in his speech for Cluentius.
haec de inartificialibus quam brevissime potui.
This is all about inartificial proofs as briefly as I could.