§1.18Quae quidem erat primo duobus ut dixi nominibus una; nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem Academiam differebat.
This philosophy, as I said, was at first indeed one under two names; for there was no difference between the Peripatetics and that Old Academy.
abundantia quadam ingenii praestabat, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio.
Aristotle, as it seems to me at least, excelled in a certain abundance of genius, but both had the same source and the same division of things to be sought and avoided.
Sed quid ago' inquit
"aut sumne sanus qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi non sus Minervam ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. "
Tum Atticus
"Tu vero"
inquit
"perge Varro; valde enim amo nostra atque nostros, meque ista delectant cum Latine dicuntur et isto modo. "
"Quid me"
inquam
"putas, qui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro me exhibiturum. " §1.19"Pergamus igitur"
inquit, 'quoniam placet.
"But what am I doing," he said, "or am I sane in teaching you these things? For even if it is not a pig [teaching] Minerva, as they say, still whoever teaches Minerva does so foolishly." Then Atticus said: "Indeed, Varro, go on; for I dearly love our things and our people, and those matters delight me when they are spoken in Latin and in that manner of yours." "What do you think of me," I said, "who have already professed that I will present philosophy to our people?" "Let us go on then," he said, "since it is pleasing.
Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex, una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum quid falsum quid rectum in oratione pravumve quid consentiens quid repugnet iudicando.
There was therefore already accepted from Plato a threefold system of philosophizing: one concerning life and morals, the second concerning nature and hidden things, the third concerning disputation and judging what is true, what is false, what is right or wrong in speech, and what is consistent or contradictory.
Ac primum illam partem bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parendum esse dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum bonum quo omnia referrentur, constituebantque extremum esse rerum expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et corpore et vita.
And first, they sought that part concerning living well from nature, and said that it must be obeyed, and that the supreme good to which all things are referred must be sought in nothing other than in nature; and they established that the ultimate of things to be sought and the end of goods was to have attained all things according to nature, both in soul, body, and life.
corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto alia in partibus, valetudinem vires pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus celeritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam vocum impressionem;
Of the body, moreover, they placed some goods in the whole, others in its parts: health, strength, and beauty in the whole; but in the parts, sound senses and a certain excellence of individual parts, as speed in the feet, power in the hands, clarity in the voice, and even in the tongue a distinct pronunciation of words.
§1.20animi autem quae essent ad comprehendendam ingeniis virtutem idonea, eaque ab his in naturam et mores dividebantur.
Of the soul, on the other hand, they placed those goods which were fit for comprehending virtue by one's talents, and these were divided by them into nature and morals.
naturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant, quorum utrumque mentis esset proprium et ingenii; morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi consuetudinem, quam partim assiduitate exercitationis partim ratione formabant, in quibus erat ipsa philosophia; in qua quod inchoatum est neque absolutum progressio quaedam ad virtutem appellatur, quod autem absolutum, id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae omniumque rerum quas in animis ponunt una res optima.
To nature they gave quickness in learning and memory, both of which belong to the mind and genius; but of morals they thought the pursuits and a sort of habit belonged, which they formed partly by constant exercise and partly by reason, in which was philosophy itself; in which that which is begun and not completed is called a certain progress toward virtue, but that which is completed, that is, virtue, is a sort of perfection of nature and the single best thing among all those which they place in the soul.
§1.21ergo haec animorum; vitae autem (id enim erat tertium) adiuncta esse dicebant quae ad virtutis usum valerent.
Therefore, these are the goods of the soul; but of life (for that was the third part), they said those things were attached which have power for the practice of virtue.
Iam virtus in animi bonis et in corporis cernitur et in quibusdam quae non tam naturae quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt.
Now virtue is discerned both in the goods of the soul, in those of the body, and in certain things which are attached not so much to nature as to a happy life.
hominem enim esse censebant quasi partem quandam civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum hominibus humana quadam societate.
For they held that man is a sort of part of the state and of the entire human race, and that he is bound together with other men by a certain human society.
ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono sic agunt; cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum aut tenendum, ut divitias ut opes ut gloriam ut gratiam.
And concerning the supreme and natural good, they act in this way; but they think the other things (such as riches, power, glory, and influence) pertain to it, either to increase it or to preserve it.
Ita tripertita ab his inducitur ratio bonorum, §1.22atque haec illa sunt tria genera quae putant plerique Peripateticos dicere.
Thus a threefold system of goods is introduced by them, and these are those three kinds of goods which most people think the Peripatetics speak of.
id quidem non falso; est enim haec partitio illorum; illud imprudenter, si alios esse Academicos qui tum appellarentur alios Peripateticos arbitrantur.
That indeed is not falsely thought, for this division belongs to them; but it is thought imprudently if they think that those who were then called Academics were different from the Peripatetics.
communis haec ratio, et utrisque hic bonorum finis videbatur, adipisci quae essent prima in natura quaeque ipsa per sese expetenda aut omnia aut maxima; ea sunt autem maxima, quae in ipso animo atque in ipsa virtute versantur.
This system was common, and the end of goods seemed to both to be to attain those things which were primary in nature and to be sought for their own sake, either all or the greatest of them; and the greatest are those which are turned toward the soul itself and toward virtue itself.
itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia sensit in una virtute esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam nisi adiungerentur etiam corporis et cetera quae supra dicta sunt ad virtutis usum idonea.
Therefore, all that ancient philosophy perceived that the happy life is placed in virtue alone, yet not the happiest unless the goods of the body and the other things mentioned above, fit for the practice of virtue, were also added.
§1.23Ex hac descriptione agendi quoque aliquid in vita et officii ipsius initium reperiebatur, quod erat in conservatione sui et in appetitione earum rerum quas natura praescriberet.
From this description was also found the beginning of acting in life and of duty itself, which consisted in the preservation of oneself and in the desire for those things which nature prescribes.
hinc gignebatur fuga desidiae voluptatumque contemptio, ex quo laborum dolorumque susceptio multorum magnorumque recti honestique causa et earum rerum quae erant congruentes cum praescriptione naturae; unde et amicitia exsistebat et iustitia atque aequitas, eaeque et voluptatibus et multis vitae commodis anteponebantur.
Hence was born the avoidance of idleness and the contempt of pleasures, from which came the undertaking of many and great labors and pains for the sake of the right and the honorable, and of those things which were consistent with the prescription of nature; whence also friendship, justice, and equity arose, and these were preferred both to pleasures and to many conveniences of life.
Haec quidem fuit apud eos morum institutio et eius partis quam primam posui forma atque descriptio.
This indeed was among them the institution of morals, and the form and description of that part which I placed first.