§1.36cetera autem etsi nec bona nec mala essent tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat alia naturae esse contraria; his ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat.
But the other things, although they were neither good nor bad, yet he said some were according to nature, others contrary to nature; among these very things he numbered others as intermediate and neutral.
quae autem secundum naturam essent ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione dignanda docebat, contraque contraria; neutra autem in mediis relinquebat, in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti.
Those which were according to nature, he taught, were to be taken and deemed worthy of a certain estimation, and on the contrary, the contrary things; but the neither-of-the-two things he left among the intermediates, in which he placed absolutely no importance.
§1.37sed quae essent sumenda, ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda alia minoris.
But of those which were to be taken, some were to be estimated at more, others at less.
quae pluris ea praeposita appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris.
Those of more value he called preferred, but those of less value, rejected.
Atque ut haec non tam rebus quam vocabulis commutaverat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum officium et contra officium media locabat quaedam, recte facta sola in bonis actionibus ponens, prave id est peccata in malis; officia autem conservata praetermissaque media putabat ut dixi.
And just as he had changed these things not so much in reality as in words, so between a right action and a sin he placed certain intermediate things, a duty and a contrary to duty, placing right actions alone among good actions, and crooked things, that is, sins, among bad ones; but duties, preserved or omitted, he thought to be intermediates, as I have said.
§1.38cumque superiores non omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent sed quasdam virtutes quasi natura aut more perfectas, hic omnis in ratione ponebat.
And while the predecessors said that not all virtue was in reason, but that certain virtues were perfected, as it were, by nature or habit, he placed all of them in reason.
cumque illi ea genera virtutum quae supra dixi seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo modo fieri posse disserebat, nec virtutis usum modo ut superiores sed ipsum habitum per se esse praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adesse quin ea semper uteretur.
And while they thought that those kinds of virtues which I spoke of above could be separated, he argued that this could in no way happen, and that not only the use of virtue, as the predecessors said, but the very disposition itself was glorious through itself, nor yet that virtue was present in anyone without his always using it.
cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non tollerent naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et efferri laetitia dicerent, sed ea contraherent in angustumque deducerent, hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem.
And while they did not remove the perturbation of the mind from human nature, saying that both to feel pain, to desire, to fear, and to be carried away by joy were natural, but contracted them and reduced them to a narrow range, he wished the wise man to be free from all these as if from diseases.
§1.39cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem assentiebatur; nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum matrem esse arbitrabatur immoderatam quandam intemperantiam.
And while the ancients said that these perturbations were natural and devoid of reason, and placed desire in one part of the soul and reason in another, he did not agree with these either; for he thought that perturbations were voluntary and undertaken by the judgment of opinion, and he believed that the mother of all perturbations was a certain immoderate intemperance.
Haec fere de moribus.
These things, then, mostly about morals.
De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum ut in quattuor initiis rerum illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur, non adhiberet; statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam quae quidque gigneret et mentem atque sensus.
¦11 But concerning natures he thought thus: first, that in those four principles of things he did not employ this fifth nature, from which the predecessors thought the senses and mind were made; for he established that fire was the very nature that generated each thing, and the mind and senses.
discrepabat etiam ab isdem, quod nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea quae expers esset corporis, cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant, nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus.
He also differed from the same in that he in no way thought that anything could be effected by that which was devoid of body, of which kind Xenocrates and the predecessors also had said the soul was, nor indeed that either that which effected something or that which was effected could be not a body.
§1.40Plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit.
But he changed most things in that third part of philosophy.
in qua primum de sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille fantasi/an, nos visum appellemus licet, et teramus hoc quidem verbum, erit enim utendum in reliquo sermone saepius— sed ad haec quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus assensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam.
In which first he said certain new things about the senses themselves, which he judged to be joined by a certain, as it were, impulse offered from without, which he called phantasia [fantasi/an], which we may call appearance, and let us wear out this word indeed, for it will have to be used rather often in the remaining discourse—but to these things which appeared and were, as it were, accepted by the senses, he adds the assent of minds, which he wishes to be placed in us and voluntary.
§1.41visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem sed is solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur; id autem visum cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile—feretis haec?' ATT.
"nos vero"
inquit; "quonam enim alio modo katalhmpto\n diceres?"
— “sed cum acceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem is rebus quae manu prenderentur; ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis (nova enim dicebat) usus est.
He did not join belief to all appearances, but only to those which had a certain proper declaration of those things which were seen; and this appearance, when it was perceived by itself, he called comprehensible—will you bear these terms?" Atticus said, "Indeed we will; for in what other way would you say katalēpton [katalhmpto ]?" "But when it was already accepted and approved, he called it comprehension, similar to those things which were grasped by the hand; from which also he had drawn this name, since before no one had used that word in such a matter, and he used very many other new words (for he spoke of new things).
Quod autem erat sensu comprensum id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita erat comprensum ut convelli ratione non posset scientiam, sin aliter inscientiam nominabat; ex qua existebat etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis.
But that which was comprehended by the sense he called sense itself, and if it was so comprehended that it could not be overthrown by reason, he named it knowledge, but if otherwise, ignorance; from which also arose opinion, which was weak and common to the false and the unknown."