§5.10.69fit etiam ex duobus, quorum necesse est alterum verum, eligendi adversario potestas, efficiturque, ut, utrum elegerit, noceat.
There is also given to the adversary the power of choosing from two options, of which one must be true, with the result that, whichever he chooses, it harms him.
facit hoc Cicero pro Oppio: utrum, cum Cottam appetisset, an cum ipse sese conaretur occidere, telum e manibus ereptum est? et pro Vareno: optio vobis datur, utrum velitis casu illo itinere Varenum usum esse an huius persuasu et inductu. deinde utraque facit accusatori contraria.
Cicero does this in defense of Oppius: "Was the weapon snatched from his hands when he had attacked Cotta, or when he was trying to kill himself?" And in defense of Varenus: "The choice is given to you, whether you wish Varenus to have used that route by chance, or by the persuasion and inducement of this man." Then he makes both options contrary to the accuser.
§5.10.70interim duo ita proponuntur, ut utrumlibet electum idem efficiat, quale est, philosophandum est, etiamsi non est philosophandum. et illud vulgatum, quo schema, si intelligitur? quo, si non intelligitur? et, mentietur in tormentis, qui dolorem pati potest; mentietur, qui non potest. §5.10.71ut sunt autem tria tempora, ita ordo rerum tribus momentis consertus est; habent enim omnia initium, incrementum, summam, ut iurgium deinde pugna, tum caedes.
Sometimes two things are proposed in such a way that whichever is chosen produces the same result, such as: "One must philosophize, even if one must not philosophize." And that well-known saying: "To what end is a figure of speech, if it is understood? To what end, if it is not understood?" And: "He who can bear pain will lie under torture; he who cannot, will also lie." Moreover, just as there are three times, so the order of things is connected by three moments; for all things have a beginning, an increase, and a climax, like a quarrel, then a fight, then a murder.
est ergo hic quoque argumentorum locus invicem probantium.
There is therefore here also a place of arguments that prove each other in turn.
nam et ex initiis summa colligitur, quale est, non possum togam praetextam sperare, cum exordium pullum videam; et contra, non dominationis causa Sullam arma sumpsisse,argumentum est dictatura deposita. §5.10.72similiter ex incremento in utramque partem ducitur rei ratio cum in coniectura tum etiam in tractatu aequitatis, an ad initium summa referenda sit, id est, an ei caedes imputanda sit, a quo iurgium coepit.
For from the beginnings the climax is inferred, such as: "I cannot hope for a toga praetexta when I see that the beginning is black"; and on the contrary, "that Sulla laid down the dictatorship is proof that he did not take up arms for the sake of domination." Similarly, from the increase, the reason of the matter is drawn in both directions, both in conjecture and also in the treatment of equity, namely, whether the climax should be referred to the beginning, that is, whether the murder should be imputed to him with whom the quarrel began.
§5.10.73est argumentorum locus ex similibus: si continentia virtus, utique et abstinentia; fidem debet tutor, et procurator. hoc est ex eo genere, quod ἐπαγωγήν Graeci vocant, Cicero inductionem.
There is a place of arguments from similar things: "If self-control is a virtue, so certainly is abstinence"; "A guardian owes good faith, and so does an agent." This is of that class which the Greeks call induction, and Cicero "inductio".
ex dissimilibus: non, si laetitia bonum, et voluptas; Non, quod mulieri, idem pupillo. ex contrariis: frugalitas bonum, luxuria enim malum; Si malorum causa bellum est, erit emendatio pax; Si veniam meretur, qui inprudens nocuit, non meretur praemium, qui imprudens profuit. §5.10.74ex pugnantibus: qui est sapiens, stultus non est. ex consequentibus sive adiunctis: si bonum iustitia, est recte iudicandum; si malum perfidia, non est fallendum. idem retro.
From dissimilar things: "Not, if joy is a good, is pleasure also"; "Not, what is applicable to a woman, is the same to a ward." From contraries: "Frugality is a good, for luxury is an evil"; "If war is the cause of evils, peace will be their correction"; "If he who harmed unknowingly deserves pardon, he who benefited unknowingly does not deserve a reward." From incompatible things: "He who is wise is not foolish." From consequents or adjuncts: "If justice is a good, we must judge rightly; if perfidy is an evil, we must not deceive." The same in reverse.
nec sunt his dissimilia ideoque huic loco subiicienda, cum et ipsa naturaliter congruant: quod quis non habuit, non perdidit; Quem quis amat, sciens non laedit; Quem quis heredem suum esse voluit, carum habuit, habet, habebit. sed cum sint indubitata, vim habent paene signorum immutabilium.
Nor are those dissimilar to these, and therefore to be subjected to this place, since they also naturally agree: "What one did not have, one did not lose"; "Whom one loves, one does not knowingly harm"; "Whom one wished to be one's heir, one held dear, holds dear, and will hold dear." But since they are unquestionable, they have almost the force of unchangeable signs.
§5.10.75sed haec consequentia dico, ἀκόλουθα; est enim consequens sapientiae bonitas; illa insequentia, παρεπόμενα, quae postea facta sunt aut futura.
But I call these "consequents", and those "subsequents", which were done afterwards or are to be.
nec sum de nominibus anxius; vocet enim, ut voluerit quisque, dum vis rerum ipsa manifesta sit, appareatque hoc temporis, illud esse natura.
Nor am I anxious about names; for let anyone call them as he wishes, as long as the force of the things themselves is manifest, and it appears that the former is of time, and the latter of nature.
§5.10.76itaque non dubito haec quoque vocare consequentia, quamvis ex prioribus dent argumentum ad ea quae sequuntur, quorum duas quidam species esse voluerunt: actionis, ut pro Oppio, quos educere inuitos in provinciam non potuit, eos invitos retinere qui potuit? temporis, in Verrem, Si finem praetoris edicto adferunt Kalendae Ian. , cur non initium quoque edicti nascatur a Kalendis Ian. ?
Therefore I do not hesitate to call these also "consequents", although they give an argument from prior things to those that follow, of which some have wished there to be two species: of action, as in defense of Oppius, "How could he retain them against their will, whom he could not lead out into the province against their will?" of time, against Verres, "If the Kalends of January bring an end to the praetor's edict, why should not the beginning of the edict also arise from the Kalends of January?" Both of which examples are such that the same is valid in the opposite direction, if you reverse them.
§5.10.77quod utrumque exemplum tale est, ut idem in diversum, si retro agas, valeat. consequens enim est, eos, qui inviti duci non potuerint, invitos non potuisse retineri.
For it is a consequent that those who could not be led against their will, could not have been retained against their will.
§5.10.78illa quoque, quae ex rebus mutuam confirmationem praestantibus ducuntur (quae proprii generis videri quidam volant et vocant ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα, Cicero ex rebus sub eandem rationem venientibus) fortiter consequentibus iunxerim: si portorium Rhodiis locare honestum est, et Hermocreonti conducere, et quod discere honestum, et docere.
Those things also, which are drawn from things affording mutual confirmation (which some wish to appear of a proper class and call "from relatives", Cicero "from things coming under the same reason"), I would strongly join to consequents: "If it is honorable for the Rhodians to lease the harbor tax, it is also honorable for Hermocreon to farm it; and what is honorable to learn, is also honorable to teach."