§3.8.35est utilitatis et in tempore quaestio, expedit sed non nunc; et in loco, non hic; et in persona, non nobis, non contra hos; et in genere agendi, non sic; et in modo, non in tantum. sed personam saepius decoris gratia intuemur, quae et in nobis et in iis, qui deliberant, spectanda est.
There is also a question of utility in time, "it is expedient, but not now"; and in place, "not here"; and in person, "not for us, not against these"; and in the kind of action, "not in this way"; and in degree, "not to such an extent." But we more often look to the person for the sake of decency, which must be observed both in ourselves and in those who deliberate.
§3.8.36itaque quamvis exempla plurimum in consiliis possint, quia facillime ad consentiendum homines ducuntur experimentis, refert tamen, quorum auctoritas et quibus adhibeatur.
Therefore, although examples have the greatest power in counsels, because men are most easily led to agreement by experience, yet it matters whose authority is applied and to whom.
§3.8.37diversi sunt enim deliberantium animi, duplex condicio.
For the minds of those who deliberate are diverse, and their condition is twofold.
nam consultant aut plures aut singuli; sed in utrisque differentia, quia et in pluribus multum interest, senatus sic an populus, Romani an Fidenates, Graeci an barbari, et in singulis, Catoni petendos honores suadeamus an C. Mario, de ratione belli Scipio prior ani Fabius deliberet.
For they consult either as many or as individuals; but there is a difference in both, because even among many, it matters much whether it is the senate in this way or the people, Romans or Fidenates, Greeks or barbarians; and among individuals, whether we advise Cato or C. Marius to seek offices, and whether Scipio the elder or Fabius deliberates on the plan of war.
§3.8.38proinde intuenda sexus, dignitas, actas.
Accordingly, sex, dignity, and age must be considered.
sed mores praecipue discrimen dabunt.
But character above all will provide the distinction.
et honesta quidem honestis suadere facillimum est; si vero apud turpes recta obtinere conabimur, ne videamur exprobrare diversam vitae sectam, cavendum.
And indeed, to advise honorable things to honorable people is easiest; but if we attempt to obtain right things among the base, we must take care lest we seem to reproach their different way of life.
§3.8.39et animus deliberantis non ipsa honesti natura, quam he non respicit, permouendus, sed laude, vulgi opinion, et si parum proficiet haec vanitas, secutura ex his utilitate, aliquanto vero magis obiiciendo aliquos, si diversa fecerint, metus.
And the mind of the deliberator is to be moved not by the nature of the honorable itself, which he does not regard, but by praise, by common opinion, and if this vanity profits little, by the utility that will follow from these, and indeed somewhat more by throwing in some fear if they do otherwise.
§3.8.40namque praeter id quod his levissimi cuiusque animus facillime terretur, nescio an etiam naturaliter apud plurimos plus valeat malorum timor quam spes bonorum, sicut facilior eisdem turpium quam honestorum intellectus est.
For besides the fact that the mind of every most frivolous person is very easily terrified by these, I do not know whether even by nature the fear of evils has more power among most people than the hope of goods, just as the understanding of base things is easier for the same people than that of honorable ones.
§3.8.41aliquando bonis quoque suadentur parum decora, dantur parum bonis consilia, in quibus ipsorum qui consulunt spectator utilitas.
Sometimes things that are hardly decent are advised even to good men, and counsels are given to those who are not very good, in which the utility of those very persons who consult is looked to.
nec me fallit, quae statim cogitatio subire possit legentem: Hoc ergo praecipis? §3.8.42et hoc fas putas? poterat me liberare Cicero, qui ita scribit ad Brutum, praepositis plurimis, quae honeste suaderi Caesari possint: simne bonus vir, si haec suadeam? minime. Suasoris enim finis est utilitas eius, cui quisque suadet.
Nor does it escape me what thought may immediately occur to the reader: "Is this then what you prescribe?" "And do you think this is right?" Cicero could set me free, who writes thus to Brutus, after proposing many things which could be honorably advised to Caesar: "Would I be a good man if I should advise these things? By no means." For the end of the adviser is the utility of him whom each one advises.
at recta sunt.
But they are right things.
quis negat? sed non est semper rectis in suadendo locus.
Who denies it? But there is not always a place for right things in advising.
sed quia est altior quaestio nec tantum ad suasorias pertinet, destinatus est mihi hic locus duodecimo, qui summus futurus est, libro.
But since this is a deeper question and does not belong only to suasory speeches, this topic has been destined by me for the twelfth book, which will be the last.
§3.8.43nec ego quicquam fieri turpiter velim.
Nor would I wish anything to be done basely.
verum interim haec vel ad scholarum exercitationes pertinere credantur, nam et iniquorum ratio noscenda est, ut melius aequa tueamur.
But meanwhile, let these things be believed to belong even to the exercises of schools; for the reasoning of the unjust must also be known, so that we may better defend what is equitable.
§3.8.44interim si quis bono inhonesta suadebit, meminerit non suadere tanquam inhonesta, it quidam declamatores Sextum Pompeium ad piraticam propter hoc ipsum quod turpis et crudelis sit, impellunt; sed dandus illis deformibus color idque etiam apud malos.
Meanwhile, if anyone advises dishonorable things to a good man, let him remember not to advise them as dishonorable, as certain declaimers impel Sextus Pompeius to piracy on this very ground, that it is base and cruel; but a pretext must be given to those unsightly things, and that even among the bad.
§3.8.45neque enim quisquam est tam malus, ut videri velit.
For there is no one so bad that he wishes to seem so.
sic Catilina apud Sallustium loquitur, ut rem sceleratissimam non militia, sed indignatione videatur audere.
Thus Catiline in Sallust speaks so that he seems to dare a most wicked deed not from malice but from indignation.
sic Atreus apud Varium: —
"iam fero (inquit) infandissima"
,
"iam facere cogor. "
quanto magis eis, quibus cura famae fuit, conservandus est hic velut ambitus?
Thus Atreus in Varius: "Now I bear (he says) things most unspeakable," "now I am forced to do them." How much more must this, as it were, roundabout way of saving face be preserved for those who have had a care for reputation?
§3.8.46quare et, cum Ciceroni dabimus consilium, ut Antonium roget, vel etiam ut Philippicas (ita vitam pollicente eo) exurat, non cupiditatem lucis allegabimus (haec enim si valet in animo eius, tacentibus quoque nobis valet), sed ut reipublicae se servet hortabimur.
Therefore, even when we shall give counsel to Cicero to entreat Antony, or even to burn his Philippics (since he promises life on that condition), we shall not allege a desire for life (for if this is strong in his mind, it is strong even when we are silent), but we shall exhort him to preserve himself for the republic.