§12.1.37nam si hominem occidere saepe virtus, liberos necare nonnunquam pulcherrimum est, asperiora quaedam adhuc dictu, si communis utilitas exegerit, facere conceditur, ne hoc quidem nudum est intuendum, qualem causam vir bonus, sed etiam quare et qua mente defendat.
For if to kill a man is often a virtue, and to put one's own children to death is sometimes most honorable, and if it is permitted to perform certain actions still harsher to speak of, if common utility should demand it, we must not consider this alone in its bare form, namely what kind of cause a good man defends, but also why and with what mind he defends it.
§12.1.38ac primum concedant mihi omnes oportet, quod Stoicorum quoque asperrimi confitentur, facturum aliquando virum bonum ut mendacium dicat, et quidem nonnunquam levioribus causis, ut in pueris aegrotantibus utilitatis eorum gratia multa fingimus, multa non facturi promittimus; §12.1.39nedum si ab homine occidendo grassator avertendus sit aut hostis pro salute patriae fallendus; ut hoc, quod alias in servis quoque reprehendendum est, sit alias in ipso sapiente laudandum.
And first of all, everyone must grant me, what even the strictest of the Stoics confess, that a good man will sometimes act so as to tell a lie, and indeed sometimes for rather slight reasons, just as in the case of sick children, for the sake of their benefit, we feign many things and promise many things which we do not intend to perform; much more so if a robber is to be turned away from killing a man, or an enemy is to be deceived for the safety of the fatherland; so that this, which at other times is to be censured even in slaves, may at other times be praised in the wise man himself.
id si constiterit, multa iam video posse evenire, propter quae orator bene suscipiat tale causae genus, quale remota ratione honesta non recepisset.
If this is established, I see now that many circumstances can occur on account of which an orator may properly undertake such a kind of cause as, if the motive had been removed, he would not have accepted as an honorable one.
§12.1.40nec hoc dico (quia severiores sequi placet leges) pro patre, fratre, amico periclitantibus, tametsi non mediocris haesitatio est, hinc iustitiae proposita imagine, inde pietatis.
Nor do I say this (since it is my pleasure to follow stricter laws) on behalf of a father, brother, or friend in danger, although there is no small hesitation, with the image of justice presented on one side, and of filial duty on the other.
nihil dubii relinquamus.
Let us leave no room for doubt.
sit aliquis insidiatus tyranno atque ob id reus: utrumne salvum eum nolet is, qui a nobis finitur, orator? an, si tuendum susceperit, non tam falsis defendet, quam qui apud iudices malam causam tuetur?
Suppose someone has plotted against a tyrant and is accused on that account: will the orator, who is defined by us, not wish him to be safe? Or, if he undertakes his defense, will he not defend him with as much falsehood as one who defends a bad cause before judges?
§12.1.41quid si quaedam bene facta damnaturus est iudex, nisi ea non esse facta convicerimus, non vel hoc modo servabit orator non innocentem modo, sed etiam laudabilem civem? quid si quaedam iusta natura, sed condicione temporum inutilia civitati sciemus, nonne utemur arte dicendi bona quidem, sed malis artibus simili?
What if a judge is going to condemn certain good deeds unless we convince him that they were not done? Will not the orator, even in this way, save a citizen who is not only innocent but even praiseworthy? What if we know that certain things are just by nature, but by the condition of the times useless to the state? Shall we not use an art of speaking that is indeed good in intention, but similar to bad arts?
§12.1.42ad hoc nemo dubitabit, quin, si nocentes mutari in bonam mentem aliquo modo possint, sicut posse conceditur, salvos esse eos magis e re publica sit quam puniri.
To this, no one will doubt that, if the guilty can in some way be changed to a good mind, as it is granted they can, it is more to the interest of the state that they be saved than that they be punished.
si liqueat igitur oratori futurum bonum virum, cui vera obicientur, non id aget, ut salvus sit?
If, therefore, it should be clear to the orator that he who is accused of true charges will be a good man in the future, will he not act so that he may be saved?
§12.1.43da nunc, ut crimine manifesto prematur dux bonus et sine quo vincere hostem civitas non possit: nonne ei communis utilitas oratorem advocabit? certe Fabricius Cornelium Rufinum, et alioqui malum civem et sibi inimicum, tamen, quia utilem sciebat ducem, imminente bello, palam consulem suffragio suo fecit atque id mirantibus quibusdam respondit, a cive se spoliari malle quam ab hoste venire.
Suppose now that a good general, and one without whom the state cannot conquer the enemy, is hard pressed by a manifest charge: will not common utility summon the orator to his aid? Certainly Fabricius, in the case of Cornelius Rufinus—who was otherwise a bad citizen and an enemy to himself—yet, because he knew him to be a useful general, when war was imminent, openly made him consul by his own vote, and answered to some who wondered at this that he preferred to be despoiled by a citizen than to be sold by an enemy.
ita, si fuisset orator, non defendisset eundem Rufinum vel manifesti peculatus reum?
Thus, if Fabricius had been an orator, would he not have defended the same Rufinus even when accused of manifest embezzlement?
§12.1.44multa dici possunt similia, sed vel unum ex iis quodlibet sufficit.
Many similar things can be said, but any single one of them is sufficient.
non enim hoc agimus, ut istud illi, quem formamus, viro saepe sit faciendum; sed ut, si talis coegerit ratio, sit tamen vera finitio, oratorem esse virum bonum dicendi peritum.
For we do not aim at this, that such a thing should often be done by that man whom we are forming; but that, if such a reason should compel him, the definition may nevertheless be true, that an orator is a good man skilled in speaking.
§12.1.45praecipere vero ac discere, quomodo etiam probatione difficilia tractentur, necessarium est.
But indeed, to teach and to learn how even those things that are difficult of proof may be treated is necessary.
nam frequenter etiam optimae causae similes sunt malis, et innocens reus multis veri similibus premitur; quo fit, ut eadem actionis ratione defendendus sit, qua si nocens esset.
For frequently even the best causes are similar to bad ones, and an innocent defendant is hard pressed by many probabilities; whence it happens that he must be defended by the same method of pleading as if he were guilty.
iam innumerabilia sunt bonis causis malisque communia, testes, litterae, suspiciones, opiniones.
Furthermore, there are innumerable things common to good and bad causes: witnesses, documents, suspicions, opinions.
non aliter autem verisimilia quam vera et confirmantur et refelluntur.
And probabilities are confirmed and refuted in no other way than truths.
quapropter, ut res feret, flectetur oratio manente honesta voluntate.
Therefore, as the circumstance shall require, the speech will be bent while the honorable will remains.