§3.9.1nunc de iudiciali genere, quod est praecipue multiplex, sed officiis constat duobus intentionis ac depulsionis.
Now concerning the judicial genre, which is especially multiplex, but consists of two duties, prosecution and defense.
cuius partes, ut plurimis auctoribus placuit, quinque sunt: prooemium, narratio, probatio, refutatio, peroratio.
Its parts, as has pleased most authors, are five: prooemium, narration, proof, refutation, and peroration.
his adiecerunt quidam partitionem, propositionem, excessum; quarum priores duae probationi succedunt.
To these some have added partition, proposition, and digression; the first two of which are subordinate to proof.
§3.9.2nam proponere quidem, quae sis probaturus, necesse est, sed et concludere; cur igitur si illa pars causae est, non et haec sit? partitio vero dispositionis est species, ipsa dispositio pars rhetorices et per omnes materias totumque earum corpus aequaliter fusa, sicut inuentio, elocutio.
For it is indeed necessary to propose what you are going to prove, but also to conclude; why then, if the former is a part of the cause, should the latter not be so as well? But partition is a species of disposition, and disposition itself is a part of rhetoric and equally diffused through all materials and their whole body, just like invention and style.
§3.9.3ideoque eam non orationis totius partem unam esse credendum est sed quaestionum etiam singularum.
And therefore it is to be believed that it is not one part of the whole speech, but also of individual questions.
quae est enim quaestio, in qua non promittere possit orator, quid primo, quid secundo, quid tertio sit loco dicturus? quod est proprium partitionis.
For what question is there in which an orator cannot promise what he is going to say in the first, second, and third place? Which is proper to partition.
quam ergo ridiculum est, quaestionem quidem speciem esse probationis, partitionem autem, quae sit species quaestionis, partem totius orationis vocari?
How ridiculous is it, then, that while a question is indeed a species of proof, partition, which is a species of a question, is called a part of the whole speech?
§3.9.4egressio vero vel, quod usitatius esse coepit, excessus, sive est extra causam, non potest esse pars causae, sive est in causa, adiutorium vel ornamentum partium est earum, ex quibus egreditur.
But digression, or, as it has begun to be more commonly called, excessus, if it is outside the cause, cannot be a part of the cause; if it is within the cause, it is an aid or an ornament of those parts from which it digresses.
nam si, quidquid in causa est, pars causae vocabitur, cur non argumentum, similitudo, locus communis, adfectus, exempla partes vocentur?
For if whatever is in the cause is to be called a part of the cause, why should not argument, similarity, common place, emotion, and examples be called parts?
§3.9.5tamen nec iis adsentior, qui detrahunt refutationem tanquam probationi subiectam, ut Aristoteles; haec enim est, quae constituat, illa, quae destruat.
Yet I do not agree with those either who remove refutation as if it were subordinate to proof, like Aristotle; for the former is that which establishes, the latter that which destroys.
hoc quoque idem aliquatenus novat, quod prooemio non narrationem subiungit sed propositionem.
He also innovates somewhat in this same regard, that he joins not narration but proposition to the prooemium.
verum id facit, quia propositio ei genus, narratio species videtur, et hac non semper, illa semper et ubique credit opus esse.
But he does this because proposition seems to him a genus, and narration a species, and he believes that the latter is not always needed, while the former is needed always and everywhere.
§3.9.6verum ex his quas constitui partibus non, ut quidque primum dicendum, ita primum cogitandum est; sed ante omnia intueri oportet, quod sit genus causae, quid in ea quaeratur, quae prosint, quae noceant, deinde quid confirmandum sit ac refellendum, tum quo modo narrandum.
But of these parts which I have established, we must not think of them first in the order in which each is to be spoken first; but before all things we must look to what the genre of the cause is, what is sought in it, what things are useful, what are harmful, then what is to be confirmed and refuted, and then in what manner it is to be narrated.
§3.9.7expositio enim probationum est praeparatio, nec esse utilis potest, nisi prius constiterit, quid debeat de probatione promittere.
For the exposition is a preparation of the proofs, nor can it be useful unless it has first been determined what it ought to promise concerning the proof.
postremo intuendum, quemadmodum iudex sit conciliandus.
Lastly, we must look to how the judge is to be won over.
neque enim nisi totius causae partibus diligenter inspectis scire possumus, qualem nobis facere animum cognoscentis expediat, severum an mitem, concitatum an remissum, adversum gratiae an obnoxium.
For indeed, unless the parts of the whole cause have been diligently inspected, we cannot know what kind of mind of the inquirer it is expedient for us to make—severe or mild, excited or relaxed, adverse to favor or compliant.
§3.9.8neque ideo tamen eos probaverim, qui scribendum quoque prooemium novissime putant.
Nor yet for that reason would I approve of those who think that the prooemium also should be written last.
nam ut conferri materiam omnem et, quid quoque loco sit opus, constare decet, antequam dicere aut scribere ordiamur, ita incipiendum ab iis, quae prima sunt.
For as it is proper that all the material be collected and what is needed in each place be clear before we begin to speak or write, so we must begin from those things which are first.
§3.9.9nam nec pingere quisquam aut fingere coepit a pedibus, nec denique ars ulla consummatur ibi, unde ordiendum est.
For neither did anyone begin to paint or model from the feet, nor indeed is any art completed there from where it must be begun.
quid fiet alioqui, si spatium componendi orationem stilo non fuerit? nonne nos haec inversa consuetudo deceperit? inspicienda igitur materia est, quo praecepimus ordine, scribenda, quo dicemus.
What will happen otherwise, if there is no time for composing the speech with the pen? Will not this inverted custom deceive us? The material, therefore, is to be inspected in the order which we have prescribed, and written in the order in which we shall speak.