§5.11.33ut, si qui me exire domo coegisset armis, haberem actionem, si qui introire prohibuisset, non haberem? dissimilia sic deprehenduntur, Non si, qui argentum omne legarit, videri potest signatam quoque pecuniam reliquisse, ideo etiam, quod est in nominibus, dari voluisse creditur.
As, if someone had forced me out of my house with arms, I should have an action, but if someone had prohibited me from entering, I should not have? Dissimilar things are thus detected: Not because someone who has bequeathed all his silver can be seen to have left also coined money, is he therefore believed to have wished to give also that which is in debts.
§5.11.34Ἀναλογίαν quidam a simili separaverunt, nos eam subiectam huic generi putamus.
Some have separated analogy from similarity, but we think it is subsumed under this class.
nam, ut unum ad decem, ita decem ad centum simile certe est; et ut hostis, sic malus civis.
For, as one is to ten, so ten to a hundred is certainly similar; and as an enemy, so is a bad citizen.
quanquam haec ulterius quoque procedere solent: si turpis dominae consuetudo cum servo, turpis domino cum ancilla; si mutis animalibus finis voluptas, idem homini.
Although these are accustomed to proceed even further: if the intercourse of a mistress with a male slave is shameful, so is that of a master with a female slave; if pleasure is the end for mute animals, so is the same for man.
§5.11.35cui rei facillime occurrit ex dissimilibus argumentatio: non idem est dominum cum ancilla coisse, quod dominam cum servo; nec, si mutis finis voluptas, rationalibus quoque; immo ex contrario: quia mutis, ideo non rationalibus.
To which argument, a counter-argument from dissimilar things most easily occurs: it is not the same for a master to have cohabited with a female slave as for a mistress with a male slave; nor, if pleasure is the end for mute animals, is it also for rational ones; nay, on the contrary: because it is for mute ones, therefore it is not for rational ones.
§5.11.36adhibebitur extrinsecus in causam et auctoritas.
Authority also will be introduced from without into a cause.
haec secuti Graecos, a quibus κρίσεις dicuntur, iudicia aut indicationes vocant, non de quibus ex causa dicta sententia est (nam ea quidem in exemplorum locum cedunt), sed si quid ita visum gentibus, populis, sapientibus viris, claris civibus, illustribus poetis referri potest.
This, following the Greeks, by whom they are called 'kriseis', they call 'judgments' or 'indications'; not those things concerning which a sentence has been pronounced on account of a lawsuit (for those indeed pass into the place of examples), but if anything can be reported as having seemed so to nations, peoples, wise men, famous citizens, or illustrious poets.
§5.11.37ne haec quidem vulgo dicta et recepta persuasione populari sine usu fuerint.
Not even those things which are commonly said and received by popular belief would be without use.
testimonia sunt enim quodammodo vel potentiora etiam, quod non causis accommodata, sed liberis odio et gratia mentibus ideo tantum dicta factaque, quia aut honestissima aut verissima videbantur.
For they are, in a way, testimonies that are even more powerful, because they were not adapted to lawsuits, but were said and done by minds free from hatred and favor, for the sole reason that they seemed either most honorable or most true.
§5.11.38an vero me de incommodis vitae disserentem non adiuvabit earum persuasio nationum, quae fletibus natos, laetitia defunctos prosecuntur? aut si misericordiam commendabo iudici, nihil proderit, quod prudentissima civitas Atheniensium non eam pro adfectu sed pro numine accepit?
Or indeed, when I am discussing the inconveniences of life, will I not be assisted by the belief of those nations who escort the newborn with weeping, and the deceased with joy? Or if I recommend mercy to a judge, will it be of no avail that the most wise state of the Athenians received it not as a mere passion, but as a divinity?
§5.11.39iam illa septem praecepta sapientium nonne quasdam vitae leges existimamus? si causam ueneficii dicat adultera, non M. Catonis iudicio damnata videatur, qui nullam adulteram non eandem esse veneficam dixit? nam sententiis quidem poetarum non orationes modo sunt refertae sed libri etiam philosophorum, qui quanquam inferiora omnia praeceptis suis ac litteris credunt, repetere tamen auctoritatem a plurimis versibus non fastidierunt.
Furthermore, do we not regard those seven precepts of the wise men as certain laws of life? If an adulteress should plead her cause on a charge of poisoning, would she not seem condemned by the judgment of Marcus Cato, who said that there was no adulteress who was not also a poisoner? For not only are speeches filled with the opinions of poets, but also the books of philosophers, who, although they believe everything to be inferior to their own precepts and writings, nevertheless did not disdain to seek authority from very many verses.
§5.11.40neque est ignobile exemplum, Megarios ab Atheniensibus, cum de Salamine contenderent, victos Homeri versu, qui tamen ipse non in omni editione reperitur, significans Aiacem naves suas Atheniensibus iunxisse.
Nor is it an obscure example that the Megarians, when contending with the Athenians for Salamis, were defeated by a verse of Homer—which, however, is not itself found in every edition—indicating that Ajax joined his ships with the Athenians.
ea quoque, §5.11.41quae vulgo recepta sunt, hoc ipso, quod incertum auctorem habent, velut omnium fiunt: quale est, ubi amici, ibi opes, et, conscientia mille testes, et apud Ciceronem, pares autem (ut est in vetere proverbio) cum paribus maxime congregantur; neque enim durassent haec in aeternum, nisi vera omnibus, uiderentur.
Those things also, which are commonly accepted, by this very fact that they have an uncertain author, become as it were the property of all: such as, 'where friends are, there are riches,' and, 'conscience is a thousand witnesses,' and in Cicero, 'but equals (as it is in the old proverb) with equals most of all congregate'; for these would not have endured forever, unless they seemed true to all.
§5.11.42ponitur a quibusdam et quidem in parte prima deorum auctoritas, quae est ex responsis, ut, Socraten esse sapientissimum.
By some, and indeed in the first part, the authority of the gods is placed, which is from responses, as, that Socrates is the wisest.
id rarum est, non sine usu tamen.
That is rare, yet not without use.
utitur eo Cicero in libro de aruspicum responsis et in contione contra Catilinam,cum signum Iovis columnae impositum populo ostendit, et pro Ligario, cum causam C. Caesaris meliorem, quia hoc dii iudicaverint, confitetur.
Cicero uses it in the book on the responses of the aruspices, and in the speech against Catiline when he shows the people the statue of Jupiter placed upon the column, and for Ligarius when he confesses that the cause of Gaius Caesar is better because the gods have so judged.
quae cum propria causae sunt, divina testimonia vocantur; cum aliunde arcessuntur, argumenta.
When these are peculiar to the cause, they are called divine testimonies; when they are fetched from elsewhere, they are called arguments.
§5.11.43nonnunquam contingit iudicis quoque aut adversarii aut eius, qui ex diverso agit, dictum aliquid aut factum adsumere ad eorum, quae intendimus, fidem.
Sometimes it happens also to assume some word or deed of the judge or the adversary, or of him who pleads on the opposite side, to establish the credibility of those things which we intend.
propter quod fuerunt, qui exempla et has auctoritates inartificialium probationum esse arbitrarentur, quod ea non inveniret orator, §5.11.44sed acciperet.
On account of which there were some who thought that examples and these authorities belong to inartificial proofs, because the orator did not invent them, but received them.
plurimum autem refert.
But it matters very much.
nam testis et quaestio et his similia de ipsa re, quae in iudicio est, pronuntiant; extra petita, nisi ad aliquam praesentis disceptationis utilitatem ingenio applicantur, nihil per se valent.
For a witness and torture and things similar to these pronounce concerning the very matter which is in judgment; things sought from without, unless they are applied by talent to some utility of the present discussion, are of no avail by themselves.