§12.1.29quae certe melius persuadebit aliis qui prius persuaserit sibi.
This [speech] will certainly better persuade others, which has first persuaded itself.
prodit enim se, quamlibet custodiatur, simulatio, nec unquam tanta fuerit loquendi facultas, ut non titubet atque haereat, quotiens ab animo verba dissentiunt.
For pretense betrays itself, however well it may be guarded, nor can the faculty of speaking ever be so great that it does not stumble and hesitate whenever words disagree with the mind.
vir autem malus aliud dicat necesse est quam sentit.
But a bad man must of necessity say something other than what he feels.
§12.1.30bonos nunquam honestus sermo deficiet, nunquam rerum optimarum (nam iidem etiam prudentes erunt) inventio; quae etiamsi lenociniis destituta sit, satis tamen natura sua ornatur nec quidquam non diserte, quod honeste, dicitur.
A noble speech will never fail good men, nor will the invention of the best things (for these same men will also be prudent) ever fail them; and even if this [invention] should be devoid of allurements, it is nevertheless sufficiently adorned by its own nature, nor is anything spoken otherwise than eloquently which is spoken nobly.
§12.1.31quare, iuventus, immo omnes aetates, (neque enim rectae voluntati serum est tempus ullum) totis mentibus huc tendamus, in hoc elaboremus; forsan et consummare contingat.
Therefore, youth, indeed all ages (for no time is too late for a right will), let us strive here with all our minds, let us labor in this; perhaps it may also fall to our lot to achieve perfection.
nam si natura non prohibet et esse virum bonum et esse dicendi peritum, cur non aliquis etiam unus utrumque consequi possit? cur autem non se quisque speret fore illum aliquem?
For if nature does not forbid a man both to be good and to be skilled in speaking, why should not even some single individual be able to attain both? And why should not everyone hope that he will be that someone?
§12.1.32ad quod si vires ingenii non suffecerint, tamen ad quem usque modum processerimus, meliores erimus ex utroque.
To which if the strength of talent should not suffice, yet to whatever limit we shall have advanced, we shall be better in respect of both.
hoc certe procul eximatur animo, rerum pulcherrimam eloquentiam cum vitiis mentis posse misceri.
Let this certainly be far removed from the mind, that eloquence, the most beautiful of things, can be mixed with the vices of the mind.
facultas dicendi, si in malos incidit, et ipsa iudicanda est malum; peiores enim illos facit, quibus contigit.
The faculty of speaking, if it falls upon bad men, must itself be judged an evil; for it makes those worse to whom it has happened.
§12.1.33videor mihi audire quosdam (neque enim deerunt unquam, qui diserti esse quam boni malint) illa dicentes: Quid ergo tantum est artis in eloquentia? cur tu de coloribus et difficilium causarum defensione, nonnihil etiam de confessione locutus es, nisi aliquando vis ac facultas dicendi expugnat ipsam veritatem? bonus enim vir non agit nisi bonas causas, eas porro etiam sine doctrina satis per se tuetur veritas ipsa. §12.1.34quibus ego, cum de meo primum opere respondero, etiam pro boni viri officio, si quando eum ad defensionem nocentium ratio duxerit, satisfaciam.
I seem to hear certain people saying (for there will never be wanting those who prefer to be eloquent rather than good): "What then is there of so much art in eloquence? Why have you spoken of colors and the defense of difficult causes, and even not a little of confession, unless sometimes the power and faculty of speaking overcomes truth itself? For a good man does not plead any but good causes, and furthermore, truth itself defends these sufficiently by itself without learning." To whom, when I have first answered concerning my own work, I will also give satisfaction on behalf of the duty of a good man, if ever reason should lead him to the defense of the guilty.
pertractare enim, quomodo aut pro falsis aut etiam pro iniustis aliquando dicatur, non est inutile, vel propter hoc solum, ut ea facilius et deprehendamus et refellamus; quemadmodum remedia melius adhibebit, cui nota quae nocent fuerint.
For to treat thoroughly how one may speak sometimes either for what is false or even for what is unjust is not useless, if only for this reason, that we may both detect and refute those things more easily; just as he will better apply remedies to whom those things which do harm have been known.
§12.1.35neque enim Academici, cum in utramque disserunt partem, non secundum alteram vivunt, nec Carneades ille, qui Romae audiente Censorio Catone non minoribus viribus contra iustitiam dicitur disseruisse quam pridie pro iustitia dixerat, iniustus ipse vir fuit.
For neither do the Academics, when they dispute on both sides, not live according to one of them, nor was the famous Carneades an unjust man himself, who is said to have disputed in Rome in the hearing of Cato the Censor against justice with no less power than he had spoken for justice the day before.
verum et virtus quid sit, adversa ei malitia detegit, et aequitas fit ex iniqui contemplatione manifestior, et plurima contrariis probantur.
But indeed, what virtue is, its opposite malice reveals, and equity becomes more manifest from the contemplation of the inequitable, and very many things are proved by their contraries.
debent ergo oratori sic esse adversariorum nota consilia ut hostium imperatori.
Therefore, the plans of adversaries ought to be known to the orator in the same way as those of enemies to a commander.
§12.1.36verum et illud, quod prima proposition durum videtur, potest adferre ratio, ut vir bonus in defensione causae velit auferre aliquando iudici veritatem.
But reason can also bring about that which at first proposition seems harsh: namely, that a good man, in the defense of a cause, may sometimes wish to take away the truth from the judge.
quod si quis a me proponi mirabitur, (quanquam non est haec mea proprie sententia, sed eorum, quos grauissimos sapientiae magistros aetas vetus credidit) sic iudicet, pleraque esse, quae non tam factis quam causis eorum vel honesta fiant vel turpia.
And if anyone shall wonder that this is proposed by me (although this is not my own proper opinion, but of those whom the ancient age believed to be the gravest masters of wisdom), let him judge thus, that there are many things which become either honorable or base not so much by their acts as by their causes.