§35Ex hoc genere illud est Ennii:
"
Utinám ne in nemore Pélio secúribus
Caesae áccidissent ábiegnae ad terrám trabes!
"
Licuit vel altius:
"Utinam ne in Pelio nata ulla umquam esset arbor!"
etiam supra:
"Utinam ne esset mons ullus Pelius!"
similiterque superiora repetentem regredi infinite licet.
Of this class is that passage of Ennius: "Would that never in the Pelian grove by axes Felled to the ground had the fir-beams fallen! "He might have gone even higher: "Would that no tree had ever grown on Pelion!" and even further above: "Would that there had been no Mount Pelion!" and likewise, one repeating the prior events is allowed to go back infinitely.
"
Neve índe navis ínchoandi exórdium
Coepísset.
"Nor thence of building a ship the first beginning Had started.
"
Quorsum haec praeterita? Quia sequitur illud:
"
Nam númquam era errans méa domo ecferrét pedem,
Medéa, animo aegra, amóre saevo saúcia,
"
†non ut eae res causam adferrent amoris.
"To what purpose are these past events? Because there follows that: "For never would my wandering mistress set foot from her home, Medea, sick in mind, wounded by cruel love, "not that those things brought about the cause of love.
§36Interesse autem aiunt, utrum eius modi quid sit, sine quo effici aliquid non possit, an eius modi, cum quo effici aliquid necesse sit.
But they say that it matters whether something is of such a kind without which something cannot be brought about, or of such a kind with which it is necessary that something be brought about.
Nulla igitur earum est causa, quoniam nulla eam rem sua vi efficit, cuius causa dicitur; nec id, sine quo quippiam non fit, causa est, sed id, quod cum accessit, id, cuius est causa, efficit necessario.
Therefore, none of those is a cause, since none brings about by its own force that thing of which it is said to be the cause; nor is that without which something does not happen a cause, but that which, when it has been added, necessarily brings about that of which it is the cause.
Nondum enim ulcerato serpentis morsu Philocteta quae causa in rerum natura continebatur, fore ut is in insula Lemno linqueretur? post autem causa fuit propior et cum exitu iunctior.
For before Philoctetes was yet ulcerated by the serpent's bite, what cause was contained in the nature of things that he would be left on the island of Lemnos? But afterwards the cause was nearer and more closely joined with the outcome.
§37Ratio igitur eventus aperit causam.
Therefore, the nature of the outcome reveals the cause.
Sed ex aeternitate vera fuit haec enuntiatio:
"Relinquetur in insula Philoctetes"
, nec hoc ex vero in falsum poterat convertere.
But from eternity this statement was true: "Philoctetes will be left on the island", nor could this turn from true to false.
Necesse est enim in rebus contrariis duabus (contraria autem hoc loco ea dico, quorum alterum ait quid, alterum negat), ex iis igitur necesse est invito Epicuro alterum verum esse, alterum falsum, ut
"Sauciabitur Philocteta"
omnibus ante saeculis verum fuit,
"Non sauciabitur"
falsum; nisi forte volumus Epicureorum opinionem sequi, qui tales enuntiationes nec veras nec falsas esse dicunt aut, cum id pudet, illud tamen dicunt, quod est inpudentius, veras esse ex contrariis diiunctiones, sed, quae in his enuntiata essent, eorum neutrum esse verum.
For it is necessary in two contrary things (and by contraries in this place I mean those of which one asserts something, the other denies it), from these, therefore, it is necessary, despite Epicurus, that one be true, the other false, just as "Philoctetes will be wounded" was true in all past ages, "He will not be wounded" was false; unless perchance we wish to follow the opinion of the Epicureans, who say that such statements are neither true nor false, or, when they are ashamed of this, they nevertheless say what is more impudent, that disjunctions from contraries are true, but neither of the things declared in them is true.
§38O admirabilem licentiam et miserabilem inscientiam disserendi! Si enim aliquid in eloquendo nec verum nec falsum est, certe id verum non est;
O admirable license and wretched ignorance of disputing!
quod autem verum non est, qui potest non falsum esse? aut, quod falsum non est, qui potest non verum esse? tenebitur igitur id, quod a Chrysippo defenditur, omnem enuntiationem aut veram aut falsam esse; ratio ipsa coget et ex aeternitate quaedam esse vera, et ea non esse nexa causis aeternis et a fati necessitate esse libera.
For if something in speech is neither true nor false, certainly it is not true; but what is not true, how can it not be false? Or what is not false, how can it not be true? Therefore, that which is defended by Chrysippus will be held, that every statement is either true or false; reason itself will compel both that certain things are true from eternity, and that they are not connected with eternal causes and are free from the necessity of fate.
§39Ac mihi quidem videtur, cum duae sententiae fuissent veterum philosophorum, una eorum, qui censerent omnia ita fato fieri, ut id fatum vim necessitatis adferret, in qua sententia Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Aristoteles fuit, altera eorum, quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animorum motus voluntarii, Chrysippus tamquam arbiter honorarius medium ferire voluisse, sed adplicat se ad eos potius, qui necessitate motus animorum liberatos volunt; dum autem verbis utitur suis, delabitur in eas difficultates, ut necessitatem fati confirmet invitus.
And indeed it seems to me, since there had been two opinions of the ancient philosophers, one of those who thought that all things happen by fate in such a way that this fate brought the force of necessity, in which opinion were Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Aristotle, the other of those to whom the voluntary motions of minds seemed to exist without any fate, that Chrysippus, like an honorary arbitrator, wished to strike a middle path, but he inclines himself rather to those who want the motions of minds freed from necessity; but while he uses his own words, he slips into those difficulties so that he confirms the necessity of fate against his will.
§40Atque hoc, si placet, quale sit videamus in adsensionibus, quas prima oratione tractavi.
And let us see, if you please, of what kind this is in the case of assents, which I treated in the first part of my discourse.
Eas enim veteres illi, quibus omnia fato fieri videbantur, vi effici et necessitate dicebant.
For those ancient philosophers to whom all things seemed to happen by fate said that they (assents) were brought about by force and necessity.
Qui autem ab iis dissentiebant, fato adsensiones liberabant negabantque fato adsensionibus adhibito necessitatem ab his posse removeri, iique ita disserebant:
"Si omnia fato fiunt, omnia fiunt causa antecedente, et, si adpetitus, illa etiam, quae adpetitum sequuntur, ergo etiam adsensiones; at, si causa adpetitus non est sita in nobis, ne ipse quidem adpetitus est in nostra potestate; quod si ita est, ne illa quidem, quae adpetitu efficiuntur, sunt sita in nobis; non sunt igitur neque adsensiones neque actiones in nostra potestate.
But those who disagreed with them freed assents from fate, and denied that if fate were applied to assents, necessity could be removed from them; and they argued thus: "If all things happen by fate, all things happen by an antecedent cause, and, if appetite is such, those things also which follow appetite, therefore also assents; but, if the cause of appetite is not situated in us, not even appetite itself is in our power; but if this is so, not even those things which are brought about by appetite are situated in us; therefore, neither assents nor actions are in our power.
Ex quo efficitur, ut nec laudationes iustae sint nec vituperationes nec honores nec supplicia"
. Quod cum vitiosum sit, probabiliter concludi putant non omnia fato fieri, quaecumque fiant.
From which it results that neither praises are just, nor censures, nor honors, nor punishments." Since this is faulty, they think it is probably concluded that not all things happen by fate, whatever happen.