§3.6.41pars qualitatis, quae est de summo genere, raro in iudicium venit, quale est, idne sit honestum, quod vulgo laudatur;
The part of quality which concerns the highest genus rarely comes into court; an example is whether that which is commonly praised is honorable.
succedentium autem aliae de communi appellatione, ut sitne sacrilegus, qui pecuniam privatam ex templo furatus est; aut de re denominata, ubi et factum esse certum est nec dubitatur, quid sit quod factum est.
But among the subordinate species, some concern common appellation, such as whether he who has stolen private money from a temple is guilty of sacrilege; or concern a designated matter, where it is certain that the act was done, and there is no doubt as to what was done.
cui subiacent omnes de honestis, iustis, utilibus quaestiones.
Under this lie all questions concerning the honorable, the just, and the useful.
§3.6.42his etiam ceteri status contineri dicuntur, quia et quantitas modo ad coniecturam referatur, ut maiorne sol quam terra? modo ad qualitatem, quanta poena quempiam quantove praemio sit affici iustum? et translatio versetur circa qualitatem, et definitio pars sit translationis; §3.6.43quin et contrariae leges et ratiocinativus status, id est syllogismos, et plerumque scripti et voluntatis aequo nitantur (nisi quod hic tertius aliquando coniecturam accipit, quid senserit legis constitutor); ambiguitatem vero semper coniectura explicari necesse sit, quia, cum sit manifestum, verborum intellectum esse duplicem, de sola quaeritur voluntate.
The other states are also said to be contained in these, because quantity is sometimes referred to conjecture, as in "is the sun larger than the earth?", and sometimes to quality, as in "what penalty or what reward is it just for someone to receive?"; and transfer is concerned with quality, and definition is a part of transfer; nay, even contrary laws, and the ratiocinative state (that is, syllogism), and for the most part (the state of) the written and intention, depend on equity (except that this third sometimes admits conjecture, namely, what the framer of the law intended); but ambiguity must always be explained by conjecture, because, since it is obvious that the meaning of the words is twofold, inquiry is made concerning the intention alone.
§3.6.44A plurimis tres sunt facti generales status, quibus et Cicero in Oratore utitur, et omnia, quae aut in controversiam aut in contentionem veniant, contineri putat, Sitne? quid sit? quale sit? quorum nomina apertiora sunt, quam ut dicenda sint.
By most writers, three general states have been made, which Cicero also uses in the *Orator*, and he thinks that all things that come into controversy or debate are contained therein: Is it? What is it? Of what kind is it? The names of these are too clear to need explanation.
§3.6.45idem Patrocles sentit.
Patrocles is of the same opinion.
tres fecit et M. Antonius his quidem verbis: paucae res sunt, quibus ex rebus omnes orationes nascuntur, factum non factum, ius iniuria, bonum malum. sed quoniam, quod iure dicimur fecisse, non hunc solum intellectum habet, ut lege, sed illum quoque, ut iuste fecisse videamur, secuti Antonium apertius voluerunt eosdem status distinguere.
Marcus Antonius also made three, in these very words: "There are few things from which all speeches arise: fact or non-fact, right or wrong, good or bad." But since that which we are said to have done lawfully (iure) has not only this meaning, namely 'according to law', but also that one, namely 'so that we seem to have done it justly', those who followed Antonius wanted to distinguish these same states more clearly.
itaque dixerunt coniecturalem, legalem, iuridicialem; qui et Verginio placent.
Therefore, they called them conjectural, legal, and juridical; which also please Verginius.
§3.6.46horum deinde fecerunt species, ita ut legali subiicerent finitionem et alios, qui ex scripto ducuntur, legum contrariarum, quae ἀντινομία dicitur, et scripti et sententiae vel voluntatis, id est κατὰ ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοιαν et μετάλημψιν, quam nos varie translativam, transumptivam, transpositivam vocamus, συλλογισμόν quem accipimus ratiocinativum vel collectivum, ambiguitatis, quae ἀμφιβολία nominatur; quos posui, quia et ipsi a plerisque status appellantur, cum quibusdam legales potius quaestiones eas dici placuerit.
Next, they made species of these, so that they subjected to the legal state: definition, and others derived from the written, such as contrary laws (which is called antinomia), and the written and the intention or will (that is, kata rheton kai dianoian), and metalepsis (which we variously call translative, transumptive, or transpositive), syllogism (which we understand as ratiocinative or collective), and ambiguity (which is named amphibolia); which I have set down because they themselves are called states by most writers, although some have preferred that they be called legal questions instead.
§3.6.47quattuor fecit Athenaeus, προτρεπτικὴν στάσιν vel παρορμητικήν, id est exhortativum, qui suasoriae est proprius; συντελικήν, qua coniecturam significari magis ex his, quae sequuntur, quam ex ipso nomine apparet; ὑπαλλακτικήν ea finitio est, mutatione enim nominis constat; iuridicialem, eadem appellatione Graeca qua ceteri usus.
Athenaeus made four: "protreptike stasis" or "parormetike" (that is, exhortatory, which is peculiar to deliberative speech); "syntelike" (by which it is clearer from what follows than from the name itself that conjecture is meant); "hypallaktike" (which is definition, for it consists in a change of name); and the juridical, using the same Greek appellation as the others.
nam est, ut dixi, multa in nominibus differentia.
For, as I have said, there is much difference in names.
§3.6.48sunt qui ὑπαλλακτικήν translationem esse existiment, secuti hanc mutationis significationem.
There are some who think "hypallaktike" is transfer, following this meaning of "change".
fecerunt alii totidem status, sed alios,
"an sit?"
"quid sit?"
"quale sit?"
"quantum sit?"
ut Caecilius et Theon.
Others made the same number of states, but different ones: "Is it?" "What is it?" "Of what kind is it?" "How much is it?", as did Caecilius and Theon.
§3.6.49Aristoteles in rhetoricis,
"an sit"
,
"quale"
,
"quantum"
, et
"quam multum sit?"
quaerendum putat.
Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* thinks inquiry should be made: "Is it?", "Of what kind?", "How much?", and "How great is it?".
quodam tamen loco finitionis quoque vim intelligit, quo dicit quaedam sic defendi, sustuli, sed non furtum feci; Percussi, sed non iniuriam feci. §3.6.50posuerat et Cicero in libris rhetoricis, facti, nominis, generis, actionis; ut in facto coniectura, in nomine finitio, in genere qualitas, in actione ius intelligeretur.
Yet in a certain place he also understands the force of definition, where he says that some cases are defended thus: "I took it, but I did not commit theft"; "I struck, but I did not commit an injury." Cicero also, in his rhetorical books, had established fact, name, genus, and action; so that in fact, conjecture was understood; in name, definition; in genus, quality; and in action, law.
iuri subiecerat translationem.
Under law, he had subjected transfer.
verum hic legales quoque quaestiones alio loco tractat ut species actionis.
But here he also treats legal questions in another place as species of action.