§41Chrysippus autem cum et necessitatem inprobaret et nihil vellet sine praepositis causis evenire, causarum genera distinguit, ut et necessitatem effugiat et retineat fatum.
Chrysippus, however, since he both disapproved of necessity and wished nothing to happen without preceding causes, distinguishes the classes of causes, so that he may both escape necessity and retain fate.
"Causarum enim"
, inquit,
"aliae sunt perfectae et principales, aliae adiuvantes et proximae.
"For of causes," he says, "some are perfect and principal, others auxiliary and proximate.
Quam ob rem, cum dicimus omnia fato fieri causis antecedentibus, non hoc intellegi volumus: causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adiuvantibus et proximis"
. Itaque illi rationi, quam paulo ante conclusi, sic occurrit: si omnia fato fiant, sequi illud quidem, ut omnia causis fiant antepositis, verum non principalibus causis et perfectis, sed adiuvantibus et proximis.
Wherefore, when we say that all things happen by fate through antecedent causes, we do not wish this to be understood as: by perfect and principal causes, but by auxiliary and proximate causes." Therefore, he meets that argument which I concluded a little while ago in this way: if all things happen by fate, it indeed follows that all things happen by antecedent causes, but not by principal and perfect causes, but by auxiliary and proximate ones.
Quae si ipsae non sunt in nostra potestate, non sequitur, ut ne adpetitus quidem sit in nostra potestate.
Even if these themselves are not in our power, it does not follow that not even appetite is in our power.
At hoc sequeretur, si omnia perfectis et principalibus causis fieri diceremus, ut, cum eae causae non essent in nostra potestate, ne ille quidem esset in nostra potestate.
But this would follow, if we said that all things happen by perfect and principal causes, so that, since those causes were not in our power, not even that (appetite) would be in our power.
§42Quam ob rem, qui ita fatum introducunt, ut necessitatem adiungant, in eos valebit illa conclusio; qui autem causas antecedentis non dicent perfectas neque principalis, in eos nihil valebit.
Therefore, against those who introduce fate in such a way as to adjoin necessity, that conclusion will hold; but against those who do not call the antecedent causes perfect or principal, it will not hold at all.
Quod enim dicantur adsensiones fieri causis antepositis, id quale sit, facile a se explicari putat.
For as to the statement that assents are brought about by antecedent causes, he thinks that what kind of thing that is can be easily explained by him.
Nam quamquam adsensio non possit fieri nisi commota viso, tamen, cum id visum proximam causam habeat, non principalem, hanc habet rationem, ut Chrysippus vult, quam dudum diximus, non ut illa quidem fieri possit nulla vi extrinsecus excitata (necesse est enim adsensionem viso commoveri), sed revertitur ad cylindrum et ad turbinem suum, quae moveri incipere nisi pulsa non possunt.
For although assent cannot occur unless stimulated by a presentation, yet, since that presentation has a proximate, not a principal cause, it has this character, as Chrysippus wishes, which we spoke of just now; not indeed that it can occur without any force excited from without (for it is necessary that assent be stimulated by a presentation), but he returns to his cylinder and spinning top, which cannot begin to move unless struck.
Id autem cum accidit, suapte natura, quod superest, et cylindrum volvi et versari turbinem putat.
But when that has happened, he thinks that for the rest, by their own nature, the cylinder rolls and the top spins.
§43'Ut igitur', inquit,
"qui protrusit cylindrum, dedit ei principium motionis, volubilitatem autem non dedit, sic visum obiectum inprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem, sed adsensio nostra erit in potestate, eaque, quem ad modum in cylindro dictum est, extrinsecus pulsa, quod reliquum est, suapte vi et natura movebitur.
"Just as therefore," he says, "he who pushed the cylinder gave it the beginning of motion, but did not give it its capacity to roll, so the presented object will indeed imprint and as it were stamp its appearance on the mind, but our assent will be in our power, and, as was said in the case of the cylinder, having been struck from without, for the rest it will be moved by its own force and nature.
Quodsi aliqua res efficeretur sine causa antecedente, falsum esset omnia fato fieri; sin omnibus, quaecumque fiunt, veri simile est causam antecedere, quid adferri poterit, cur non omnia fato fieri fatendum sit? modo intellegatur, quae sit causarum distinctio ac dissimilitudo. " §44Haec cum ita sint a Chrysippo explicata, si illi, qui negant adsensiones fato fieri, †fateantur tamen eas non sine viso antecedente fieri, alia ratio est; sed, si concedunt anteire visa, nec tamen fato fieri adsensiones, quod proxima illa et continens causa non moveat adsensionem, vide, ne idem dicant.
But if some thing were brought about without an antecedent cause, it would be false that all things happen by fate; but if it is probable that a cause precedes in all things, whatever happen, what reason can be brought forward why it should not be confessed that all things happen by fate? provided that it is understood what the distinction and dissimilarity of causes is." These things having been thus explained by Chrysippus, if those who deny that assents happen by fate should nevertheless confess that they do not happen without a preceding presentation, it is another matter; but, if they concede that presentations precede, and yet that assents do not happen by fate, because that proximate and immediate cause does not move the assent, see whether they are not saying the same thing.
Neque enim Chrysippus, concedens adsensionis proximam et continentem causam esse in viso positam, eam causam esse ad adsentiendum necessariam concedet, ut, si omnia fato fiant, omnia causis fiant antecedentibus et necessariis; itemque illi, qui ab hoc dissentiunt confitentes non fieri adsensiones sine praecursione visorum, dicent, si omnia fato fierent eius modi, ut nihil fieret nisi praegressione causae, confitendum esse fato fieri omnia; ex quo facile intellectu est, quoniam utrique patefacta atque explicata sententia sua ad eundem exitum veniant, verbis eos, non re dissidere.
For neither will Chrysippus, while conceding that the proximate and immediate cause of assent is placed in the presentation, concede that this cause is necessary for assenting, so that, if all things happen by fate, all things happen by antecedent and necessary causes; and likewise those who disagree with him, while confessing that assents do not happen without the pre-running of presentations, will say that, if all things happened by fate in such a way that nothing happened without the preceding of a cause, it must be confessed that all things happen by fate; from which it is easy to understand that, since both, when their opinion is laid open and explained, come to the same conclusion, they disagree in words, not in reality.
§45Omninoque cum haec sit distinctio, ut quibusdam in rebus vere dici possit, cum hae causae antegressae sint, non esse in nostra potestate, quin illa eveniant, quorum causae fuerint, quibusdam autem in rebus causis antegressis in nostra tamen esse potestate, ut illud aliter eveniat, hanc distinctionem utrique adprobant, sed alteri censent, quibus in rebus, cum causae antecesserint, non sit in nostra potestate, ut aliter illa eveniant, eas fato fieri; quae autem in nostra potestate sint, ab iis fatum abesse
And altogether since this is the distinction—namely, that in some things it can be truly said that when these causes have preceded, it is not in our power that those things whose causes they were should not happen, but in some things, even though causes have preceded, it is nevertheless in our power that the thing should happen otherwise—both approve of this distinction, but the one group thinks that those things in which, when causes have preceded, it is not in our power that they should happen otherwise, happen by fate; while those things which are in our power, from them fate is absent.