§12.1.9denique, ut maximam partem quaestionis eximam, demus, id quod nullo modo fieri potest, idem ingenii, studii, doctrinae, pessimo atque optimo viro: uter melior dicetur orator? nimirum qui homo quoque melior.
Finally, to remove the greatest part of the question, let us grant—what can in no way happen—the same amount of talent, study, and learning to the worst and to the best man: which of them will be called the better orator? Doubtless, the one who is also the better man.
non igitur unquam malus idem homo et perfectus orator.
Therefore, the same man will never be both bad and a perfect orator.
§12.1.10non enim perfectum est quidquam, quo melius est aliud.
For nothing is perfect, if there is something else better than it.
sed, ne more Socraticorum nobismet ipsi responsum finxisse videamur, sit aliquis adeo contra veritatem obstinatus, ut audeat dicere, eodem ingenio, studio, doctrina praeditum nihilo deteriorem futurum oratorem malum virum quam bonum: convincamus huius quoque amentiam.
But, lest we should seem, after the manner of the Socratics, to have made up the answer for ourselves, let someone be so obstinate against the truth as to dare to say that a bad man, endowed with the same talent, study, and learning, will be in no way a worse orator than a good one: let us convict his madness also.
§12.1.11nam hoc certe nemo dubitabit, omnem orationem id agere, ut iudici, quae proposita fuerint, vera et honesta videantur.
For certainly no one will doubt this, that every speech aims at making the things which have been proposed seem true and honorable to the judge.
utrum igitur hoc facilius bonus vir persuadebit an malus? bonus quidem et dicet saepius vera atque honesta. §12.1.12sed etiam si quando aliquo ductus officio (quod accidere, ut mox docebimus, potest) falso haec adfirmare conabitur, maiore cum fide necesse est audiatur.
Will a good man, then, or a bad one persuade this more easily? The good man indeed will both speak true and honorable things more frequently, but even if ever, led by some duty (which can happen, as we shall soon teach), he attempts to affirm these things falsely, he must of necessity be heard with greater credibility.
at malis hominibus ex contemptu opinionis et ignorantia recti nonnunquam excidit ipsa simulatio.
But in bad men, from contempt for public opinion and ignorance of what is right, even the pretense itself sometimes slips away.
inde immodeste proponunt, sine pudore adfirmant.
Hence they propose immodestly, they affirm without shame.
§12.1.13sequitur in iis, quae certum est effici non posse, deformis pertinacia et irritus labor.
In those matters which it is certain cannot be accomplished, there follows an ugly obstinacy and useless labor.
nam sicut in vita, ita in causis quoque spes improbas habent.
For just as in life, so also in lawsuits do they hold wicked hopes.
frequenter autem accidit, ut iis etiam vera dicentibus fides desit, videaturque talis advocatus malae causae argumentum.
Moreover, it frequently happens that even when they speak the truth, credibility is lacking to them, and such an advocate is seen as proof of a bad cause.
§12.1.14nunc de iis dicendum est, quae mihi quasi conspiratione quadam vulgi reclamari videntur.
Now we must speak of those things which seem to me to be cried out against by a sort of conspiracy of the common people.
Orator ergo Demosthenes non fuit? atqui malum virum accepimus. non Cicero? atqui huius quoque mores multi reprehenderunt. quid agam? magna responsi invidia subeunda est, mitigandae sunt prius cures.
"Was Demosthenes, then, not an orator? Yet we have heard that he was a bad man." "Was Cicero not? Yet many have blamed his character too." What shall I do? I must undergo great unpopularity by my response; but first, anxieties must be appeased.
§12.1.15mihi enim nec Demosthenes tam gravi morum dignus videtur invidia, ut omnia, quae in eum ab inimicis congesta sunt, credam, cum et pulcherrima eius in re publica consilia et finem vitae clarum legam, §12.1.16nec Marco Tullio defuisse video in ulla parte civis optimi voluntatem.
For to me, neither does Demosthenes seem worthy of so heavy an odium concerning his character that I should believe all the things heaped upon him by his enemies, when I read of both his most beautiful counsels in the state and the illustrious end of his life; nor do I see that the goodwill of an excellent citizen was lacking in any part to Marcus Tullius.
testimonio est actus nobilissime consulatus, integerrime provincia administrata et repudiatus vigintiviratus, et civilibus bellis, quae in aetatem eius gravissima inciderunt, neque spe neque metu declinatus animus, quo minus optimis se partibus, id est rei publicae, iungeret.
Witness the conduct of his most noble consulship, his provincial administration conducted with the highest integrity, and his rejection of the membership of the board of twenty; and in the civil wars, which fell most heavily upon his age, his mind was turned aside neither by hope nor by fear from joining himself to the best party, that is, to the republic.
§12.1.17parum fortis videtur quibusdam, quibus optime respondit ipse, non se timidum in suscipiendis, sed in providendis periculis; quod probavit morte quoque ipsa, quam praestantissimo suscepit animo.
He seems insufficiently brave to some, to whom he himself answered best: that he was not timid in undertaking dangers, but in anticipating them; which he proved also by his death itself, which he met with a most excellent mind.
§12.1.18quodsi defuit his viris summa virtus, sic quaerentibus, an oratores fuerint, respondebo, quomodo Stoici, si interrogentur an sapiens Zeno, an Cleanthes, an Chrysippus ipse, respondeant, magnos quidem illos ac venerabiles, non tamen id, quod natura hominis summum habet, consecutos.
But if supreme virtue was lacking to these men, to those who ask whether they were orators, I will answer in the same way as the Stoics, if they should be asked whether Zeno was wise, or Cleanthes, or Chrysippus himself, would answer: that those men were indeed great and venerable, but did not, however, attain that which the nature of man holds as the highest.
§12.1.19nam et Pythagoras non sapientem se, ut qui ante eum fuerunt, sed studiosum sapientiae vocari voluit.
For Pythagoras too wished to be called not a wise man, like those who were before him, but a lover of wisdom.
ego tamen secundum communem loquendi consuetudinem saepe dixi dicamque, perfectum oratorem esse Ciceronem; ut amicos et bonos viros et prudentissimos dicimus vulgo, quorum nihil nisi perfecte sapienti datur.
I, however, according to the common custom of speaking, have often said and will say that Cicero is a perfect orator; just as we commonly speak of friends and good men and most prudent ones, none of which is granted except to the perfectly wise.
sed cum proprie et ad legem ipsam veritatis loquendum erit, cum quaeram oratorem, quem et ille quaerebat.
But when it is necessary to speak strictly and according to the law itself of truth, I will seek that orator whom he too was seeking.