§15Hoc loco Chrysippus aestuans falli sperat Chaldaeos ceterosque divinos, neque eos usuros esse coniunctionibus, ut ita sua percepta pronuntient:
"Si quis natus est oriente Canicula, is in mari non morietur"
, sed potius ita dicant:
"Non et natus est quis oriente Canicula, et is in mari morietur.
At this point, Chrysippus, in a sweat, hopes that the Chaldeans and other diviners are mistaken, and that they will not use conditional connections to state their grasped principles, as follows: "If anyone was born at the rising of the Dog-star, he will not die in the sea", but rather that they say: "It is not the case both that someone was born at the rising of the Dog-star and that he will die in the sea." What a ludicrous liberty!
"
O licentiam iocularem! ne ipse incidat in Diodorum, docet Chaldaeos, quo pacto eos exponere percepta oporteat.
Lest he himself should fall into the hands of Diodorus, he teaches the Chaldeans in what manner they ought to set forth their grasped principles.
Quaero enim, si Chaldaei ita loquantur, ut negationes infinitarum coniunctionum potius quam infinita conexa ponant, cur idem medici, cur geometrae, cur reliqui facere non possint.
For I ask, if the Chaldeans speak in such a way as to pose negations of indefinite conjunctions rather than indefinite conditionals, why the same cannot be done by physicians, by geometers, and by the rest.
Medicus in primis, quod erit ei perspectum in arte, non ita proponet:
"Si cui venae sic moventur, is habet febrim"
, sed potius illo modo:
"Non et venae sic cui moventur, et is febrim non habet. "
Itemque geometres non ita dicet:
"In sphaera maximi orbes medii inter se dividuntur"
, sed potius illo modo:
"Non et sunt in sphaera maximi orbes, et ii non medii inter se dividuntur. " §16Quid est, quod non possit isto modo ex conexo transferri ad coniunctionum negationem? Et quidem aliis modis easdem res efferre possumus.
A physician, in particular, will not propose what has been observed by him in his art in this way: "If anyone's pulse beats thus, he has a fever", but rather in that other way: "It is not the case both that anyone's pulse beats thus and that he does not have a fever." And likewise a geometer will not say: "In a sphere the greatest circles bisect each other", but rather in that other way: "It is not the case both that there are greatest circles in a sphere, and that they do not bisect each other." What is there that cannot be transferred in this manner from a conditional statement to a negation of conjunctions? And indeed we can express the same things in other ways.
Modo dixi:
"In sphaera maximi orbes medii inter se dividuntur"
; possum dicere:
"Si in sphaera maximi orbes erunt"
, possum dicere:
"Quia in sphaera maximi orbes erunt"
.
Just now I said: "In a sphere the greatest circles bisect each other"; I can say: "If there shall be greatest circles in a sphere", I can say: "Because there shall be greatest circles in a sphere".
Multa genera sunt enuntiandi nec ullum distortius quam hoc, quo Chrysippus sperat Chaldaeos contentos Stoicorum causa fore.
There are many kinds of proposition, and none is more distorted than this one, with which Chrysippus hopes the Chaldeans will be content for the sake of the Stoics.
§17Illorum tamen nemo ita loquitur; maius est enim has contortiones orationis quam signorum ortus obitusque perdiscere.
Yet none of those people speaks in this way; for it is a greater task to learn thoroughly these distortions of speech than the risings and settings of the constellations.
Sed ad illam Diodori contentionem, quam peri\ dunatw=n appellant, revertamur, in qua, quid valeat id, quod fieri possit, anquiritur.
But let us return to that contention of Diodorus which they call "On Possibilities", in which inquiry is made into the meaning of that which can happen.
Placet igitur Diodoro id solum fieri posse, quod aut verum sit aut verum futurum sit.
It is Diodorus' view, then, that only that can happen which either is true or will be true.
Qui locus attingit hanc quaestionem, nihil fieri, quod non necesse fuerit, et, quicquid fieri possit, id aut esse iam aut futurum esse, nec magis commutari ex veris in falsa posse ea, quae futura, quam ea, quae facta sunt; sed in factis inmutabilitatem apparere, in futuris quibusdam, quia non apparet, ne inesse quidem videri, ut in eo, qui mortifero morbo urgeatur, verum sit
"Hic morietur hoc morbo"
, at hoc idem si vere dicatur in eo, in quo vis morbi tanta non appareat, nihilo minus futurum sit.
This topic touches upon the following question: that nothing happens which was not necessary, and whatever can happen is either already the case or will be the case, and that future events can no more be changed from true to false than past events; but that while immutability is apparent in the case of past events, in the case of certain future events, because it is not apparent, it does not even seem to be present, so that in the case of a man who is afflicted with a fatal disease, it is true that "This man will die of this disease", but if this same statement is made truly of a man in whom the force of the disease does not appear so great, it is nonetheless to happen.
Ita fit, ut commutatio ex vero in falsum ne in futuro quidem ulla fieri possit.
Thus it happens that no change from true to false can occur even in the future.
Nam
"Morietur Scipio"
talem vim habet, ut, quamquam de futuro dicitur, tamen ut id non possit convertere in falsum; de homine enim dicitur, cui necesse est mori.
For "Scipio will die" has such force that, although it is said of the future, yet it cannot change into false; for it is said of a man, for whom it is necessary to die.
§18Sic si diceretur:
"Morietur noctu in cubiculo suo vi oppressus Scipio"
, vere diceretur; id enim fore diceretur, quod esset futurum; futurum autem fuisse ex eo, quia factum est, intellegi debet.
So if it were said: "Scipio will die at night in his bedchamber, overpowered by force", it would be said truly; for that would be said to be about to happen which was to be; but that it was to be ought to be understood from the fact that it has happened.
Nec magis erat verum
"Morietur Scipio"
quam
"Morietur illo modo"
, nec magis necesse mori Scipioni quam illo modo mori, nec magis inmutabile ex vero in falsum
"Necatus est Scipio"
quam
"Necabitur Scipio"
; nec, cum haec ita sint, est causa, cur Epicurus fatum extimescat et ab atomis petat praesidium easque de via deducat et uno tempore suscipiat res duas inenodabiles, unam, ut sine causa fiat aliquid, ex quo existet, ut de nihilo quippiam fiat, quod nec ipsi nec cuiquam physico placet, alteram, ut, cum duo individua per inanitatem ferantur, alterum e regione moveatur, alterum declinet.
Nor was "Scipio will die" any more true than "He will die in that manner," nor was it any more necessary for Scipio to die than to die in that manner, nor is "Scipio was killed" any more immutable from true to false than "Scipio will be killed"; nor, since these things are so, is there any reason why Epicurus should dread fate and seek protection from atoms, and lead them out of their path, and at one and the same time undertake two insoluble problems: one, that something happens without a cause, from which it will result that something comes out of nothing, which is pleasing neither to himself nor to any natural philosopher; the other, that when two indivisible bodies are carried through the void, one moves straight down while the other swerves.