§3.8.24denique non fecerunt Saguntini nec in rate Opitergina circumventi.
In short, neither the Saguntines nor those surrounded on the Opitergian raft did so.
igitur in his quoque causis aut de sola utilitate ambigetur aut quaestio inter utile atque honestum consistet.
Therefore, in these cases too, either utility alone will be in dispute, or the question will stand between the useful and the honorable.
at enim si quis liberos procreare volet, necesse habet ducere uxorem.
But indeed, if anyone wishes to procreate children, he must of necessity take a wife.
§3.8.25quis dubitat? sed ei, qui pater vult fieri, liqueat necesse est uxorem esse ducendam.
Who doubts it? But to him who wishes to become a father, it must be clear of necessity that a wife is to be taken.
itaque mihi ne consilium quidem videtur, ubi necessitas est, non magis quam ubi constat, quid fieri non possit.
Therefore, it seems to me that there is not even consultation where there is necessity, no more than where it is clear what cannot be done.
Omnis enim deliberatio de dubiis est.
For all deliberation is about doubtful things.
melius igitur, qui tertiam partem dixerunt δυνατόν quod nostri possibile nominant, quae ut dura videatur appellatio, tamen sola est.
Better, therefore, are those who have called the third part 'dynaton', which our people name 'possible', which, though it may seem a harsh appellation, is yet the only one.
§3.8.26quas partes non omnes in omnem cadere suasoriam manifestius est, quam ut docendum sit.
That not all of these parts fall into every suasory speech is more manifest than that it needs to be taught.
tamen apud plerosque earum numerus augetur, a quibus ponuntur ut partes, quae superiorum species sunt partium.
Yet among most writers their number is increased, by whom those are set down as parts which are species of the superior parts.
nam fas, iustum, pium, aequum, mansuetum quoque (sic enim sunt interpretati τὸ ἥμερον) et si qua adhuc adiicere quis eiusdem generis velit, subiici possunt honestati.
For what is divine law, just, pious, equitable, and also mild (for so they have interpreted 'to hemeron'), and if anyone wishes to add anything else of the same kind, can be subordinated to the honorable.
§3.8.27an sit autem facile, magnum, iucundum, sine periculo, ad quaestionem pertinet utilitatis.
But whether it is easy, great, pleasant, or without danger, belongs to the question of utility.
qui loci oriuntur ex contradictione: est quidem utile sed difficile, parvum, iniucundum, periculosum.
These topics arise from contradiction: it is indeed useful but difficult, small, unpleasant, or dangerous.
Tamen quibusdam videtur esse nonnunquam de iucunditate sola consultatio, ut si de aedificando theatro, instituendis ludis deliberetur.
Yet to some, there seems to be sometimes a consultation about pleasure alone, as if deliberation were held about building a theater or establishing games.
sed neminem adeo solutum luxu puto, ut nihil in causa suadendi sequatur praeter voluptatem.
But I think no one is so dissolved in luxury that he pursues nothing in the cause of advising except pleasure.
§3.8.29praecedat enim semper aliquid necesse est, ut in ludis honor deorum, in theatro non inutilis laborum remissio, deformis et incommoda turbae, si id non sit, conflictatio, et nihilominus eadem illa religio, cum theatrum veluti quoddam illius sacri templum vocabimus.
For it is necessary that something always precede, as in the games the honor of the gods, in the theater a not useless relaxation from labors (which, if it were not so, would be a disgraceful and inconvenient conflict for the crowd), and nonetheless that same religion, when we shall call the theater, as it were, a certain temple of that sacred rite.
§3.8.30saepe vero et utilitatem despiciendam esse dicimus, ut honesta faciamus, ut cum illis Opiterginis damus consilium, ne se hostibus dedant, quanquam perituri sint, nisi fecerint; et utilia honestis praeferimus, ut cum suademus, ut bello Punico servi armentur.
But often we also say that utility must be despised so that we may do honorable things, as when we give advice to those Opitergians not to surrender themselves to the enemy, although they will perish unless they do so; and we prefer useful things to honorable ones, as when we advise that slaves be armed in the Punic War.
§3.8.31sed neque hic plane concedendum est esse id inhonestum, liberos enim natura omnes et eisdem constare elementis et fortasse antiquis etiam nobilibus ortos dici potest; et illic, ubi manifestum periculum est, opponenda alia, ut crudelius etiam perituros adfirmemus, si se dediderint, sive hostis non servaverit fidem, sive Caesar vicerit, quod est vero similius.
But neither here must it be fully conceded that this is dishonorable, for it can be said that by nature all are free and consist of the same elements, and perhaps are sprung even from ancient nobles; and there, where there is manifest danger, other things must be opposed, so that we may assert that they will perish even more cruelly if they surrender themselves, whether because the enemy will not keep faith, or because Caesar will conquer, which is more probable.
§3.8.32haec autem, quae tantum inter se pugnant, plerumque nominibus deflecti solent.
But these things, which clash so much with one another, are for the most part accustomed to be deflected by names.
nam et utilitas ipsa expugnatur ab iis, qui dicunt, non solum potiora esse honesta quam utilia, sed ne utilia quidem esse, quae non sint honesta; et contra, quod nos honestum, illi vanum, ambitiosum, stolidum, verbis quam re probabilius vocant.
For utility itself is driven out by those who say not only that honorable things are better than useful ones, but that those things are not even useful which are not honorable; and on the contrary, what we call honorable, they call empty, ambitious, foolish, more probable in words than in reality.
§3.8.33nec tantum inutilibus comparantur utilia, sed inter se quoque ipsa, ut si ex duobus eligamus, in altero quid sit magis, in altero quid sit minus.
Nor are useful things compared only with useless ones, but also among themselves, as if we should choose from two things, in one of which there is more, in the other less.
crescit hoc adhuc.
This grows still further.
nam interim triplices etiam suasoriae incidunt: ut cum Pompeius deliberabat, Parthos an Africam an Aegyptum peteret.
For sometimes even triple suasory speeches occur, as when Pompey deliberated whether to seek the Parthians, Africa, or Egypt.
ita non tantum, utrum melius sed quid sit optimum, quaeritur, itemque contra.
Thus, not only which of the two is better, but what is the best, is asked, and likewise the contrary.
§3.8.34nec unquam incidet in hoc genere materiae dubitatio rei, quae undique secundum nos sit.
Nor will there ever occur in this kind of material a doubt about a thing which is entirely on our side.
nam ubi contradictioni locus non est, quae potest esse causa dubitandi? ita fere omnis suasoria nihil est aliud quam comparatio, videndumque, quid consecuturi simus et per quid, ut aestimari possit, plus in eo quod petimus sit commodi, an vero in eo per quod petimus incommodi.
For where there is no room for contradiction, what cause of doubting can there be? Thus, almost every suasory speech is nothing else than a comparison, and we must see what we are going to attain and through what, so that it can be estimated whether there is more advantage in that which we seek, or indeed disadvantage in that through which we seek it.