§3.8.58quod genus accidere etiam veritati potest.
This kind of thing can happen even in reality.
non simplex autem circa suasorias error in plerisque declamatoribus fuit, qui dicendi genus in iis diversum atque in totum illi iudiciali contrarium esse existimaverunt.
But there was not a simple error concerning deliberative speeches among most declaimers, who thought that the genre of speaking in them was different and altogether contrary to the judicial one.
nam et principia abrupta et concitatam semper orationem et in verbis effusiorem, ut ipsi vocant, cultum adfectaverunt, et earum breviores utique commentarios quam legalis materiae facere laborarunt.
For they affected both abrupt beginnings and an speech that was always excited, and a more lavish adornment, as they themselves call it, in their words, and they labored to make shorter notes of them than of legal material.
§3.8.59ego porro ut prooemio video non utique opus esse suasoriis, propter quas dixi supra causas, ita cur initio furioso sit exclamandum, non intelligo; cum proposita consultatione rogatus sententiam, si modo est sanus, non quiritet, sed quam maxime potest civili et humano ingressu mereri adsensum deliberantis velit.
For my part, just as I see that there is indeed no need for a prooemium in deliberative speeches, for the reasons which I have stated above, so I do not understand why one must cry out with a furious beginning; since when a consultation is proposed and a person is asked for his opinion, if only he is sane, he does not shout, but wishes as much as possible to win the assent of the deliberating person by a polite and gentle entry.
§3.8.60cur autem torrens et utique aequaliter concitata sit in ea dicentis oratio, cum vel praecipue moderationem consilia desiderent? neque ego negaverim, saepius subsidere in controversiis impetum dicendi prooemio, narratione, argumentis; quae si detrahas, id fere supererit, quo suasoriae constant, verum id quoque aequalius erit non tumultuosius atque turbidius.
But why should the speaker's speech in it be torrent-like and in any case equally excited, since consultations especially desire moderation? Nor would I deny that in controversies the force of speaking more often subsides in the prooemium, the narration, and the arguments; which if you take away, that which consists of deliberative speech will almost remain, but that too will be more even, and not more tumultuous and turbulent.
§3.8.61verborum autem magnificentia non validius est adfectanda suasorias declamantibus, sed contingit magis; nam et personae fere magnae fingentibus placent, regum, principum, senatus, populi et res ampliores; ita cum verba rebus aptentur, ipso materiae nitore clarescunt.
But magnificence of words must not be more intensely affected by those who declaim deliberative speeches, but it happens more naturally; for indeed great characters usually please those who invent themes, such as kings, leaders, the senate, the people, and more grand subjects; thus, when words are adapted to the things, they shine by the very splendor of the matter.
§3.8.62alia veris consiliis ratio est, ideoque Theophrastus quam maxime remotum ab omni adfectione in deliberativo genere voluit esse sermonem, secutus in hoc auctoritatem praeceptoris sui, quanquam dissentire ab eo non timide solet.
In real consultations, the reason is different, and therefore Theophrastus wished the speech in the deliberative genre to be as far removed as possible from all emotional influence, following in this the authority of his teacher, although he is not timidly accustomed to dissent from him.
§3.8.63namque Aristoteles idoneam maxime ad scribendum demonstrativam proximamque ab ea iudicialem putavit, videlicet quoniam prior ilia tota esset ostentationis, haec secunda egeret artis, vel ad fallendum, si ita poposcisset utilitas, consilia fide prudentiaque constarent.
For Aristotle thought the demonstrative genre most fit for writing, and next to it the judicial, obviously because that former was entirely for ostentation, and this second needed art, even for deceiving if utility should so demand, while consultations consisted of trust and prudence.
§3.8.64quibus in demonstrativa consentio, nam et omnes alii scriptores idem tradiderunt; in iudiciis autem consiliisque secundum condicionem ipsius, quae tractabitur, rei accommodandam dicendi credo rationem.
In these things, I agree with him on the demonstrative, for all other writers have handed down the same; but in trials and consultations, I believe that the method of speaking must be adapted according to the condition of the very thing which is to be treated.
§3.8.65nam et Philippicas Demosthenis iisdem quibus habitas in iudiciis orationes video eminere virtutibus, et Ciceronis sententiae et contiones non minus clarum, quam est in accusationibus ac defensionibus, eloquentiae lumen ostendunt.
For indeed I see that the Philippics of Demosthenes stand out with the same virtues as the speeches delivered in trials, and Cicero's opinions and public speeches show no less bright a light of eloquence than is found in accusations and defenses.
dicit tamen idem de suasoria hoc modo: tota autem oratio simplex et gravis et sententiis debet ornatior esse quam verbis.
Yet the same Cicero says concerning deliberative speech in this way: but the whole speech ought to be simple and grave, and more adorned with thoughts than with words.
§3.8.66usum exemplorum nulli materiae magis convenire merito fere omnes consentiunt, cum plerumque videantur respondere futura praeteritis, habeaturque experimentum velut quoddam rationis testimonium.
Almost all agree, and rightly so, that the use of examples is suited to no material more, since for the most part future things seem to correspond to the past, and experience is held as if it were a certain testimony of reason.
§3.8.67brevitas quoque aut copia non materiae genere sed modo constat.
Brevity also or abundance depends not on the genre of material but on the measure.
nam ut in consiliis plerumque simplicior quaestio est, ita saepe in causis minor.
For as in consultations the question is for the most part simpler, so it is often smaller in judicial causes.
quae omnia vera esse sciet, si quis non orationes modo, sed historias etiam (namque in iis contiones atque sententiae plerumque suadendi ac dissuadendi funguntur officio), legere maluerit quam in commentariis rhetorum consenescere.
All of which anyone will know to be true if he prefers to read not only speeches but also histories (for in them public speeches and opinions for the most part perform the duty of persuading and dissuading) rather than to grow old in the notebooks of rhetoricians.
§3.8.68inveniet enim nec in consiliis abrupta initia et concitatius saepe in iudiciis dictum et verba aptata rebus in utroque genere et breviores aliquando causarum orationes quam sententiarum.
For he will find neither abrupt beginnings in consultations, and that it is often spoken more excitedly in trials, and words adapted to things in both genres, and sometimes shorter speeches of judicial causes than of opinions.
§3.8.69ne illa quidem in iis vitia deprehendet, quibus quidam declamatores laborant, quod et contra sentientibus inhumane conviciantur et ita plerumque dicunt, tanquam ab iis qui deliberant utique dissentiant, ideoque obiurgantibus similiores sunt quam suadentibus.
Nor indeed will he detect in them those faults under which certain declaimers labor, namely, that they insult those of contrary opinion in an inhumane manner and speak for the most part as if they altogether disagreed with those who are deliberating, and are therefore more similar to those who scold than to those who persuade.
§3.8.70haec adolescentes sibi scripta sciant, ne aliter quam dicturi sunt exerceri velint et in desuescendis morentur.
Let young men know that these things are written for them, lest they wish to be exercised in a way different from how they are going to speak, and waste time in habits that must be unlearned.
ceterum, cum advocari coeperint in consilia amicorum, dicere sententiam in senatu, suadere si quid consulet princeps, quod praeceptis fortasse non credunt, usu docebuntur.
Otherwise, when they begin to be called into the consultations of friends, to speak their opinion in the senate, and to advise if the emperor consults them on anything, they will be taught by practice, even if they do not believe the precepts.