§5.12.1haec fere de probatione vel ab aliis tradita vel usu percepta in hoc tempus sciebam.
These are roughly the things concerning proof, either handed down by others or perceived by experience, that I knew up to this time.
neque mihi fiducia est, ut ea sola esse contendam, quin immo hortor ad quaerendum et inveniri posse fateor; quae tamen adiecta fuerint, non multum ab his abhorrebunt.
Nor do I have the confidence to contend that these are the only ones; nay, rather, I encourage further search, and I confess that more can be found; however, those that may be added will not shrink far from these.
nunc breviter, quemadmodum sit utendum iis, subiungam.
Now, briefly, I will subjoin how they are to be used.
§5.12.2traditum fere est argumentum oportere esse confessum; dubiis enim probari dubia qui possunt Quaedam tamen, quae in alterius rei probationem ducimus, ipsa probanda sunt.
It is generally handed down that an argument ought to be self-evident; for how can doubtful things be proved by doubtful things? Yet some things, which we bring forward for the proof of another matter, must themselves be proved.
occidisti virum, eras enim adultera. prius de adulterio convincendum est ut, cum id coeperit esse pro certo, fiat incerti argumentum.
"You killed your husband, for you were an adulteress." First, the adultery must be proved so that, when it begins to be certain, it may become an argument for what is uncertain.
spiculum tuum in corpore occisi inventum est; negat suum: ut probationi prosit, probandum est.
"Your spear was found in the body of the slain man." He denies it is his: that it may benefit the proof, it must be proved.
§5.12.3illud hoc loco monere inter necessaria est, nulla esse firmiora quam quae ex dubiis facta sunt certa.
It is among the necessary things to warn in this place that none are stronger than those which have been made certain from being doubtful.
caedes a te commissa est, cruentam enim vestem habuisti; non est tam grave argumentum, si fatetur quam si convincitur.
"The murder was committed by you, for you had a bloody garment." It is not so heavy an argument if he confesses it as if he is convicted of it.
nam si fatetur, multis ex causis potuit cruenta esse vestis; si negat, hic causae cardinem ponit, in quo si victus fuerit, etiam in sequentibus ruit.
For if he confesses, the garment could have been bloody from many causes; if he denies, he places here the hinge of the cause, in which if he is defeated, he falls also in the following points.
non enim videtur in negando mentiturus fuisse, nisi desperasset id posse defendi, si confiteretur.
For he does not seem likely to have lied in denying, unless he had despaired that it could be defended if he confessed.
§5.12.4firmissimis argumentorum singulis instandum, infirmiora congreganda sunt, quia illa per se fortia non oportet circumstantibus obscurare, ut qualia sunt appareant, haec imbecilla natura mutuo auxilio sustinentur.
We must press upon the strongest arguments individually, and the weaker must be gathered together, because it is not proper for those that are strong by themselves to be obscured by surrounding things, so that they may appear as they are, while these weak ones are sustained by mutual aid through their nature.
§5.12.5ita quae non possunt valere, quia magna sint, valebunt, quia multa sunt; utique vero ad eiusdem rei probationem omnia spectant.
Thus, things which cannot have weight because they are great, will have weight because they are many; at any rate, indeed, they all look to the proof of the same matter.
ut, si quis hereditatis gratia hominem occidisse dicatur: hereditatem sperabas et magnam hereditatem, et pauper eras et tum maxime a creditoribus appellabaris; et offenderas eum, cuius eras heres, et mutaturum tabulas sciebas. singula levia sunt et communia, universa vero nocent etiamsi non ut fulmine, tamen ut grandine.
As, if someone should be said to have killed a man for the sake of an inheritance: "You expected an inheritance, and a great inheritance, and you were poor, and just then you were especially dunned by creditors; and you had offended him whose heir you were, and you knew he was about to change his will." Individual things are light and common, but all together they do harm, if not like a thunderbolt, yet like hail.
§5.12.6quaedam argumenta ponere satis non est, adiuvanda sunt: cupiditas causa sceleris fuit, quae sit vis eius: ira, quantum efficiat in animis hominum talis adfectio;
It is not enough to lay down certain arguments; they must be assisted: "Covetousness was the cause of the crime"—what is its power? "Anger"—how much such an affection effects in the minds of men?
ita et firmiora erunt ipsa et plus habebunt decoris, si non nudos et velut carne spoliatos artus ostenderint.
Thus they will be both stronger themselves and will have more of grace, if they do not show limbs that are bare and, as it were, stripped of flesh.
§5.12.7multum etiam refert, si argumento nitemur odii, utrum hoc ex invidia sit an ex iniuria an ex ambitu, vetus an novum, adversus inferiorem, parem, superiorem, alienum, propinquum.
It also matters much, if we rely on the argument of hatred, whether this is from envy, or from injury, or from ambition, old or new, against an inferior, an equal, a superior, a stranger, or a relative.
suos habent omnia ista tractatus et ad utilitatem partis eius quam tuemur referenda sunt.
All these have their own treatments, and must be referred to the utility of the party we defend.
§5.12.8nec tamen omnibus semper, quae invenerimus, argumentis onerandus est iudex, quia et taedium adferunt et fidem detrahunt.
Yet the judge must not always be burdened with all the arguments we have found, because they both bring weariness and detract from credibility.
neque enim potest iudex credere satis esse ea potentia, quae non putamus ipsi sufficere qui diximus.
For the judge cannot believe that those are powerful enough which we ourselves, who spoke them, do not think sufficient.
in rebus vero apertis argumentari tam sit stultum quam in clarissimum solem mortale lumen inferre.
Indeed, to argue in open matters would be as foolish as to bring a mortal light into the brightest sun.
§5.12.9his quidam probationes adiiciunt, quas παθητικάς vocant, ductas ex adfectibus.
To these, some add proofs which they call 'pathetikai', drawn from the feelings.
atque Aristoteles quidem potentissimum putat ex eo, qui dicit, si sit vir bonus; quod ut optimum est, ita longe quidem, sed sequitur tamen, videri.
And Aristotle indeed thinks that the most powerful is from him who speaks, if he be a good man; which, as it is best, so, though indeed far off, yet to seem so follows.
§5.12.10inde enim ilia nobilis Scauri defensio: Q. Varius Sucronensis ait Aemilium Scaurum rem publicam populi Romani prodidisse; Aemilius, Scaurus negat. cui simile quiddam fecisse Iphicrates dicitur, qui cum Aristophontem, quo accusante similis criminis reus erat, interrogasset, an is accepta pecunia rem publicam proditurus esset; isque id negasset: quod igitur, inquit, tu non fecisses, ego feci? §5.12.11intuendum autem et qui sit apud quem dicimus, et id quod illi maxime probabile videatur requirendum; qua de re locuti sumus in prohoemii et suasoriae praeceptis.
For from there comes that noble defense of Scaurus: "Quintus Varius of Sucro says that Aemilius Scaurus betrayed the republic of the Roman people; Aemilius Scaurus denies it." A similar thing is said to have been done by Iphicrates, who, when he had asked Aristophon, by whose accusation he was accused of a similar crime, whether he would betray the republic if he received money, and he had denied it, said: "Therefore, what you would not have done, have I done?" Moreover, we must observe who it is before whom we speak, and that which seems most probable to him must be sought; concerning which matter we have spoken in the precepts of the proem and of the deliberative speech.