§5.14.10in tribus autem, quas fecimus, partibus non est forma semper eadem, sed una, in qua idem concluditur quod intenditur: anima immortalis est. nam quidquid ex se ipso movetur, immortale est; anima autem ex se ipsa movetur, immortalis igitur est anima. hoc fit non solum in singulis argumentis sed in totis causis, quae sunt simplices, et in quaestionibus.
However, in the three parts which we have made, the form is not always the same, but there is one in which the same thing is concluded as is intended: "the soul is immortal; for whatever is moved by itself is immortal; but the soul is moved by itself; therefore the soul is immortal." This occurs not only in single arguments but in whole cases, which are simple, and in questions.
§5.14.11nam et hae primam habent propositionem: sacrilegium commisisti; Non, quisquis hominem occidit, caedis tenetur, deinde rationem; (sed haec est in causis et quaestione longior quam in singulis argumentis) et plerumque summa complexione, vel per enumerationem vel per brevem conclusionem, testantur, quid effecerint.
For these also have a first proposition: "you have committed sacrilege"; or "No, whoever kills a man is not held guilty of murder"; then they have the reason (but this is longer in cases and questions than in single arguments); and for the most part, by the final conclusion, either through enumeration or through a brief conclusion, they declare what they have proved.
in hoc genere propositio dubia est, de hac enim quaeritur.
In this kind, the proposition is doubtful, for it is about this that it is inquired.
§5.14.12altera est complexio non par intentioni sed vim habens parem: mors nihil ad nos, nam quod est dissolutum, sensu caret; quod autem sensu caret, nihil ad nos. in alio genere non eadem propositio est quae connexio: omnia animalia meliora sunt quam inanima, nihil autent melius est mundo, mundus igitur animal. hic potest videri deesse intentio.
Another is a conclusion not identical to the intention, but having equal force: "death is nothing to us, for what is dissolved lacks sensation; and what lacks sensation is nothing to us." In another kind, the proposition is not the same as the connection: "all animals are better than inanimate things; but nothing is better than the universe; therefore the universe is an animal." Here the intention may seem to be missing.
Potuit enim sic constitui ratiocinatio: animal est mundus, omnia enim animalia meliora sunt quam inanima et cetera.
For the reasoning could have been set up thus: "the universe is an animal, for all animals are better than inanimate things," and so forth.
§5.14.13haec propositio aut confessa est ut proxima, aut probanda ut, qui beatam vitam vivere volet, philosophetur oportet, non enim conceditur; cetera sequi nisi confirmata prima parte non possunt.
This proposition is either admitted, as the nearest one, or must be proved, as "he who wishes to live a happy life must practice philosophy," for this is not granted; the remaining parts cannot follow unless the first part is confirmed.
item adsumptio interim confessa est ut, omnes autem volunt beatam vitam vivere; interim probanda ut illa, quod est dissolutum, sensu caret; cum, soluta corpore anima an sit immortalis vel ad tempus certe maneat, sit in dubio.
Likewise, the assumption is sometimes admitted, as "but all wish to live a happy life"; sometimes it must be proved, as that one: "what is dissolved lacks sensation"; since, whether the soul, when released from the body, is immortal or at least remains for a time, is in doubt.
quam adsumptionem alii, rationem alii vocant. §5.14.14epichirema autem nullo differt a syllogismis, nisi quod illi et plures habent species et vera colligunt veris, epichirematis frequentior circa credibilia est usus.
This assumption some call "reason," others "assumption." But the epichireme differs in nothing from syllogisms, except that they have both more species and conclude truths from truths, whereas the use of the epichireme is more frequent concerning what is credible.
nam si contingeret semper controversa confessis probare, vix esset in hoc genere usus oratoris.
For if it happened that we could always prove controversial things by admitted ones, there would be scarcely any use for an orator in this kind.
nam quo ingenio est opus, ut dicas: §5.14.15bona ad me pertinent, solus enim sum filius defuncti, vel solus heres, cum iure bonorum possessio testati secundum tabulas testamenti detur, §5.14.16ad me igitur pertinet. sed cum ipsa ratio in quaestionem venit, efficiendum est certum id quo probaturi sumus quod incertum est: ut si ipsa forte intentione dicatur aut filius non es aut non es legitimus aut non es solus, itemque aut non es heres, aut non iustum testamentum est, aut capere non potes, aut habes coheredes, efficiendum est iustum, propter quod nobis bona adiudicari debeant.
For what talent is needed to say: "the goods belong to me, for I am the only son of the deceased, or the only heir," since by law the possession of the goods of a testator is given according to the tablets of the will, "therefore it belongs to me." But when the reason itself comes into question, we must make certain that by which we are going to prove what is uncertain: as if perhaps against the intention itself it should be said: "you are not the son," or "you are not legitimate," or "you are not the only one," and likewise "you are not the heir," or "the will is not valid," or "you cannot take it," or "you have co-heirs," we must establish the justice, on account of which the goods ought to be adjudged to us.
§5.14.17sed tum est necessaria illa summa connexio, cum intervenit ratio longior; alioqui sufficient intentio ac ratio: silent enim leges inter arma nec se expectari iubent, cum ei, qui exspectare velit, ante iniusta poena luenda sit quam iusta repetenda. ideoque id enthymema, quod est ex consequentibus, rationi simile dixerunt.
But then that final connection is necessary when a longer reason intervenes; otherwise, the intention and the reason will suffice: "for laws are silent among arms, nor do they command themselves to be waited for, since by him who should wish to wait, an unjust punishment must be suffered before a just satisfaction can be demanded." And therefore they called that enthymeme, which is from consequences, similar to a reason.
sed et singula, interimque recte, ponuntur, ut ipsum illud silent leges inter arma;
But even single parts are sometimes, and rightly, placed, such as that very "laws are silent among arms";