§5.14.18et a ratione incipere fas est, deinde concludere, ut ibidem: quodsi duodecim tabulae nocturnum furem quoquo modo, diurnum autem, si se telo defenderet, interfici impune voluerunt, quis est qui, quoquo modo quis interfectus sit, puniendum putet? variavit hic adhuc et rursus rationem tertio loco posuit, cum videat aliquando gladium nobis ab ipsis porrigi legibus.
It is also permissible to begin with the reason, and then to conclude, as in the same passage: "But if the Twelve Tables willed that a thief by night might be killed in any manner, but a thief by day only if he defended himself with a weapon, who is there that would think a person must be punished, in whatever manner he was killed?" He varied this still further and placed the reason in the third place again, since he saw that sometimes a sword is offered to us by the laws themselves.
§5.14.19Ppr constantem partis duxit ordinem: insidiatori vero et latroni quae potest inferri iniusta nex? hoc intentio;
He conducted the argument by a consistent order of parts: "But what unjust death can be inflicted upon a waylayer and a robber?" This is the intention.
quid comitatus nostri, quid gladii volunt? hoc ratio;
"What do our escorts, what do our swords mean?" This is the reason.
quos habere certe non liceret, si uti illis nullo pacto liceret, hoc ex ratione et intentione connexio.
"Which it would certainly not be lawful to have, if it were in no way lawful to use them." This is the connection from the reason and the intention.
§5.14.20huic generi probationis tribus occurritur modis, id est per omnes partes.
This kind of proof is countered in three ways, that is, through all its parts.
aut enim expugnatur intentio aut adsumptio aut conclusio, nonnunquam omnia.
For either the intention, or the assumption, or the conclusion is attacked, and sometimes all of them.
intentio expugnatur: iure occidi eum, qui insidiatus sit. nam prima statim quaestio pro Milone est, an ei fas sit lucem intueri qui a se hominem necatum esse fateatur.
The intention is attacked, for example: "He who has lain in wait is justly killed." For the very first question in the defense of Milo is whether it is lawful for him to look upon the light who confesses that a man was killed by him.
§5.14.21expugnatur adsumptio omnibus iis quae de refutatione diximus.
The assumption is attacked by all those means which we have mentioned concerning refutation.
et ratio quidem nonnunquam est vera, cum eius propositio vera non sit; interim verae propositionis falsa ratio est. virtus bonum est, verum est; si quis rationem subiiciat, quod ea locupletes faciat, verae intentionis falsa sit ratio.
And indeed, the reason is sometimes true when its proposition is not true; on the other hand, a false reason may be attached to a true proposition: "Virtue is a good" is true; if someone should add the reason, "because it makes people rich," the reason of the true intention would be false.
conclusio autem aut vera negatur, §5.14.22cum aliud colligit quam id quod ex prioribus efficitur, aut nihil ad quaestionem dicitur pertinere.
But the conclusion is either denied to be true, when it infers something other than what is produced from the premises, or is said to have nothing to do with the question.
non est vera sic: insidiator iure occiditur; nam cum vitae vim adferat ut hostis, debet etiam repelli ut hostis; recte igitur Clodius ut hostis occiditur est; non utique, nondum enim Clodium insidiatorem ostendimus.
It is not true in this way: "A waylayer is justly killed; for since he brings violence against life like an enemy, he must also be repelled like an enemy; therefore Clodius is justly killed as an enemy." Not at all, for we have not yet shown Clodius to be a waylayer.
sed fit vera connexio, recte igitur insidiator ut hostis occiditur; nihil ad nos, nondum enim Clodius insidiator apparet.
But it becomes a true connection: "Therefore a waylayer is justly killed as an enemy"; but this is nothing to us, for Clodius does not yet appear to be a waylayer.
§5.14.23sed ut potest vera esse intentio et ratio et tamen falsa connexio, ita, si illa falsa sunt, nunquam est vera connexio.
But just as the intention and the reason can be true, and yet the connection false, so, if those are false, the connection is never true.
§5.14.24enthymema ab aliis oratorius syllogismus, ab aliis pars dicitur syllogismi, propterea quod syllogismus utique conclusionem et propositionem habet et per omnes partes efficit, quod proposuit, enthymema tantum intelligi contentum sit.
The enthymeme is called by some an oratorical syllogism, by others a part of a syllogism, because a syllogism certainly has a conclusion and a proposition and accomplishes what it proposed through all its parts, whereas an enthymeme is content merely to be understood.
§5.14.25syllogismus talis: solum bonum virtus, nam id demum bonum est, quo nemo male uti potest; virtute nemo male uti potest, bonum est ergo virtus. enthymema ex consequentibus: bonum est virtus, qua nemo male uti potest. et contra, non est bonum pecunia; non enim bonum, quo quis male uti potest; pecunia potest quis male uti, non igitur bonum est pecunia. enthymema ex pugnantibus: an bonum est pecunia, §5.14.26qua quis male uti potest?—Si pecunia, quae est in argento signato, argentum est, qui argentum omne legavit, et pecuniam, quae est in argento signato, legavit; argentum autem omne legavit, igitur et pecuniam, quae est in argento, legavit, habet formam syllogismi.
The syllogism is of this kind: "Virtue alone is a good, for that alone is a good which no one can use badly; no one can use virtue badly; therefore virtue is a good." The enthymeme from consequences: "Virtue is a good, which no one can use badly." And conversely: "Money is not a good; for that is not a good which anyone can use badly; anyone can use money badly; therefore money is not a good." The enthymeme from opposites: "Is money indeed a good, which anyone can use badly?"――"If money, which is in coined silver, is 'silver', he who bequeathed all his silver also bequeathed the money which is in coined silver; but he bequeathed all his silver; therefore he also bequeathed the money which is in the silver," has the form of a syllogism.
oratori satis est dicere, cum argentum legaverit omne, pecuniam quoque legavit, quae est in argento.
For an orator it is enough to say: "since he bequeathed all his silver, he also bequeathed the money which is in the silver."