§5.10.79unde illa non hac ratione dicta sed efficiens idem Domitii Afri sententia est pulchra: Ego accusavi, vos damnastis. est invicem consequens et quod ex diversis idem ostendit; ut, qui mundum nasci dicit, per hoc ipsum et deficere significet, quia deficit omne quod nascitur.
Hence that beautiful saying of Domitius Afer, though not spoken in this manner, yet producing the same effect: "I accused, you condemned." There is also a mutual consequence which shows the same thing from different matters; as he who says that the world had a beginning, signifies by this very fact that it will also perish, because everything that is born perishes.
§5.10.80simillima est his argumentatio, qua colligi solent ex iis quae faciunt ea quae efficiuntur, aut contra, quod genus a causis vocant.
Very similar to these is the argumentation by which they are accustomed to infer from those things which produce to those which are produced, or on the contrary, which class they call "from causes".
haec interim necessario fiunt, interim plerumque sed non necessario.
These sometimes happen necessarily, sometimes for the most part but not necessarily.
nam corpus in lumine utique umbram facit, et umbra, ubicunque est, ibi esse corpus ostendit.
For a body in the light certainly produces a shadow, and a shadow, wherever it is, shows that a body is there.
§5.10.81alia sunt, ut dixi, non necessaria, vel utrinque vel ex altera parte: sol colorat; non utique, qui est coloratus, a sole est.
Others are, as I said, not necessary, either on both sides or on one side: the sun colors; not certainly is he who is colored colored by the sun.
iter pulverulentum facit; sed neque omne iter pulverem movet nec, quisquis est pulverulentus, ex itinere est.
A journey makes one dusty; but neither does every journey raise dust, nor is everyone who is dusty from a journey.
§5.10.82quae utique fiunt, talia sunt: si sapientia bonum virum facit, bonus vir est utique sapiens; itemque boni est honeste facere, mali turpiter; et qui honeste faciunt, boni, qui turpiter, mali iudicantur; recte.
Those which certainly happen are of this kind: if wisdom makes a good man, a good man is certainly wise; and likewise it is the part of a good man to act honorably, of a bad man shamefully; and those who act honorably are judged good, those who act shamefully, bad; rightly.
at, exercitatio plerumque robustum corpus facit; sed non quisquis est robustus exercitatus, nec quisquis exercitatus robustus; nec, quia fortitudo praestat ne mortem timeamus, quisquis mortem non timuerit, vir fortis erit existimandus; nec, si capitis dolorem facit, inutilis hominibus sol est.
But exercise for the most part makes a robust body; yet not everyone who is robust has exercised, nor everyone who has exercised is robust; nor, because courage prevents us from fearing death, must everyone who has not feared death be thought a brave man; nor, if it causes a headache, is the sun useless to men.
§5.10.83haec ad hortativum maxime genus pertinent: virtus facit laudem, sequenda igitur; at voluptas infamiam, fugienda igitur.
These belong chiefly to the hortatory class: virtue produces praise, therefore it is to be pursued; but pleasure infamy, therefore it is to be avoided.
recte autem monemur, causas non utique ab ultimo esse repetendas, ut Medea, utinam ne in nemore Pelio; §5.10.84quasi vero id eam fecerit miseram aut nocentem, quod illic ceciderint abiegnae ad terram trabes; et Philocteta Paridi, Si impar esses tibi, ego nunc non essem miser; quo modo pervenire quolibet retro causas legentibus licet.
But we are rightly warned that causes are not always to be traced back from the ultimate origin, as in Medea: "Would that in the grove of Pelion..."; as if indeed that made her miserable or guilty, because there the fir beams fell to the earth; and Philoctetes to Paris: "If you had been unequal to yourself, I should not now be miserable"; in which manner those who read causes backward may arrive anywhere.
illud his adiicere ridiculum putarem, §5.10.85nisi eo Cicero uteretur, quod coniugatum vocant, ut eos, qui rem iustam faciunt, iuste facere (quod certe non eget probatione), quod compascuum est, compascere licere.
I should think it ridiculous to add to these, unless Cicero used what they call conjugate, as that those who do a just thing act justly (which certainly needs no proof), and that what is a common pasture, it is lawful to graze in common.
quidam haec, §5.10.86quae vel ex causis vel ex efficientibus diximus, alieno nomine uocant ἐκβάσεις id est exitus.
Some call these, which we have said to be either from causes or from efficient things, by a foreign name, "ecbaseis", that is, outcomes.
nam nec hic aliud tractatur quam quid ex quoque eveniat.
For indeed nothing else is treated here than what happens from each thing.
adposita vel comparativa dicuntur, quae minora ex maioribus, maiora ex minoribus, paria ex paribus §5.10.87probant.
Adposite or comparative arguments are called those which prove smaller things from greater, greater from smaller, equal from equal.
confirmatur coniectura ex maiore, si quis sacrilegium facit, faciet et furtum; ex minore, qui facile ac palam mentitur, peierabit; ex pari, qui ob rem iudicandam pecuniam accepit, et ob dicendum falsum testimonium accipiet. §5.10.88iuris confirmatio huiusmodi est: ex maiore, si adulterum occidere licet, et loris caedere; ex minore, si furem nocturnum occidere licet, quid latronem? ex pari, quae poena adversus interfectorem patris iusta est, eadem adversus matris; quorum omnium tractatus versatur in syllogismis.
Conjecture is confirmed from the greater: "If anyone commits sacrilege, he will also commit theft"; from the less: "He who lies easily and openly will commit perjury"; from the equal: "He who has received money for judging a case will also receive it for giving false testimony." The confirmation of law is of this kind: from the greater: "If it is lawful to kill an adulterer, it is also lawful to scourge him"; from the less: "If it is lawful to kill a night thief, what about a highwayman?"; from the equal: "Whatever punishment is just against the killer of a father, the same is just against the killer of a mother"; the treatment of all of which is engaged in syllogisms.
§5.10.89ilia magis finitionibus aut qualitatibus prosunt, si robur corporibus bonum est, non minus sanitas; Si furtum scelus, magis sacrilegium; Si abstinentia virus, et continentia; Si mundus providentia regitur, administranda respublica; Si domus aedificari sine ratione non potest, quid urbs agenda? si agenda est navalium cura, et armorum. ac mihi quidem sufficeret hoc genus, §5.10.90sed in species secatur.
These are of more service for definitions or qualities: "If strength of body is a good, health is no less so"; "If theft is a crime, sacrilege is more so"; "If abstinence is a virtue, so is self-control"; "If the world is ruled by providence, the state must be administered"; "If a house cannot be built without plan, how should a city be managed?"; "If care must be taken of dockyards, so also of arms." And indeed this class would be sufficient for me, but it is cut into species.
nam ex pluribus ad unum et ex uno ad plura (unde est quod semel, et saepius),et ex parte ad totum et ex genere ad speciem, et ex eo quod continet ad id quod continetur, aut ex difficilioribus ad faciliora et ex longe positis ad propiora et ad omnia, quae contra haec sunt, eadem ratione argumenta ducuntur.
For arguments are drawn by the same reasoning from many to one and from one to many (whence comes the argument "once, and more often"), and from part to whole and from genus to species, and from that which contains to that which is contained, or from more difficult to easier and from things placed far off to those nearer, and to all things which are contrary to these.