§12.1.1sit ergo nobis orator, quem constituimus, is, qui a M. Catone finitur, vir bonus dicendi peritus; verum, id quod et ille posuit prius et ipsa natura potius ac maius est, utique vir bonus.
Let our orator, therefore, whom we are establishing, be that one who is defined by M. Cato: "a good man skilled in speaking"; but, what he also placed first and what is by nature itself more important and greater, by all means a good man.
id non eo tantum, quod, si vis illa dicendi malitiam instruxerit, nihil sit publicis privatisque rebus perniciosius eloquentia, nosque ipsi, qui pro virili parte conferre aliquid ad facultatem dicendi conati sumus, pessime mercamur de rebus humanis, si latroni comparamus haec arma, non militi.
This, not only because, if that power of speaking should equip wickedness, nothing would be more ruinous to public and private affairs than eloquence, and we ourselves, who have endeavored to the best of our ability to contribute something to the faculty of speaking, make a very bad bargain with human affairs, if we provide these weapons for a robber, not a soldier.
§12.1.2quid de nobis loquor? rerum ipsa natura in eo, quod praecipue indulsisse homini videtur quoque nos a ceteris animalibus separasse, non parens, sed noverca fuerit, si facultatem dicendi, sociam scelerum, adversam innocentiae, hostem veritatis invenit.
Why do I speak of ourselves? The very nature of things, in that which she seems to have especially bestowed upon man and by which she has separated us from the other animals, would have been not a mother, but a stepmother, if she invented the faculty of speaking as an ally of crimes, an adversary to innocence, an enemy of truth.
mutos enim nasci et egere omni ratione satius fuisset quam prouidentiae munera in mutuam perniciem convertere.
For it would have been better to be born mute and to lack all reason than to turn the gifts of providence into mutual destruction.
§12.1.3longius tendit hoc iudicium meum.
This judgment of mine goes further.
neque enim tantum id dico, eum, qui sit orator, virum bonum esse oportere, sed ne futurum quidem oratorem nisi virum bonum.
For I do not only say this, that he who is an orator ought to be a good man, but that he will not even be an orator unless he is a good man.
nam certe neque intelligentiam concesseris iis qui, proposita honestorum ac turpium via, peiorem sequi malent, neque prudentiam, cum in gravissimas frequenter legum, semper vero malae conscientiae poenas a semet ipsis improviso rerum exitu induantur.
For surely you would grant neither intelligence to those who, when the path of things honorable and shameful is set before them, prefer to follow the worse, nor prudence, since they are frequently led by themselves, through an unforeseen issue of events, into the most severe penalties of the laws, and always indeed into those of a bad conscience.
§12.1.4quodsi neminem malum esse nisi stultum eundem non modo a sapientibus dicitur, sed vulgo quoque semper est creditum, certe non fiet unquam stultus orator.
But if that no one is bad except he who is also foolish is not only said by the wise but has also always been believed by the common people, surely a foolish man will never become an orator.
adde quod ne studio quidem operis pulcherrimi vacare mens nisi omnibus vitiis libera potest: primum quod in eodem pectore nullum est honestorum turpiumque consortium, et cogitare optima simul ac deterrima non magis est unius animi quam eiusdem hominis bonum esse ac malum; §12.1.5tum illa quoque ex causa, quod mentem tantae rei intentam vacare omnibus aliis etiam culpa carentibus curis oportet.
Add that not even the mind can be free to devote itself to the study of the most beautiful work unless it is free from all vices: first because in the same breast there is no partnership of honorable and shameful things, and to think the best and the worst at the same time is no more possible for one mind than for the same man to be good and bad; then also for this reason, because it is necessary that a mind intent on so great a matter be free from all other cares, even those free from blame.
ita demum enim libera ac tota, nulla distringente atque alio ducente causa, spectabit id solum ad quod accingitur.
For only thus, free and entire, with no cause distracting it and leading it elsewhere, will it look solely to that for which it girds itself.
§12.1.6quodsi agrorum nimia cura et sollicitior rei familiaris diligentia et venandi voluptas et dati spectaculis dies multum studiis auferunt (huic enim rei perit tempus, quodcumque alteri datur), quid putamus facturas cupiditatem, avaritiam, invidiam, quarum impotentissimae cogitationes somnos etiam ipsos et illa per quietem visa perturbent?
But if excessive care of fields, and too anxious attention to family property, and the pleasure of hunting, and days given to spectacles take away much from studies (for whatever time is given to one thing is lost to this one), what do we think desire, avarice, and envy will do, whose uncontrollable thoughts disturb even sleep itself and those visions during rest?
§12.1.7nihil est enim tam occupatum, tam multiforme, tot ac tam variis adfectibus concisum atque laceratum quam mala mens.
For nothing is so busy, so multiform, cut up and torn by so many and so various emotions, as an evil mind.
nam et cum insidiatur, spe, curis, labore distringitur; et etiam cum sceleris compos fuit, sollicitudine, paenitentia, poenarum omnium exspectatione torquetur.
For both when it plots, it is distracted by hope, anxiety, and toil; and even when it has achieved its crime, it is tortured by anxiety, repentance, and the expectation of every punishment.
quis inter haec litteris aut ulli bonae arti locus? non hercule magis quam frugibus in terra sentibus ac rubis occupata.
What place is there among these things for literature or any good art? Not, by Hercules, any more than for crops in a land occupied by thorns and brambles.
§12.1.8age, non ad perferendos studiorum labores necessaria frugalitas? quid ergo ex libidine ac luxuria spei? non praecipue acuit ad cupiditatem litterarum amor laudis? num igitur malis esse laudem curae putamus? iam hoc quis non videt, maximam partem orationis in tractatu aequi bonique consistere? dicetne de his secundum debitam rerum dignitatem malus atque iniquus?
Come, is not frugality necessary to endure the labors of studies? What hope, then, is there from lust and luxury? Does not the love of praise especially sharpen the mind toward the desire for literature? Do we then suppose that praise is a care to evil men? Now who does not see this, that the greatest part of speech consists in the treatment of the equitable and the good? Will an evil and unjust man speak about these things according to the due dignity of the matters?