§3.6.51fuerunt qui facerent quinque, coniecturam, finitionem, qualitatem, quantitatem, ad aliquid.
There were some who made five: conjecture, definition, quality, quantity, and relation.
Theodorus quoque, ut dixi, iisdem generalibus capitibus utitur. an sit? quid sit? quale sit? quantum sit? ad aliquid.
Theodorus also, as I have said, uses the same general heads: Is it? What is it? Of what kind is it? How much is it? and relation.
hoc ultimum maxime in comparativo genere versari putat, quoniam melius ac peius, maius et minus nisi alio relata non intelliguntur.
He thinks that this last is chiefly employed in the comparative department, since the better and the worse, the greater and the less, are not understood unless they are referred to something else.
§3.6.52sed in illas quoque translativas, ut supra significavi, quaestiones incidit, An huic ius agendi sit? vel, facere aliquid conveniat? an contra hunc? an hoc tempore? an sic? omnia enim ista referri ad aliquid necesse est.
But this relation also applies to those translative questions, as I indicated above: Whether this person has the right to bring an action? Or, is it proper to do something? Or against this person? Or at this time? Or in this manner? For all those things must of necessity be referred to something.
§3.6.53alii sex status putant, coniecturam, quam γένεσιν vocant, et qualitatem, et proprietatem, id est μετάστασις quo verbo finitio ostenditur, et quantitatem, quam μετάστασις; dicunt, et comparationem, et translationem, cuius adhuc novum nomen inventum est μετάστασις novum, inquam, in statu, alioqui ab Hermagora inter species iuridiciales usitatum.
Others think there are six states: conjecture, which they call genesis; quality; propriety (that is, metastasis, by which word definition is shown); quantity, which they call metastasis; comparison; and transfer, for which yet another new name, metastasis, has been invented—new, I say, in a state, though otherwise commonly used by Hermagoras among juridical species.
§3.6.54aliis septem esse placuit; a quibus nec translatio nec quantitas nec comparatio recepta est, sed in horum trium locum subditae quattuor legales adiectaeque tribus illis rationalibus.
Others preferred that there should be seven; by whom neither transfer, nor quantity, nor comparison was admitted, but in place of these three, four legal states were substituted and added to those three rational ones.
§3.6.55alii pervenerunt usque ad octo, translatione ad septem superiores adiecta.
Others went as far as eight, by adding transfer to the seven above.
A quibusdam deinde divisa ratio est, ut status rationales appellarent, quaestiones (quemadmodum supra dixi) legales, ut in illis de re, in his de scripto quaereretur.
Then, by some, the classification was divided so that they called the rational ones 'states', and the legal ones 'questions' (as I said above), so that in the former, inquiry was made concerning the fact, and in the latter, concerning the written word.
quidam in diversum hos status esse, §3.6.56illas quaestiones maluerunt.
Some, on the contrary, preferred that these should be states, and those should be questions.
sed alii rationales tres putaverunt, An sit? quid sit? quale sit? Hermagoras solus quattuor, coniecturam, proprietatem, translationem, qualitatem, quam per accidentia, id est κατὰ συμβεβηκός vocat, hac interpretatione, an illi accidat viro bono esse, vel malo.
But others thought there were three rational ones: Is it? What is it? Of what kind is it? Hermagoras alone made four: conjecture, propriety, transfer, and quality, which he calls that which is by accidents, that is, kata symbebekos, with this interpretation: whether it happens to someone to be a good man or a bad one.
hanc ita dividit, de appetendis et fugiendis, quae est pars deliberativa; §3.6.57de persona, ea ostenditur laudativa; negotialem, quam πραγματικήν vocat, in qua de rebus ipsis quaeritur, remoto personarum complexu, ut, Sitne liber qui est in assertione, an divitiae superbiam pariant, an iustum quid, an bonum sit.
This he divides as follows: concerning things to be sought and avoided, which is the deliberative part; concerning person, which is shown in the laudatory; the practical, which he calls pragmatike, in which inquiry is made concerning things themselves, excluding the consideration of persons, such as: Whether he whose status is claimed is free? Or, whether riches produce pride? Or, whether a certain thing is just or good?
iuridicialem, in qua fere eadem sed certis destinatisque personis quaerantur: an ille iuste hoc fecerit, vel bene
And the juridical, in which almost the same things are inquired into, but with reference to certain defined persons: whether that person did this justly, or well.
§3.6.58nec me fallit, in primo Ciceronis rhetorico aliam esse loci negotialis interpretationem, cum ita scriptum sit: negotialis est, in qua, quid iris ex civili more et aequitate sit, consideratur; cui diligentiae praeesse apud nos iurisconsulti existimantur. §3.6.59sed quod ipsius de his libris iudicium fuerit, supra dixi.
Nor does it escape me that in Cicero's first rhetorical work there is a different interpretation of the practical department, since it is written thus: 'The practical is that in which is considered what the law (text: quid iris) is according to civil custom and equity; which careful study our jurists are considered to direct.' But what his own opinion was of these books, I have said above.
sunt enim velut regestae in hos commentarios, quos adolescens deduxerat, scholae, et si qua est in his culpa, tradentis est, sive eum movit id, quod Hermagoras prima in hoc loco posuit exempla ex quaestionibus iuris, sive quod Graeci πραγματικούς vocant iuris interpretes.
For they are, as it were, lectures copied into these notebooks, which he had compiled as a youth, and if there is any fault in them, it belongs to the teacher, whether he was moved by the fact that Hermagoras placed his first examples in this department from questions of law, or because the Greeks call interpreters of the law pragmatikoi.
§3.6.60sed Cicero quidem his pulcherrimos illos de Oratore substituit, ideoque culpari, tanquam falsa praecipiat, non potest.
But Cicero indeed substituted for these those most beautiful books On the Orator, and therefore cannot be blamed as if he taught what was false.
nos ad Hermagoran.
Let us return to Hermagoras.
trans lationem hic primus omnium tradidit, quanquam semina eius quaedam citra nomen ipsum apud Aristotelen reperiuntur.
He was the first of all to teach transfer, though some seeds of it, without the name itself, are found in Aristotle.
§3.6.61legales autem quaestiones has fecit, scripti et voluntatis (quam ipse vocat κατὰ ῥητὸν καὶ ὑπεξαίρεσιν, id est dictum et exceptionem, quorum prius ei cum omnibus commune est, exceptionis nomen minus usitatum), ratiocinativum, ambiguitatis, legum contrariarum.
He made the legal questions as follows: the written and the intention (which he himself calls kata rheton kai hypexairesin, that is, the word and the exception, of which the former is common to him with all writers, while the name of exception is less usual), the ratiocinative, ambiguity, and contrary laws.
§3.6.62Albutius eadem divisione usus detrahit translationem, subiiciens eam iuridiciali.
Albutius, using the same division, withdraws transfer, subjecting it to the juridical.
in legalibus quoque quaestionibus nullum putat esse, qui dicatur ratiocinativus.
In legal questions also, he thinks there is none that can be called ratiocinative.
scio plura inventuros adhuc, qui legere antiquos studiosius volent, sed ne haec quoque excesserint modum vereor.
I know that those who wish to read the ancients more diligently will find still more, but I fear lest even these may have exceeded due limit.