§1.29quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi, eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque perfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum quae sunt ei subiectae quasi prudentiam quandam procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris ea quae pertineant ad homines; quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, interdum * * * quasi fatalem et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni, non numquam quidem eandem fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa et necopinata nobis propter obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.
Which force they say is the soul of the world, and that the same is perfect mind and wisdom, which they call god, and, as it were, a certain prudence procuring all things that are subjected to it, especially celestial things, and then on earth those things that pertain to humans; which sometimes they call the same necessity, because nothing can happen otherwise than as has been established by it, sometimes * * * as it were, a fatal and immutable continuation of the eternal order, and sometimes indeed the same fortune, because it effects many unforeseen and unexpected things for us on account of the obscurity and ignorance of causes.
§1.30Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque.
Then the third part of philosophy, which was in reason and in discussion, was treated by both in this way.
Quamquam oriretur a sensibus tamen non esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus.
Although it arose from the senses, yet they held that the judgment of truth was not in the senses.
mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem, solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset (hanc illi i)de/an appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere).
They wished the mind to be the judge of things, and they thought it alone fit to be believed, because it alone perceived that which was always simple and of one kind and such as it was (this they called idea [i)de/an], already so named by Plato, which we can rightly call species).
§1.31sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur nec percipere ullo modo res eas quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quod essent aut ita parvae ut sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et concitatae ut nihil umquam unum esset et constans, ne idem quidem, quia continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia.
But they thought that all senses were dull and slow, and did not perceive in any way those things which seemed subjected to the senses, because they were either so small that they could not fall under the sense, or so mobile and excited that nothing was ever one and constant, not even the same, because all things were continually sliding and flowing.
itaque hanc omnem partem rerum opinabilem appellabant; §1.32scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus.
Therefore, they called this whole part of things opinable; but they thought that knowledge was nowhere except in the notions and reasons of the mind.
qua de causa definitiones rerum probabant et has ad omnia de quibus disceptabatur adhibebant; verborum etiam explicatio probabatur, id est qua de causa quaeque essent ita nominata, quam e)tumologi/an appellabant; post argumentis quibusdam et quasi rerum notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad concludendum id quod explanari volebant.
For which cause they approved definitions of things and applied these to all things about which there was dispute; the explanation of words was also approved, that is, for what cause each thing was so named, which they called etymology [e)tumologi/an]; afterwards they used certain arguments and, as it were, signs of things as guides to prove and to conclude that which they wished to be explained.
in qua tradebatur omnis dialecticae disciplina id est orationis ratione conclusae; huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae.
In which was handed down the whole discipline of dialectic, that is, of speech concluded by reason; to this, as if from the other side, the oratorical force of speaking was applied, the explainer of continuous speech accommodated to persuade.
§1.33Haec forma erat illis prima, a Platone tradita; cuius quas acceperim dissupationes si vultis exponam. '
"Nos vero volumus"
inquam,
"ut pro Attico etiam respondeam. "
"Et recte quidem"
inquit
"respondes; praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum et Academiae veteris auctoritas. "
“Aristoteles igitur primus species quas paulo ante dixi labefactavit, quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, ut in iis quiddam divinum esse diceret.
This form was their first, handed down by Plato; of which what breakups I received, I will set forth if you wish." "Indeed we wish," I said, "so that I may answer also on behalf of Atticus." "And rightly indeed you answer," he said; "for the authority of the Peripatetics and of the Old Academy is excellently explained." "Aristotle, therefore, first shook the species which I spoke of a little before, which Plato had wonderfully embraced, so as to say that there was something divine in them.
Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et ita moratus ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat, vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae; spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere.
But Theophrastus, a man both sweet in speech and so mannered as to bear a certain probity and openness, broke even more vehemently in a way the authority of the old discipline; for he despoiled virtue of its beauty and rendered it weak, because he denied that living happily was placed in it alone.
§1.34Nam Strato eius auditor quamquam fuit acri ingenio tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est; qui cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et in moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis.
For Strato, his hearer, although he was of sharp intellect, yet is to be entirely removed from that discipline; who, when he had left the most necessary part of philosophy, which is placed in virtue and in morals, and had betaken himself entirely to the investigation of nature, in that itself disagreed most from his own.
Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui primi Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et post eos Polemo et Crates unaque Crantor in Academia congregati diligenter ea quae a superioribus acceperant tuebantur.
But Speusippus and Xenocrates, who first had received Plato's system and authority, and after them Polemo and Crates, and together with them Crantor, assembled in the Academy, diligently maintained those things which they had received from their predecessors.
Iam Polemonem audiverant assidue Zeno et Arcesilas.
Already Zeno and Arcesilas had constantly heard Polemo.
§1.35sed Zeno, cum Arcesilam anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter dissereret et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam.
But Zeno, since he preceded Arcesilas in age and disputed very subtly and was moved very acutely, attempted to correct the discipline.
eam quoque si videtur correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus. ”
"Mihi vero"
inquam
"videtur, quod vides idem significare Pomponium. "
'Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat qui ut Theophrastus nervos virtutis inciderit, sed contra qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis idque appellaret honestum quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum.
That correction also, if it seems good, I will explain, just as Antiochus was accustomed." "To me indeed," I said, "it seems good, as you see Pomponius signifies the same." "Zeno, therefore, was in no way one who, like Theophrastus, would cut the sinews of virtue, but on the contrary, one who would place all things that pertained to a happy life in virtue alone, and would not number anything else among goods, and would call that honestum which was a certain simple and sole and one good."